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To tax the sum invested, and afterwards to tax also the proceeds of the
investment, is to tax the same portion of the contributor's means twice
over. The principal and the interest cannot both together form part of his
resources; they are the same portion twice counted; if he has the interest,
it is because he abstains from using the principal; if he spends the
principal, he does not receive the interest. Yet, because he can do either
of the two, he is taxed as if he could do both, and could have the benefit
of the saving and that of the spending, concurrently with one another.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Loomings
Perhaps we should blame it all on Mill. A great deal and possibly
all of the mind-numbing complexity of America's largest and least
popular tax follows from the decision to have a progressive personal
income tax.2 Proponents wanted an individual income tax
notwithstanding - indeed, in large part because of - such a tax's

1. JOHN STUART MILL, 5 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. ch. II,§ 4, at 179-80
(Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1848).
2. See EDWARD]. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT. at 1 (2002) [hereinafter MCCAFFERY,
FAIR NOT FLAT] ("[O]ur tax system is a disgrace . . . . complicated. inefficient, and unfair.'"):
Greg M. Shaw & Stephanie L. Reinhart. The Polls - Trends: Devolution and Confidence in
Government, 65 PUB. OPINION Q. 369. 382 (2001) (poll results from 1999 showing that a
plurality chose the "federal income tax" as the "worst tax, that is, the least fair'').
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"double taxation" of savings. This double-tax argument is an analytic
point generally attributed to Mill's classic 1848 treatise, Principles of
Political Economy.3 Historically, much of the support for the Sixteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1913, came from Southern and Midwestern,
progressive, agricultural interests, who wanted, in general, to
implement a redistributive tax and, in particular, to collect some tax
from East Coast financiers.4 After all, the Supreme Court had ruled
that the income tax of the late nineteenth century was unconstitutional
only insofar as it fell on the fruits of capital; no constitutional
amendment would have been necessary to retain or implement a
national wage or sales tax.5 The legal raison d 'etre of the income tax
was to get at such returns to savings as dividends and interest.
To this day, liberals and moderates insist on retaining the structure
of an income tax precisely because it gets at the returns to saving in
addition to labor earnings.6 Consumption taxes of all sorts are set in
contrast to the income tax, on another side of a great divide, as taxes
that fail to get at the yield to capital - that deliberately avoid Mill's
"second" tax.7 Prominent commentators on the case for consumption

3. MILL, supra note 1.
4. For some among several good sources of the political history, see SHELDON D.
POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY 45-53 (1996); ROBERT STANLEY,
DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(1993); and Steven A. Bank, The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2238 (2003) (reviewing EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: How TO MAKE THE TAX
SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002)). See also KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND
DEMOCRACY (2002). Another and somewhat related reason to go with an individual income
tax was the failure to think through the possibilities of a progressive consumption tax; this
failure of imagination was understandable, given the relatively low dollar stakes involved,
and the Jack of both theory and real-world experience pertaining to large comprehensive tax
systems. See STEVEN WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS (2002); Erik M. Jensen, The
Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes, " 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1057 (2001 ).
5. See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), modified by 158 U.S.
601 (1895).

6. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX
(1997); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE (2002); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth
Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996); Michael
J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 1 12 YALE
L.J. 261 (2002); see also BILL BRADLEY, THE FAIR TAX (1984).
7. See, e.g. , Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax
Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 17 (1996) ("Both bases include consumption; the difference is that
an income tax also includes changes in wealth, or savings. Whether or not it is appropriate or
desirable to tax savings has been at the core of the debate."); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and
the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 961 (1992) ("Under a plausible set of
assumptions, the two forms of consumption tax - a tax on consumption only and a tax on
wages only - impose an equivalent tax burden in present value terms."). David A.
Weisbach & Joseph Bankman, The Superiority of a Consumption Tax Over an Income Tax
(draft on file with author) ("The only difference between an income tax and a consumption
tax and hence the only issue governing the choice between the two tax systems is the
taxation of the riskless return to savings."). A particularly clear statement of the traditional
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taxation - both those in favor and those opposed - continue to cite,
as the "best" or "most sophisticated" argument for adopting a
consumption-based tax, the analytic facts that consumption taxes do
not overly burden capital or its yield, and as such do not distort the
savings-consumption decision, or, equivalently, do not favor present
over deferred consumption.8 The literature for and against
consumption taxation is strewn with stock "horizontal equity" models,
comparing savers and spenders, Ants and Grasshoppers: the idea is
that income taxes punish savers, like the mythical Ant, vis-a-vis
spenders like her friend Grasshopper.9 On the other side of the great
divide, supporters of redistributive taxation argue that retaining an
income tax base is a central task of maintaining or obtaining fairness
in tax in large part because it, alone, gets at the return to capital, the
nearly exclusive province of the economically fortunate. 10
The idea that income taxes and only income taxes effectively get at
the yield to capital, and, as explained further below, that consumption
taxes of either of two broad types, prepaid and postpaid, do not,
constitutes the traditional view of tax.11 The traditional view has

view comes from the recent philosophical tract by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel: "This
equivalence allows us to say, furthermore, that any consumption tax scheme, in taxing not
accretions to wealth as such, but rather only consumption, exempts from taxation normal
returns to investment." MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 101; see also JOEL SLEMROD &
JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 231-34 (2d ed. 2000). Of course, most of these fine
scholars note the assumption of flat, constant, or proportionate rates. See, e.g., Fried, supra
note 7, at 961 n.2. A way to understand the present Article is that it takes seriously the idea
of nonconstant tax rates, and attempts to build a normative theory around them, taking the
tax rates themselves as the prior, foundational commitment of tax. This proposed
rearrangement in the political epistemology of tax is a central theme of this Article.
8. See, e.g. , William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Income Tax]; see also
DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM (2d ed. 1984); Fried, supra note 7, at 963; Mark Kelman, Time Preference and Tax
Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Joel B. Slernrod & William G. Gale, Overview, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 1, 30-32 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001); c. EUGENE STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 10 (2004). For deep critiques of the horizontal equity
norm, see Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy
Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1155
("Horizontal equity is, perhaps, the most widespread norm underlying traditional tax policy
analysis. It is also the least helpful. [It] cannot provide the answer to [any] . . . important tax
policy question."); and Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of Principle, 42
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Bank, supra note 4 at 2256-58.
11. At least the "traditional view" as referred to within the mainstream of legal
academic discourse, and in the law school classroom. The economics profession has typically
had a more sophisticated, nuanced perspective. See, e.g. , William M. Gentry & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 1 1
TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Gentry & Hubbard, Distributional Implications];
Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994);
Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT'L TAX
J. 789 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking]. Even the economics
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extended well beyond the academy to influence the popular
understanding of tax and its possibilities, as well as practical political
decisionmaking. This traditional view has generated an impoverished
choice set for tax, consisting of a badly flawed status quo on the one
hand and a flat consumption tax of some sort on the other. Under the
guiding light of the traditional view, we are heading ever closer
towards a flat wage tax.
The traditional view is wrong.
This Article sets out a new understanding of tax. The key insight is
that the canonical understanding of consumption taxes changes under
consistently progressive tax rates.12 No longer are prepaid and
postpaid consumption taxes - taxes on wages and spending,
respectively - equivalent. Postpaid consumption taxes can and do
burden the yield to capital, and not in an arbitrary, random way. Far
from it: A progressive postpaid consumption tax emerges as the fairest
and least arbitrary of all comprehensive tax systems, precisely because
it chooses to make its decisions about the appropriate level of
progressivity at the right time. In doing so, it burdens some but not all
uses of capital and its yield, and for normatively attractive reasons.
These points follow from a simple statement of the analytics of tax.
This then raises an obvious question from the start: Why has the
traditional view persisted for so long, virtually unchallenged? It is true
enough that an ideal income tax including all sources of income both labor earnings, or the yield to human capital, and savings, or the
yield to financial capital - is a "double tax" on savings that burdens

literature, however, refers to the prevalence of the standard view, see, e.g., Gentry &
Hubbard, supra, at 5 n. 4 (referring back to Mill), and also typically suffers some limitations
in its analysis and recommendations on account of the continued prevalence of this view.
12. A word on terminology is in order. What matters for most purposes for claims of
justice is progressive average or (equivalently) effective tax rates, wherein taxes as a percent
of total income (or consumption. or wealth, or whatever the base might be), rise in that base.
See A. 8. ATKINSON, PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN ACTION: THE BASIC INCOME/FLAT TAX
PROPOSAL (1995); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith. Is the Debate Between an Income
Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377
(1992) [hereinafter Bankman & Griffith, Debate]; Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1905 (1987) [hereinafter Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare]; Marcus Berliant & Paul
Rothstein, Possibility, Impossibility, and History in the Origins of the Marriage Tax, 56
NAT'L TAX J. 303 (2003); James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971); MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra
note 2, at 78-87. The United States tax system relies, and has always relied, on progressive
marginal tax rates. This is one but not the only means to progressive average taxation; a
better way, per the optimal tax tradition, is to rely on relatively flat, even declining marginal
tax rates, coupled with a "demogrant" or lump-sum transfer to effect progression. See
Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra at 1967; Mirrlees, supra; Joel Slemrod, Optimal
Tax and Optimal Tax Systems, 41. ECON. PERSP. 157 (1990). For the most part, this Article,
following traditional tax policy discussions. shall conflate progressive marginal and effective
taxation; later it shall comment on how the new understanding of tax ought to change the
analysis of progressivity, too.
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savers relative to spenders. This is accurate both within the income
tax's own framework, in which savers are treated more harshly than
spenders, and also compared to a hypothetical no-tax world, with the
income tax destroying the pretax financial equivalence between
present and deferred consumption.13 It is also analytically correct that
a prepaid, yield-exempt, or (all equivalently) wage tax categorically
exempts the yield to savings, preserving the relation whereby savers
and spenders under normal circumstances have equal material
resources in present value terms. But under progressive tax rates, a
postpaid, cash-flow, or (all equivalently) spending tax is not equivalent
to a yield-exempt or wage tax; that is, it is not equivalent to an
"income" tax with a zero rate of taxation on savings, which is itself a
semantic paradox.14 This is a point that the traditional tax-policy
literature has sometimes stated, but only in a passing manner.15

13. Alvin C. Warren, Jr . Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 933-36 ( 1975).
,

14. William A. Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 n.2 (1977)
("The choice between income and expenditure can be regarded as a timing question because
an expenditure base can be thought of as income minus a deduction for savings, and a
deduction for savings can in tum be regarded as a deferral of tax on the income set aside as
savings. . . . The choice [of income or consumption taxation] can also, and for some purposes
more usefully, be thought of as a zero tax rate on the income from invested savings. "
(citations omitted)).
15. An especially good statement of the qualification in the traditional view comes from
Anne Alstott, in her response to some of my earlier work. See Alstott, supra note 6. Alstott
first sets out the traditional view, stating:
The defining characteristic of a consumption tax is that it removes from the tax base income
that is saved or invested (for example, in financial instruments like stocks or bonds or in real
investments like plant or equipment). A consumption tax, by definition, taxes only income
spent on current, personal consumption (for example, on cars, food and travel). By deferring
tax on saved income until the money is spent, a proportional consumption tax essentially
exempts the earnings on investment from taxation. A progressive consumption tax of the
kind Professor McCaffery advocates would offer significant tax benefits to savers while
penalizing those with high levels of consumption spending.

Id. at 364-65 (footnote omitted). Professor Alstott adds a footnote explaining (in more detail
than typical of the literature) the relevance of rates:
A proportional consumption tax exempts from tax the income from savings. ... This familiar
"yield exemption " result holds only if tax rates are constant, however, and under a
progressive consumption tax, the exclusion may save tax at a rate that is higher or lower than
the subsequent tax rate paid on consumption. . . . In general, the tax rate on investment
income will be positive where the saver faces a lower marginal tax rate than the consumer,
negative where the saver faces a higher marginal tax rate than the consumer and zero where
the two marginal rates are equal.

Id. at 365 n. 11. For a related point, see Slemrod, supra note 12, at 159. See also Eric
Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 349-50 (2000).
Professor Alstott wrote these thoroughly correct analytic words on the occasion of a
symposium on some of my earlier articles, after considering my own reply to criticisms, part
of which follows:
Professor Alstott likes income taxes because they capture the yield to savings. But so does a
back-ended progressive consumption tax. The equivalence of the yield-exempt and the cash
flow consumption tax models depends on constant marginal rates; as I point out in my
articles, this fact has led many to advocate flat-rate consumption taxes. But a progressive
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On the occasions when scholars have paused to reflect over the
idea that varying progressive rates destroy the equivalence of prepaid
and postpaid consumption taxes, they have taken one of two
subsequent turns.
Some scholars simply note that the interaction of progressive rates
and a postpaid consumption tax is more or less random. They state
that taxes will go up, and hence there will be a "penalty" for savers if
consumption occurs in a higher rate bracket than initial earnings; taxes
will go down, and hence there will be a "subsidy" for savers if
consumption occurs at a lower level than initial earnings.16 This
language of subsidy and penalty is not helpful: It tends to confuse
matters, perhaps because of an innate or intuitive aversion to
nonneutral sounding rules, a belief that neutrality per se is an end.17
More deeply, this first move does not take the analytical
understanding of tax far enough. When savings or the yield to capital
will decrease or increase a taxpayer's burden of taxation under a
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax is not random. The
burden of taxation will decrease when a taxpayer uses capital
transactions (borrowing, saving, investing) to smooth out the pattern
of her lifetime labor earnings, and thereby to consume, in any given
year, at the level of her average annual lifetime labor earnings in
constant dollar terms. The burden will also decrease when capital
transactions result in diminished consumption, again measured against
the average annual labor earnings as the baseline. The burden of
cash flow or (equivalently) back-ended consumption tax consciously hits at wealth that is
spent as it is spent, whether it is taken out of earnings or capital. There is no reason, dictated
by political liberal theory alone, to link flat rates with consumption taxes. A progressive
consumption-without-estate tax is not a consumption tax in the sense that a consumption tax
never taxes the yield to capital. But I do not necessarily care about that, because no part of
my analysis turned on prior definitions.
Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51 TAX L. REV.
615, 630-31 (1996) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter McCaffery, Being the Best]. The present
Article grew out of my continued thinking about the relevance of variable and progressive
rates to the income-versus-consumption debate. Not only did I notice the continued iteration
of the view that consumption taxes do not reach the yield to capital in the popular political
culture and in tax policymaking circles, but I also came to see that my own earlier work was
incomplete in that I had not developed a suitably general theory of how, precisely, varying
rates affected the choice of tax base, and of the normative basis for the argument. In time, I
came to see that the reason for the repetition of the traditional view was having the wrong
argument structure supporting a consistent consumption tax, a theme throughout this
Article. Working on these issues over several years led to the present Article.
16. See, e.g. , Alstott, supra note 6, at 386-87; William D. Andrews, Fairness and the
Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954 (1975)
[hereinafter, Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren]; Warren, supra note 13, at 940-51 .
17. See, e.g. , Edward J. McCaffery & Jon Baron, Framing and Taxation: Normative
Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 679
(2003) (discussing, inter alia, experimental results showing a "neutrality bias"); see also
Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of High-Risk
Activities, 48 TAX. L. REV. 163, 229 (1993) (criticizing naive neutrality norms in tax policy
scholarship).
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taxation will increase when capital transactions are used to finance
enhanced, or greater, consumption than this level. This pattern is not
random, as this Article demonstrates.
Other scholars point out that the potential nonequivalence of the
two consumption taxes leads to an argument for flat or proportionate
consumption tax rates, because they presume - or presume that
consumption tax supporters presume - that the best argument for a
consumption tax is one of preserving the "neutrality" between savers
and spenders, or of avoiding Mill's second tax, or, other times, of
promoting savings on an individual or social aggregate level.18 This
move puts the cart before the horse: it rests the case for consumption
taxation on weak normative foundations. To counter this move, we
need to explore portions of the intellectual history of tax so as to
develop new arguments for old ideas. It turns out that the best
argument for a consumption tax of the right sort is not a simple
horizontal equity argument at all, as this Article develops.
The new understanding of tax embraces three, not two, choices of
comprehensive tax bases.19 A consistent, progressive postpaid
consumption tax stands between an income tax, which double taxes all
savings by including the yield to capital in its base, and a prepaid
consumption or wage tax, which never taxes the yield to capital. A
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax burdens some but
not all of the yield to capital, and does so in a principled way, by
design. There is no need for ad hoc deviations from an analytically
sound understanding of the comprehensive tax ideal to achieve the
result, as there is, for an important example, under the "income" tax
so as to remove the double-tax sting from retirement (or medical or
education-related) savings. A progressive postpaid consumption tax
relatively lightens taxation on the use of capital transactions to move
uneven labor market earnings into even cash flows in constant dollar
terms. But the very same tax falls more heavily on the use of capital
transactions to increase one's lifestyle above this level. There is
nothing arbitrary about this.
This analytic theme of the new understanding of tax opens the way
for a rethinking of the normative grounding of tax. A consistent,
progressive postpaid consumption tax is appealing, in part precisely
because it corresponds with widely held and independently reasonable
ordinary moral intuitions in regard to the taxation of capital and its
18. For a good example, see Warren, supra note 13, at 934-41 (responding to Andrews,
Personal Income Tax, supra note 8). Warren saw clearly that " [t ) he only relevant difference
between a consumption-type personal income tax and a wage tax is thus the disparity that
arises when tax rates are not constant." But he went on to argue, on account of Andrews's
"most sophisticated" argument for consumption taxation, that this fact argued against
progressive rates.
19. See Edward J. McCaffery, Three Views of Tax, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 153
(2005) (hereinafter McCaffery, Three Views].
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yield. To be clear, this is not the only, or even necessarily the best
argument for a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax:
Writing on a blank slate, one might simply cut to the chase and argue
that this tax is the fairest, most efficient, and simplest to administer of
any comprehensive tax plan.20 But history and a considerable amount
of tax-policy scholarship, at least since Mill, have conflated the case
for consumption taxes of any sort with the case against taxing some or
all of the yield to capital. Given that this is where matters stand, it
becomes important to see that, among all the major alternatives, a
progressive postpaid consumption tax best gets at the yield to capital
in just the way that ordinary moral intuitions seem to want to get at
such yield. The most decisive evidence for this claim comes from an
examination of a near century of experience with tax. Looking at tax
policy through the lens of the new understanding of tax, with its three,
not two, types of tax, we can see that the actual income tax is not an
income tax at all because it is inconsistent in its taxation of the yield to
savings. But this inconsistency is not without principle. We can see the
income tax attempting to differentiate between "ordinary" savings
that effectuate smoothing and all else. Coining two further normative
terms, the new understanding refers to the idea that those savings that
are used to even out cash-flows, such as retirement savings, should not
be double taxed as the "ordinary-savings" norm, and refers to the idea
that the yield to capital is an increment of value that ought to bear
some tax as the "yield-to-capital" norm. The uneasy coexistence of
these two norms under the income tax has led to incoherence,
inefficiency, and unfairness. But the two norms, by design, come into
perfect harmony under a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption
tax.
The best argument for a postpaid consumption tax is not,
therefore, about the "horizontal equity" of savers and spenders, or
about the principled nontaxation of the yield to capital. It is not an
argument about the aggregate capital stock, or even about the
importance of savings on individual or national levels: depending on
the choice of tax rates, we can have more, less, or the same amount of
savings under a consumption as under an income tax. Rather, the best
argument for a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax is
that the moment of actual consumption represents the best - namely,
the fairest and most efficient - time to make the decisions about the
appropriate level of taxation, in large part because this allows us to get
to some but not all of the yield to capital: only that yield which
enhances lifestyles, and no other.

20. This is what I have attempted to do in Fair Not Flat. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT
FLAT, supra note 2.
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In all this, I more or less posit that progressivity - getting the
better able-to-pay to pay more, to some degree, than the less able - is
an attractive end for tax. I shall say a few words about this end later.
But for the most part, I presume that we want a progressive,
redistributive tax system.21 Partly, this is a matter of ordinary moral
intuitions and our collective history, as I read them, as well as
independent political and moral theory. But it is also analytic. Under a
flat-rate tax, prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes are indeed
largely equivalent, and neither reaches the yield to capital.22 If we do
not want progressive tax rates, many far simpler alternatives to the
status quo are available; if we do not want to reach the yield to capital,
ever, then we can choose a prepaid or a flat-rate postpaid
consumption tax. I proceed on the assumption that "we" - at least a
good many contemporary citizens and readers - do want
progressivity and some taxation of the yield to capital, and in fact that
these ends are prior to any preference over more particular forms of
taxation. I write to show that a progressive postpaid consumption tax
is the best - indeed, the only practicable - way to obtain these goals.
The new understanding of tax paves the way for extensive tax
reform and opens up an important line of critique on current political
proposals. The real and pressingly practical question for tax is not
whether to have an income or a consumption tax, but what form of
consumption tax to have. The stakes in this battle are clear and
dramatic: the fate of progressivity in tax lies in the balance.
Contemporary conservative leaders have signaled a desire to move tax
towards a prepaid consumption tax. Such a tax, falling exclusively on
wages, jeopardizes America's historic commitment to at least
moderate progression in the distribution of tax burdens. The path
towards maintaining that commitment lies in taxing at the opposite

21. There are, of course, compelling moral and political theoretic arguments for
progressivity. See HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (6th ed. 2002); Andrews, Reply to
Professor Warren, supra note 16; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12; Fried,
supra note 7; STEUERLE, supra note 9. I also largely accept the argument of Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell, tracking the two welfare theorems, that the general legal system should
be evaluated vis-a-vis the goal of welfare maximization or allocative efficiency, leaving the
tax system to redistribute wealth. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAYELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE (2002). But this sensible bifurcation of normative labors puts more
pressure on getting progressivity in tax down right. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan
Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2005);
see also, Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its Absence),
in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE (Edward J. Mccaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., forthcoming
2005). In fact, most Americans support the notion of progressivity and oppose a flat tax.
See Will Lester, Poll: Americans Say Taxes Too Complicated, Associated Press, Apr. 12,
2005, available at http://staging.hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/T/TAXES_AP_IPSOS_
POLL?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2005-04-ll14-49-05 (noting that 57 percent of respondents to AP poll oppose a flat tax regime, while
only 40 percent support it).
22. See infra Part 11.C.
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time,. of ultimate outflow, not inflow - which the postpaid
consumption tax model, alone among major alternatives, does. It is
time to get the fair timing of tax down right.
The rest of this Article makes good on these opening claims.
B.

The Road A head

Reconsidering tax policy more or less from the ground up has its
advantages, for the traditional view has made certain wrong turns
along its· way. Thus, an intellectual history merges with an analytic
discussion of tax to generate a critique of the status quo on the way to
a specific programmatic proposal for normative improvement. Here is
a brief summary of the path through the argument.
Part II sets out the traditional understanding of the income and
both forms of consumption taxes.
Part III begins to translate the analytic facts of tax into a normative
theory. It explores some of the intellectual history of tax to lay the
foundation for a reconceived normative argument structure.
Part IV introduces a new vocabulary and analysis to support the
new understanding of tax. Most importantly, it develops more
formally two norms about the taxation of capital: the yield-to-capital
norm, which holds that the return to capital is an increment of value
that ought to be taxed, and the ordinary-savings norm, which holds
that savings that merely shift labor earnings within a lifetime or
between taxpayers ought not to be excessively burdened. These two
norms are in fatal tension under an income tax; in contrast, a
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax accommodates both
norms by design.
Part V begins to look at and critique contemporary practice by
explaining that, in reality, the so-called income tax is effectively a
prepaid consumption or wage tax.
Part VI continues the examination of tax practice beyond the
income tax. The overall skew of the present system towards wage and
away from capital taxation becomes more dramatic when other taxes
join the mix.
Part VII completes the journey by arguing that the right choice is a
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax. It sets out a better
argument structure for supporting this tax; notes issues of transition,
implementation, and objections to the tax; and points out how the new
understanding of tax underscores some persistent errors in the popular
understanding of tax. The Part, and the Article, concludes by noting
why it all matters.
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IN THEORY: THREE FORMS OF TAX

There are three major choices of broad-based tax systems in ideal
theory: the income tax, and prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes.23
The traditional view of tax has contrasted the income tax with both
forms of consumption tax, which forms it has equated. But the
traditional view has gone awry in overlooking some of the lessons
from the analytics of tax. The new understanding turns on the
uniqueness of each of the three forms of tax. It is worth beginning with
the basics.
A. An Example
A simple numeric example helps to illustrate the more technical
discussion to follow.
Suppose that Ant and Grasshopper each earn $200 in wages, the
tax rate is 50 percent (for simplicity), and the interest rate on savings is
10 percent.
Grasshopper, as is his way, spends all of his available money at
once. Under any tax - income, prepaid or postpaid consumption the government takes its 50 percent cut, or $100, and Grasshopper
consumes the remaining $100. This illustrates an important point: A
good deal of this discussion has no direct impact on most Americans
for the simple reason that they do not save.24 Income is consumption
for those who do not save.25
Ant, in contrast, does save, as is her way. The choice of tax does
matter to her. Suppose Ant saves for two years, at the conclusion of
which she consumes all that she has amassed. How do the three
different taxes treat her?
An income tax reduces Ant's $200 to $100 right away, which she
puts in the bank. Ant earns 10 percent on her savings, or $10, in Year
1, but the income tax taxes this, too - Mill's double tax - taking

23. This is before bringing transaction costs into the story, which push the income tax to
an income-with-realization tax, and generate other types of "hybrid" taxes. Edward J.
McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1 145
(1992) [hereinafter McCaffery, Hybrid]. See discussion in Parts V and VI, infra. Part of the
argument of this Article is that unprincipled "hybrids" can lead to perverse, counter
productive results; the current hybrid income-consumption tax, for an important example,
ends up being a prepaid consumption or wage tax. See infra Part V. A consistent progressive
postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, is mixed in its effects on capital on the individual
level, as I argue throughout, but is not a "hybrid."
24. This is not to say that the subject does not matter indirectly, of course; the savings
and consumption behavior of the wealthy affect the whole society. See Edward J. McCaffery,
Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
UNDERSTANDING OF PROPERTY 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) [hereinafter Mccaffery,
The Right to Waste?].
25. See infra Part 11.B (explaining the Haig-Simons definition of income).
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away $5, leaving her with $105 at the end of Year 1 . In Year 2, this
$105 again earns 10 percent, or $10.50; again the income tax strikes,
taking $5.25; this leaves Ant with $1 10.25 to consume at the end of
Year 2. If the 10 percent interest rate simply compensated Ant for
inflation - if the cost of goods were rising at 10 percent per year Ant would be losing real value, or actual purchasing power, over time
under the income tax: $1 10.25 at the end of two periods of 10 percent
inflation is worth - that is, has the same real purchasing power as $91 at the start of the two periods.26
Consider next the two forms of consumption tax. First, the prepaid
model: Ant is taxed right off the bat under this system, reducing her
$200 to $100. But she is not taxed again: consumption taxes are single
taxes, escaping Mill's double-tax label. The $100 grows by the full 10
percent interest rate, to $1 10, after Year 1. In Year 2, the $ 1 10 grows
another 10 percent, or $11, to $121 , and Ant is left to consume this
much at the end of Year 2. Unlike the case with the income tax, this
end of Year 2 consumption is worth the same as $100 at the start of
Year 1, under a 10 percent inflation rate.
Under the postpaid consumption tax model, Ant can save her
entire $200 because she pays no tax up front. This grows by 10 percent,
or $20, in Year 1, to $220. The $220 grows by another 10 percent, or
$22, to $242, in Year 2. When Ant goes to consume this, the
government collects its 50 percent share, leaving Ant with $121 to
consume. The result is equivalent to that under the prepaid model.
And what Ant has left is more than what is left over under an income
tax. There are no smoke and mirrors here. There are only two critical
assumptions needed to make out the equivalence of prepaid and
postpaid consumption taxes: that the interest and tax rates have stayed
constant in the two periods.27
Table 1 summarizes the example. Grasshopper's consumption at
the start of Year 1, set out in the first column, is constant at $100.
Ant's potential consumption at the end of Year 2, set out in the
middle column, is $110.25 under an income tax and $121 under either
form of consumption tax. The final column converts these values back
into constant initial Year 1 dollars, at a 10 percent discount/interest
rate. This conversion makes clear that, under constant rates, savers
lose real value under a true income tax, whereas a constant-rate
consumption tax is "neutral" as between savers and spenders, present
and deferred consumption.

26. The real purchasing power at the start of the two periods is equal to 110.25/(l+r)' =
110.25/1.21= 91.
27. See infra Part 11.D for further discussion of these assumptions.
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INCOME, PREPAID AND POSTPAID

CONSUMPTION TAXES COMPARED

Tax

Income
Prepaid
Consumption
Postpaid
Consumption

Grasshopper
Year 1
Consumption
$ 1 00
$ 1 00
$ 1 00

Ant
Year2
Consumption
$ 1 1 0.25
$121
$121

Value in
Year 1 $
$91
$ 1 00
$ 1 00

The Ant-Grasshopper example stands at the center of the
traditional view of tax. The income tax is a double tax on value that is
not immediately consumed, which has led many conservatives to
oppose it as an unfair burden on the noble Ant, but liberals to support
it as a necessary means of capturing some of the return to capital - a
benefit that inures almost exclusively to the wealthy. Both forms of
consumption tax get put on the other side of a great divide, as not
reaching the yield to capital. It becomes a matter of either indifference
or administrative convenience which of the two forms is chosen.28
B.

The Income Tax

This and the following sections present the analytics of the income
and consumption taxes more formally than the numeric example of
Ant and Grasshopper. The formal analysis helps to reveal some more
subtle points.
Traditional income tax theory begins, and sometimes ends, with
the Haig-Simons definition of income.29 Simons took many more
words to get the idea across, but his definition is a very simple identity,
stating in essence that:
Income= Consumption+ Savings. [1]

28. Like many elements in the traditional view, Andrews was among the first best
spokespersons for this idea. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 114-19; see
also BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 10; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 221-22.
29. The definition is named after Henry C. Simons and Robert Haig who, along with
several others, derived it independently. Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed.,
1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (photo reprint 1980) (1938) ("Income may be defined as
the algebraic sum of the market value of rights exercised in consumption plus the change in
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question.").
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This is no more and no less than the accounting truth that:
Sources = Uses, [la]

or, even more simply, the truism that:
A ll Income is either spent (Consumption), or not (Savings). [lb]

This is not profound. But simple principles often underlie complex
structures. The Haig-Simons definition of income has been
enormously influential in analyzing tax. An especially common use of
the definition of income has been to show, by rearranging terms, that a
consumption tax does not include savings in its base, while an income
tax does:
Consumption = Income - Savings. [2]

The idea here is simple. Since all you can do with your available
wealth is spend it or not (Equation [lb]), and since what you do not
spend you save - by the semantic definition of "saving" - the
government can come up with any particular taxpayer's consumption
for any given period simply by subtracting savings from income. If you
know two components of an identity relationship involving three
terms, the third can be derived. This leads to the important practical
point that a postpaid consumption tax need not proceed along an
administrative line requiring tallying up precise consumption items;
subtracting savings from income will do the trick perfectly well.
Hence, a postpaid consumption tax is sometimes called a "consumed
income tax," blurring the ideal distinctions, while attempting to mute
opposition to the "consumption" tax label.30 Traditional individual
retirement accounts (IRAs) and qualified pension plans work this
way: as subtractions from (or noninclusions in) what would otherwise
be "income."31 The unsaved portion of income is - by definition consumed.

30. See David A. Hartman, The End of Income Taxes, CHRONICLES, May 2003, at 42;
Laurence Seidman, A Better Way to Tax, PUB. INT., Winter 1994, at 65; Al Ehrbar,
Consumption
Tax, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ConsumptionTax.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) ("A
consumption tax - also known as an expenditures tax, consumed-income tax, or cash-flow
tax - is a tax on what people spend instead of what they earn.").
31. l.R.C. § 408 (traditional IRAs} (2004}; § 401 (qualified pension plans) (2004). In a
qualified pension plan that works on the "defined benefit" model, the employer's
contribution to the employee's plan never enters into the employee's income in the first
place. This is equivalent, of course, to including the value in income and then allowing a
deduction for savings.
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Mill's criticism of the income tax, quoted in the opening epigraph
and discussed in greater detail below, is that any income tax is a
"double" tax on savings. To understand this point analytically,
consider the basic financial equation defining the future value (FV) of
a present value (PV) invested over time (n) at any given interest rate,
( r) :
FV

=

PV (1

+

r). " [3]

This is a simple relation. Recall the case of Ant. She saved the sum of
$100 for two periods at an interest rate of 10 percent, or . 10, per
period. After one period, the $100 grew to (100)(1 + . 10), or $110. In
the second period, this $110, that is (100)(1 + .10), again grew by 10
percent, becoming (100)(1 + .10)(1 + .10) (100)(1 + .10)2 $121. And
so on.
Consider what happens when the government imposes a tax. A tax
takes t away from a taxpayer, leaving her to keep (1 - t). 32 Suppose for
example the tax rate were 30 percent; the government would take this,
leaving the taxpayer with 70 percent of whatever was being taxed. A
fundamental principle of economic "neutrality" is that tax should not
distort the nontax allocation of resources or the relative price system.33
So we would expect, in a "neutral" tax world, as a first cut, that
Equation [3] would become:
=

(1 - t) FV

=

=

(1 - t) PV (1

+

rr [4]

At a 30 percent tax rate, Equation [4] illustrates the fact that a
taxpayer keeps 70 percent of her initial resources. By multiplying each
side of Equation [3] by .7, the equality is maintained.
The problem that Mill identified was that an income tax is not
neutral, because it falls again on the yield to capital, or r(PV) in
Equations [3] and [4] . An income tax looks like the right-hand side of
the equation below:
(J - t) FV > (1 - t) PV (1

+

(1 - t) r) . " [5]

The income tax is not neutral because two minus ts appear on the
right hand side of this equation. The left-hand side of this relation,
32. In these examples, for simplicity, the text uses a single flat-rate tax. But nothing of
any consequence changes if one imagines instead a vector of taxes, as befits the step function
approach to tax rates found in today's income tax. See infra Part IV.C.
33. Don Fullerton & Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson, The Impact of Fundamental Tax
Reform on the Allocation of Resources, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION 401 (Martin Feldstein ed. 1987); Don Fullerton & Diane Lim Rogers,
Neglected Effects on the Uses Side: Even a Uniform Tax Would Change Relative Goods
Prices, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 120 (1997).
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that imposes a single tax on the FV of Equation [3], is no longer equal
to the right-hand side as it had been under the "neutral" tax system
posited in Equation [4]. What is actually left by the income tax - the
right-hand side of Equation [5] - is less than this amount. The "="
sign of Equation [4] must now become a ">" sign. This is what Table 1
had shown, using the canonical Ant-Grasshopper example: Income
taxes hurt savers compared to nonsavers.
C.

Two Forms of Consumption Tax

The same equations just set out also illustrate the broad
equivalence of the two basic forms of consumption taxation. Consider
again Equation [4]:
(1 - t) FV

=

(1 - t) PV (1 + r)." [4]

This equation had set out the "neutral," or one tax, condition: in
order to maintain the equivalence of present and future values for a
given increment of wealth, a single tax ought to be levied on the flow,
however long the underlying wealth persists in the taxpayer's hands.
Now it does not matter, under the commutative principle of
multiplication (which holds that ab = ba), where, or, better put, when,
one levies the consumption tax's single tax. That is:
(1 - t) FV = ((1 - t) P V} (1

+

r)" = {PV (1 + r)" } (1 - t). [6]

The middle form of consumption taxation in Equation [6], where
the minus t is levied up front, is the prepaid or yield-exempt model.34 It
is, in essence, a wage tax, like social security. The single tax is levied
when dollars are first earned - the (1 - t) is applied to the PV - and
never again. One does not pay a "second" social security tax on
dividends and interest; the yield to capital is exempt. The recently
added "Roth" IRAs work this way, and contemporary proposals from
the Bush Administration would move tax policy even more decisively
in this direction.35
The second form of consumption tax, where the minus t is levied
on the back-end, is the postpaid, qualified account, or cash-flow
model. This is how traditional IRAs and qualified pension plans are
taxed under the so-called income tax. More simply, it is like a sales
tax. You do not pay taxes when money is first earned: the (1 - t) lies in
wait to apply to a bigger nominal sum later on down the road. Under

34. See BRADFORD ET. AL., supra note 8, at 31-33.
35. I.RC. § 408A (2004) (Roth IRA); see also John Cassidy, Tax Code, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 6, 2004, at 70 (discussing contemporary proposals from Bush Administration).
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the current income tax, you get a deduction (or noninclusion) for
contributions to an IRA or a pension plan (or for the employer's
contribution thereto). You pay the single tax when the money is
withdrawn, in the case of a pension plan, or actually spent, in the case
of a literal sales tax.
The dramatic insight is that the two taxes are - or can be - the
same, as in the simple Ant-Grasshopper example summarized in Table
1 . Equation [6], relying only on the commutative principle of
multiplication, shows this fact more formally.
D.

Two Conditions of Equivalence

Equation [6], and thus the equivalence of the prepaid and postpaid
consumption taxes - of wage and sales taxes - holds under just two
seemingly innocuous conditions, constant tax rates and constant rates
of return.
1.

Constant Tax Rates

The tax rate, t, must be the same in the two possible periods of
taxation - the period of first labor market earning, and the period of
subsequent (in the case of any savings) consumption. To help make
this clearer, Equation [7] simply restates Equation [6] , showing the
equivalence of the prepaid and postpaid models under the traditional
view, with subscripts on the two t terms:
(1 - t) FV

=

((1 ti) PV} (1 + r) "
-

=

{PV (1 + r) " } (1 t2). [7]
-

This form makes more transparent the mathematical fact, which is
typically assumed, that ti must be equal to t2 in order for the general
equivalence of prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes to hold. In the
Ant-Grasshopper example, the same 50 percent tax must apply at the
start of Year 1 as at the end of Year 2. In the traditional view of tax,
explored here and in Part III, these analytics morph into a norm that
the tax rate should be the same.36 In the new understanding of tax, the
analytics open up the possibilities of and hopes for deliberately
variable progressive rates.

36. Warren pointed out that this should be so if Andrews's "most sophisticated" reason
for preferring consumption taxation were to hold sway. See Warren, supra note 13, at 944-45.
Andrews, in his 1975 response to Warren, protested this point a bit, but eventually the
nuance was lost on the literature. See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at
955.
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Constant Rates of Return

Just as the t in Equation [6] must be constant, so must the r. This
second condition, a more technical one than the first, is that there not
be "windfall" or "inframarginal" returns to capital, disproportionate
to the net amount of capital invested - that the rates of return do not
change between the second and third terms in Equations [6] and [7].37
It may, at first, seem intuitive that a prepaid consumption tax does not
capture a windfall or lucky return in the capital markets at all, and
hence a simpler statement of this second condition - that postpaid
consumption taxes get at windfalls, while prepaid ones do not - is all
that is needed.38 But under a prepaid consumption tax model, there is
less wealth in the taxpayer's hands to invest in the first place. If the
windfall returns shrink proportionate to the reduced private capital
stock occasioned by the tax, there is no technical difference between
the two models, hence the added nuance. Macroeconomic or micro
level individual behavioral changes can alter the equivalence as well.39
A simple numeric example again helps to illustrate these technical
points. Suppose that there are some investments that will yield
staggering (extraordinary) returns - say that they will double one's
money in a year, a 100 percent rate of return. Under a prepaid
consumption tax model, recall that Ant will earn $200, pay $100 in
taxes right away, and have $100 to invest. With the 100 percent rate of
return available, this can grow to $200 in a single year. Under the
postpaid consumption tax model, Ant will have the full $200 to invest
initially and pay tax later. The question raised by this second condition
is simply this: Can Ant's $200 grow to $400? If so - this is a case
where the windfall return possibilities expand with the private capital

37. See Michael J. Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED:
INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 161, 172-75, 238 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); Mccaffery,
Hybrid, supra note 23, at 1151 n.24; Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms
and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990) [hereinafter Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion
Taxation]; Jeff Strnad, Taxation ofIncome from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1023, 1056-61, 1087-88 (1985).
38. Cf STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 241 n.4.
39. See Bankman & Griffith, Debate, supra note 12, at 385-86; Louis Kaplow, Taxation
and Risk Taking, supra note 11; David Weisbach, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L.
REV. (forthcoming 2004); David M. Schizer, Scaling Up and the Taxation of Risky
Investments: Derivatives and the Search for Practical Applications (Northwestern School of
Law, Law & Economics Colloquium Series, Oct. 15, 2003), at http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/Schizer.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2004);
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing (or Not) The Returns to Risk-Bearing (Dec. 17, 2003) (draft on
file with author); Weisbach & Bankman, supra note 7. This literature points out that, with an
ideal income tax with full loss offsets, the only difference between an income tax and a
postpaid consumption tax is that the former includes, whereas the latter does not, the real,
riskless rate of return. Once again, this analysis holds tax rates constant in its models. The
current income tax has limited capital loss offsets. I.RC. § 1211 (2004). For further
discussion see infra Part V.C.1.
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stock - the postpaid tax will collect its 50 percent on withdrawal,
leaving her with $200, just as under the prepaid model with the
supranormal 100 percent return. Or, instead, will Ant's "first" $100 of
savings double, to $200, and her "second" $100 of savings return the
"normal" 10 percent, growing to $110, leaving her with $310 total?
This is the case where the opportunities for windfall returns either go
to the public sector, or are in any event invariant to the net amount of
private capital invested: there was just one lucky opportunity to be
had, for $100, whether Ant had $100 or $200 to invest. If that is the
case, the postpaid tax will collect $155, leaving her with a like amount.
If this latter case occurs then the postpaid consumption tax - but not
the prepaid one - will have captured at least some of the high or
"windfall" returns from the capital markets; Ant will have more value
to consume in the prepaid world.
E.

The Treatment of Debt

How the two forms of the consumption tax and the income tax
treat savings is widely noted and reflected in traditional tax policy
doctrine, now set out in basic tax textbooks.40 There is far less
discussion and hence less understanding of the proper analytic
treatment of debt. This is unfortunate, as a practical matter, because
debt is of enormous consequence both in everyday life and in
understanding the appeal of different tax systems. The failure to get
the tax treatment of debt down right led to an analytic mistake in the
design of the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax, a progressive postpaid
consumption tax that almost became American law.41 The
misunderstanding is also unfortunate, for the proper analytic
understanding of debt is simple enough if one merely considers debt as
a form of negative savings, or dissavings.
An income tax ignores debt under the Haig-Simons definition of
income in Equation [1]. There is no genuine accession to wealth - no
change in one's net worth - when one borrows. The proceeds of debt
will be put to one of the two basic and mutually exclusive uses of
income, or some combination thereof - the money will be spent
(consumed) or not (saved). In any event, the consumption, savings, or
combined consumption and savings is precisely offset by the dissavings
that the debt itself represents, a subtraction of Savings on the right
hand side of Equation [1]. Borrowing is a "wash," as tax lawyers say.

40. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE,
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 67-80 (3d ed. 2004); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 15 (12th ed. 2000); MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2; PAUL
R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4-20 (5th ed. 2004).
41. See LAURENCE SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX (1997). See generally USA Tax Act of
1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995).

828

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 103:807

Consistent with the ignoring of the initial incurring of debt, there is no
general deduction for the repayment of the principal of debt: material
resources are diminished by the payment, but savings or net wealth is
increased by the elimination of the liability, resulting in another
wash.42
A prepaid consumption or wage tax systematically ignores debt.
This is because it only falls on labor earnings. Prepaid consumption
taxes ignore all savings, negative savings included. There is no
deduction for the repayment of principal or interest. One's credit
history is irrelevant to the social security or payroll tax authorities.
A postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, includes debt as a taxable
inflow. Recall Equation [2]:
Consumption = Income - Savings. [2]

A postpaid consumption tax allows a general, unlimited deduction
for positive savings. Borrowing is negative savings. Subtracting a
negative means adding it, so debt comes into the postpaid
consumption tax base in the first instance. Debt that is used to finance
present period savings, however, will come out as a wash: an inclusion
qua negative savings, an exclusion qua positive savings. Debt that is
used to finance consumption, on the other hand, will trigger tax in the
year of consumption: only the negative savings will appear on the
right-hand side. In a later period, repayments of principal and interest
are fully deductible from the consumption tax base. These repayments
do represent positive savings.43

42. The deductibility of interest is a separate and more complicated matter. A case can
be made for deducting all interest under an income tax, because interest payments reflect
neither present period consumption nor savings, but rather the compensation for consuming
or saving in some other time period. See Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be
Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE 195 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988). This was indeed
generally the law prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. l .R.C § 163 (1982) (amended 1986);
but cf l .R.C. § 265 (2004) (limitation on interest deduction on debt used to acquire tax
exempt income). But because the "income" tax is not really an income tax - it looks more
like a prepaid consumption tax (see infra Part V) - an unlimited interest deduction could
literally obliterate the tax. Hence, the current law in regard to the deductibility of interest, as
in many other areas, is rife with uneasy compromises. See l .R C. §§ 163(a) (general rule),
163(d) (limitation of deduction of investment-related interest), 163(h) (limitation on
deduction of personal interest) (2004).
.

.

43. I suspect that much of the misunderstanding of the tax treatment of debt follows
from a failure to understand that zero is simply a number, merely one point on the spectrum
of possible wealth. Moving from a negative net wealth to zero, or from a deeply negative
position to a less deeply negative one, is an accession to wealth. So if a taxpayer is $5,000 in
debt, and she pays off $1,000 of this, she has "saved" by increasing her net worth from
negative $5,000 to negative $4,000. This is not analytically different from saving $1,000 to
increase one's bank account from $4,000 to $5,000. But it seems a fairly durable feature of
most of our thinking about financial matters that strange things happen to our understanding
around zero. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive
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This sounds odd and unfamiliar, but it need not. Consider a
routine sales tax, the most common form of a postpaid consumption
tax. Grasshopper pays sales tax when he purchases an item, even if he
is using borrowed funds to do so, as by putting the purchase on his
credit card. Later when Grasshopper pays off his credit card balance,
including any interest that he may have accumulated by then, he does
not pay another round of sales taxes on the payment. So it would work
under a broad-based, comprehensive postpaid consumption tax.
It may seem as if a postpaid consumption tax is to be disfavored on
this score, but we shall see later that this is not so.44
III. A PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING
The traditional view of tax opposes income to consumption
taxation. A better understanding of tax shows that, under progressive
rates, three distinct forms emerge: income, prepaid consumption, and
postpaid consumption, each with unique positive and normative
properties. This Part has two related goals. One, it canvasses some of
the intellectual history of tax, to better understand where the
traditional view came from and why certain misunderstandings persist.
Two, it begins translating the new, better understanding of the analytic
facts of tax into a normative argument structure; it helps lay the
foundations for moving from an is to an ought, setting the stage for the
new understanding of tax.
A. Means and Ends
A proper normative argument structure for tax - or any other
practical political matter - ought to begin with a clear statement of
the goals to be pursued, setting the ends, at least provisionally, first.45
We can note at the start that the form of tax, per se, is not plausibly
such an end: few ordinary persons have strong preferences for income
versus consumption versus any other particular type of tax, apart from
the effects of such taxes. It is these effects, of course, that matter.
On reflection, the principal end of broad-based, comprehensive tax
systems is to finance the provision of public goods, the central activity
of the modern democratic state, including, possibly, the distribution or

Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994) (hereinafter McCaffery, Cognitive Theory
and Tax).

44. See infra Part IV.D.
45. See Louis Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing Gift and Estate Taxation, in
RETHINKING GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 1 64 (James R. Hines Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2001). I write "provisionally" because subsequent analysis might reveal that the ends are not
obtainable, or stand in some tension with one another, and so must be reconsidered.
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redistribution of income itself, in a fair and efficient manner.46 Fairness
and efficiency are two broad, compelling ends for tax. For the most
part, this Article sets aside efficiency concerns;47 the new
understanding of tax is based on the idea that there are three distinct
types of comprehensive tax systems, with different claims to fairness
- most specifically because of how they affect capital as well as labor
market returns.
On further reflection, fairness is central to tax and not j ust, or
primarily, because of a welfarist argument that efficiency should be
the principal norm of legal rules, while fairness should be left to the
tax and transfer system.48 Rather the reason to have a tax system,
especially an individuated tax system, is to finance the ne·eds of the
state in a fair and just manner. A printing press - or any of a number
of far simpler taxing systems than what we have today - could raise
the finances needed for public goods. In moving to individuated tax
systems such as the broad-based income tax or any of its usual
competitors, society must desire individuated justice.
On still further reflection, this individuated sense of justice must
stem from a desire for some differentiation or progression in the
allocation of tax burdens; from some sense that the better able or
more fortunate should pay more than the less able or less fortunate.49
"Genuinely progressive taxation is necessarily personal taxation," as
Vickrey began his classic 1947 Agenda for Progressive Taxation.50 We
can add that the converse is also compelling: Personal taxation ought

46. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); Lester C.
Thurow, The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good, 85 Q.J. ECON. 327 (1971);
STEUERLE, supra note 9.
47. But see, e.g., analysis of optimal consumption tax theory in note 347 infra.
48. This is the argument of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, first pressed in Why the
Legal System ls Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 667 (1994), see also KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 21. For partial critiques of the
Kaplow-Shavell position, see Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency
Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing
Optimally: Of Tax Rules - Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003).
49. Under a flat percent tax, taxpayers with higher incomes pay more in absolute
dollars, leading to a certain confusion in the understanding of progressivity. See Edward J.
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the
Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
230 (2003) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Humpty Dumpty Blues] (discussing the "metric
effect"). The new understanding of tax aims for a progressive percent tax, that is,
progressivity in effective tax rates.
50. WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 3 (1947). It is simply
not compelling, normatively, as a matter of first-best theory, to impose progressive taxes on
entities, where the ultimate incidence of the tax burden is apt to be uncertain, at best, and
quite possibly regressive relative to individuals, at worst. See infra Part VI.C. But cf Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1 193 (2004) (arguing that corporate income tax is important as a check on
managerial power).
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to be progressive, or at least somehow individuated, based on ability
to pay or benefits received or some such principle. In this regard it is
worth noting that no major policy proposal in the United States at
least has been for a genuinely flat tax - all so-called flat taxes feature
"zero brackets," or other accommodations for family size, and so on.51
Indeed, a persuasive case can be made out under both liberal
egalitarian political theories, such as those of John Rawls, and
utilitarian or welfarist conceptions of justice that, at least given fair
and efficient markets, the tax system is the best or even the only place
to redistribute material resources (or, perhaps better put, to set the
fair initial distribution of such resources}.52
Thus all roads lead to some individuation in tax, which means
some progression.53 This is a compelling end for tax. But questions
follow: On what grounds should we determine each individual's fair
share of the tax burden? In the classic language of tax policy, we look
to levy taxes on individuals based on the benefits they receive from
the state, their ability to pay, or both.54 We can, with Adam Smith,
elide the two principles and finesse the semantics. But in any event,
the new understanding of tax turns on the insight that this question of
what to tax is vitally connected to the question of when to tax. Having
accepted progressivity as an end, we should ask when, in an

51. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 51-53. Note also that progressivity
can come from the expenditure side of fiscal policy. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt,
Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of Personal Income Tax in Developing
Countries, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2005); Edward J. Mccaffery & Jonathan
Baron, The Political Psychology ofRedistribution, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2005).
52. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 278 (1971); Kaplow & Shaven, supra note
48; KAPLOW & SHAYELL, supra note 21. For a good statement of the argument that the tax
system is actually helping to set an appropriate initial normative baseline for ownership or
command over material resources, see MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6.
53. STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 11, writes that "[A]ny general attack on the progressivity
principle, in my view, is almost tantamount to an attack on natural law theory."
54. Adam Smith famously combined the two, reasoning that those who have more
ability to pay are, on that account, more benefited by the very existence of the state: "The
subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of government, as nearly as
possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., The
Modern Library 1937) (1776). The first clause points to "ability to pay." The second clause
conflates this with the benefits-received view, by implying that the revenue enjoyed "under
the protection of the state" is precisely the measure of one's ability to pay. One has the
ability to pay, in other words, precisely because one benefits from the very existence and
structure of society, a point that echoes Amartya Sen's argument that all "individual" wealth
is in fact a joint product of self and society. See AMARTYA KUMNAR SEN, ON ETHICS &
ECONOMICS 28 (1987); see also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992);
STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 14, 31 n.11 (discussing SMITH, supra, at 777).
However we come out on the semantics, note that both "ability to pay" and "benefits
received" are, in traditional tax policy terms, largely vertical equity norms: those with more
ability, and/or those who benefit more from the state, ought to pay more. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 46; MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6.
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individual's flow of funds, is it fair and appropriate to levy progressive
tax rates? In other words, when should we make the social judgments
necessary to and inherent in a system of individuated progressive
taxation?
In short, progressivity in tax burdens is an end, whereas any
particular tax system for achieving progressivity is a means. Our
commitment to the income tax is not foundational. It depends on the
tax as being the best means to the ends we hold. We ought to reverse
the intellectual process, to ask what tax is the best means to the end of
fairness and justice.
B.

The Traditional Logic of Tax

The political and intellectual history of tax have both influenced
and, in tum, been influenced by, the way we have come to think about
tax policy. This bidirectionality in reasoning helps to explain how the
traditional view of tax arose and why it persists.55 This section takes a
look at the usual way of thinking about tax, in a historical context.
Who? What? When? How much? are the questions that lie at the
foundation of all practical tax systems. Each must be answered sooner
or later, actively or by default, to get a tax system in place. How we
answer these questions - and, further, in what order we answer them
- matters a great deal. The new understanding of tax changes the
order of the questions.
It is logical enough to begin with the what question: the
appropriate tax base. Whether we use ability to pay, benefits received,
or both, we want to know on what basis to levy our social judgment.
Hence, much of the intellectual history of tax has been consumed with
asking just this question.56 This has meant, when it comes to broad
based, comprehensive tax systems, the celebrated income-versus
consumption debate at the core of the traditional understanding of
tax. There are important roots of this debate in the writings of Hobbes
and Smith, both of whom came down on the side of consumption
taxes, for rather different reasons.57 Then came Mill and his analytic
55. For a general discussion of bidirectionality in legal reasoning, see Dan Simon, A
Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 5 1 1 (2004).
56. See, e.g. , BABEITE B. BARTON ET AL., TAXATION OF INCOME 1992-1993, at 4
(1992); BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 'I[ 2.1 (2d ed. 1 995); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
(9th ed. 2002); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 7; JOHN K. MCNULTY & DANIEL J.
LATHROPE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 31 (1999).
57. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 386-87 (C. B. MacPherson ed., Pelican Books
1968) (1651).
[T)he equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed than
of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that he which
laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more

March 2005]

A New Understanding of Tax

833

critique of the income tax as a double tax on savings, and the
seemingly concomitant argument for a proportionate consumption
tax. This argument has been enormously influential within the domain
of political theory proper: Rawls has accepted the argument for
consumption taxation (indeed, proportionate consumption taxation),
at least in ideal theory, citing to Nicholas Kaldor,58 and the "ultra
liberal" thinker Roberto Unger has also recently endorsed
consumption taxation as well.59
Practical politics, however, have come down decisively on the
other side of the great divide. Having experimented with income
taxation in the nineteenth century, America made a firm commitment
by ratifying the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 and implementing a
statute within months, all motivated, at least in large part, by a
progressive desire to get at the fruits of capital.(j() Policymakers at the
time rejected a wide range of consumption tax alternatives, in part
because of the fact that consumption typically forms a higher percent
of disposable income for the lower- and middle-income classes than it
does for the upper-income class - in other words, because the rich
save more.61 This led to a "base argument" for income taxation,62

charged than he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets, seeing the one hath
no more protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are
laid upon those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth, nor
is the commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.
Id. Fried, supra note 7, at 962; Warren, supra note 13, at 933-34. SMITH, supra note 54, at
778.
Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be
convenient for the contributor to pay it. . . . Taxes upon such consumable goods as are
articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very
convenient for him. He pays them little by little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he
is at liberty too, either to buy, or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever
suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes.
Id.
58. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 278, noting the common pool argument. Rawls was quick
to add that, in practice, "even steeply progressive income taxes" may be the right answer,
and here he joined with his fellow practical political liberals. Id. at 279. See also NICHOLAS
KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); Kaldor begins his volume with the quotation from
HOBBES, in note 57, supra. See also Mill, supra note 1.
59. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVE 51-52 (1998).
60. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 1093-131. Of course, these arguments against a
consumption tax are based on the traditional view of tax.

61. See POLLACK, supra note 4; STANLEY, supra note 4; Bank, supra note 4; Jensen,
supra note 4; Slemrod, supra note 12. The equivalence of the formulations follows from the
Haig-Simons "definition," or identity, discussed below, that holds, in short, that Income
Consumption + Savings. See infra Part 11.B. The variable Savings is, in other words,
nonconsumption; if a person consumes more, she saves less, if a person saves more, she
consumes less, all as a percent of income, or available resources. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR
NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 14-15.
=

62. See McCaffery, Three Views, supra note 19.
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which predominated early on in the public political thinking about tax,
and lingers to this day. The income base seems to be a means to the
ends of tax justice.
The how much question has been a distant second - in terms of
quantities of ink expended - to the what question, although much
important recent work has been done on point. The reasons for the
historical neglect are not hard to come by: significantly high tax rates
are a distinctly modem creature, not present until the twentieth
century and not widespread until the latter half of that century. Smith
and Mill discussed taxes in the range of 5 to 10 percent.63 The initial
"progressive" income tax of 1913 had featured a top marginal rate,
including a surcharge, of 7 percent, and it had applied to far less than 5
percent of all adult Americans.64 It was thus the very existence of an
income tax - supplemented by a corporate income tax and, later, in
1916, by an estate tax - with its deliberate inclusion of dividends and
interest, that furthered the progressive cause, providing the means to
the end.
Things changed.
World War I radically altered the rate schedule, ratcheting it up,
and World War II transformed the breadth of the tax's application,
expanding it enormously once the practical expedient of wage
withholding was discovered.65 The top marginal rate bracket under the
income tax rose to above 90 percent during World War II, and stayed
at 90 percent throughout the 1950s, until John F. Kennedy cut it - to
70 percent - in 1963. These high tax rates now added to the base as
means to the ends of j ustice in tax. But, meantime, the dramatic
expansions in scale and scope triggered the perceived need for some
previously scarce thought, reflection, and justification: Why did we
have such steep progressivity in tax rates?
Walter Blum and Harry Kalven, writing in full view of extremely
high nominal rates, set the tone for postwar scholarship by sounding a
skeptical note, sketching out the "uneasy case" for progressivity.66
Later, the case was made to seem far less uneasy by the economic
analysis of optimum income taxation most famously made out by the
Nobel Laureate James Mirrlees, and subsequently brought into a wide
tax scholarly readership by Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith the latter pair writing after Ronald Reagan, America's second great
63. SMIIB, supra note 54, at 777, 782; Mill, supra note 1, at 171-73.
64. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 44-46 (1996); JOHN F.
WITTE , THE POLmCS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 78 (1985).

65. BROWNLEE, supra note 64; POLLACK, supra note 4; Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to
Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War
II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686, 697 (1988/89).
66. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
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income-tax-cutting President, had slashed the top marginal rate all the
way down to 28 percent.67 Mirrlees, Bankman and Griffith, and the
wider welfarist or utilitarian turn in law-and-economics theory lent a
strong hand to the arguments for progressivity in tax. Given any form
of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, social welfare could improve,
under specified conditions, by taking proportionately more from those
who have proportionately more material resources.68 Further, the
theory of optimal income tax gave prescriptive advice for how to
effectuate progressivity in tax, without relying excessively - and
perhaps counterproductively - on steep marginal tax rates.69 Such
rates are only a means to the end of redistribution.70 The optimal
income tax movement attempted to reground analysis of the tax rate
structure in the compelling framework of ends, equity and efficiency.
What is most important at this stage of the story is that the rate
questions historically followed the base ones. Because high rates and a
broadened base arose in the shadows of the actual income tax, which
itself had followed from a simple conception of the income-versus
consumption debate, the traditional view of tax infused the
understanding of the effects of tax rates. Since it was by now assumed
that a consumption tax base was more inherently regressive than an
income tax base - the base argument - a "rate argument" seemed to
follow naturally enough.71 If consumption taxes are regressive, a
progressive consumption tax must be doubly so. More sophisticated
scholars fell into a subtler trap. If the reason for a consumption tax
was to exempt the yield to capital, as the traditional conception of the
income-versus-consumption debate would have it be, then the rate
structure of any consumption tax was constrained. And so a rate
argument joined with the base argument to favor an income tax in the
service of progressivity or liberal egalitarianism.
67. See Mirrlees, supra note 12; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12; see
also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). See also VICKREY, supra note 50.
Mirrlees and Vickrey won the 1 996 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in large part for their
work on tax. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges
Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for
1996 (Oct. 8, 1996) at http:www.se/economics/laureates/1996/press.html (noting their
contributions to optimal taxation theory).
68. KAPLOW & SHAYELL, supra note 21; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra
note 12.
69. See Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12; Berliant & Rothstein, supra
note 12; Mirrlees, supra note 12. The important distinction between marginal and average,
or (equivalently) effective, tax rates shall factor into the new understanding of tax. A flat
percent tax combined with a lump sum tax effectuates progressivity in average, or effective,
tax rates. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 79-85, for a simple illustration.
70. See Mirrlees, supra note 12. Part of Mirrlees's brilliance was to show convincingly
how progressivity in effective rates could be obtained without progressivity in marginal ones.
71. See McCaffery, Three Views, supra note 19.
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The what and how much questions, asked in that order, have
dominated discussions of tax policy, inside and outside the academy.
The relative neglect of the who question has been unfortunate, for
deep issues of justice lie buried in both the seemingly arcane questions
of attribution, that is, of the appropriate taxable unit, and of the
equally arcane questions of incidence, that is, of who really, ultimately,
bears the burden of various alternative taxes.72 If the central aim of tax
as an instrument of social justice is to get citizens to share in the
burdens of their society in proportion to something - their ability to
pay, their benefits received, or some combination thereof - it matters
critically who is in fact bearing the burden of any particular tax.
This then leaves the when question. It is hardly the case that
matters of time and tax have been understudied.73 But the questions of
time have been framed by the seemingly prior and foundational what,
or tax base, question. There have been two large and persistent
themes.
First, principles of timing have been used to help inform the
fundamental tax base debate, that is, to illustrate the difference
between income and consumption taxes. Under the traditional view,
timing principles have been used to show the equivalence of prepaid
and postpaid consumption taxes in present value terms, and the
differences between an income and any consumption tax.74 There are
only differences over time, after all - savings, which is analytically
identical to nonconsumption, only exists in what an economist would
call a "two period model."75 The initial mapping between an income
tax as a double tax on savings, on the one hand, and both forms of
consumption tax as involving no effective taxation of the yield to
savings, on the other, was made out in simple, partial-equilibrium
models. Since then, more sophisticated financial analysis has suggested
that some but not all of the yield to capital is taxed under a postpaid,
but not a prepaid, consumption tax - the "supranormal" or
0

72. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997) (hereinafter MCCAFFERY ,
TAXING WOMEN]; Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1972); Edward J. McCaffery,
Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (1996).
73. See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money '',
95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for
Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1 1 1 1 (1986); David Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary
Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967). See generally
Cunningham, supra note 7; Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral,
88 MICH L. REV. 722 (1990): Kelman. supra note 8: Klein. supra note 14: Reed Shuldiner, A
General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243 (1992);
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37.
74. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
75. See Strnad, Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399, 448 (2003); see also Jeff
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37.
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"inframarginal" returns, in some specifications, the return to risk, in
others.76
Second, principles of timing have been brought into play in the
context of what is wrong with the "income" tax: how its failure to
currently tax all of the yield to capital leaves it short of its animating
ideal, and how to cure this defect.77 Tax policy scholars have analyzed
how and when to tax capital appreciation - or "ordinary"
appreciation masquerading as "capital" appreciation - so as to
effectuate a practicable income tax. Some scholars, for example, have
considered a form of "taxation on realization," or "retrospective
capital gains," to make up for the deferral of taxes created by an

76. Much recent tax policy literature has been breaking down the analytics of the return
to capital and exploring the related empirical and macroeconomic issues. Scholars have
analyzed the different components of the yield to capital - compensation for risk or
inflation, inframarginal returns, the pure riskless rate of return - with the income-versus
consumption debate in mind, showing how different tax systems, with and without certain
technical features (such as full loss offsets under an income tax), affect each component. See
sources cited in note 39, supra.
This is all interesting and important work. A central message of this descriptive, analytic
traditional literature is that a postpaid consumption tax, even with constant tax rates, most
likely captures some or all of the supranormal returns to capital, whereas a prepaid
consumption tax, by design, captures none of it. The traditional view has often left it at that;
with Andrews's "most sophisticated" argument haunting the consumption tax, the facts of
the matter might even suggest a prepaid consumption tax from this analysis. Within the new
understanding of tax, in contrast, where the commitment to progressivity comes first, the
possibility that even a constant-rate postpaid consumption tax gets at some of the
extraordinary returns to capital offers yet another reason to prefer the postpaid model over
the prepaid, yield-exempt one. The analytics normatively suggest a prepaid model only if (1)
the reason for adopting a consumption tax is to preserve the pretax equality of present and
deferred consumers (Mill's insight and Andrews's most sophisticated argument, again), and
(2) the proper moment for deciding on that equality is ex ante to the distribution of returns
from the capital market. If these two conditions held, it would be "wrong" - nonneutral to burden any of the windfall return with a "second" tax. But both prongs are normatively
dubious at best. The horizontal equities of Ant and Grasshopper are not the best reasons for
adopting a consumption tax, and an ex post perspective more befits a social concern with
individuated justice, given the moral arbitrariness of varying returns to capital, and, within
the new understanding of tax, the wisdom of waiting until ultimate private preclusive use to
make judgments about the yield to capital. This latter point, which echoes a strong theme of
Warren's - namely, that tax policy should take an ex post perspective - is, in essence, the
yield-to-capital norm. Warren, supra note 13; see also Gentry & Hubbard, Distributional
Implications, supra note 11; William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Fundamental Tax
Reform and Corporate Financial Policy, 12 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 191, 196-97 (1998) (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS (1992)); Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123
(2003).
77. See Fellows, supra note 73; Halperin, supra note 73; Shakow, supra note 73; David
Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000); Jeff
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37. See generally Deborah H. Schenk,
A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 355 (2004); Deborah H. Schenk,
An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503 (2004);
David M. Hasen, A Realization-based Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 57
TAX L. REV. 397 (2004).
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income-with-realization-requirement tax;78 others have explored
questions of "original issue discount" and similar mechanisms for
disguising the ordinary return to savings as capital appreciation.79 All
thesf! technical questions have been framed by the income-versus
consumption debate: they arise out of an attempt to ensure that the_
"income" tax is, in fact, an income tax.
These timing matters are important questions, to be sure. The tax
policy literature has generated valuable insights into matters of tax
policy design by asking them. But they are not the central questions of
the fair timing of tax. A different question waits to be asked, one that
promises new and pressingly practical insights into matters of tax
policy design. Asking it lies at the core of the new understanding of
tax. The new timing question sounds in a commonsensical morality,
and follows from the first commitment of the tax system, to having at
least moderately progressive rates:
When, in a taxpayer's flow of funds, is it fair and
appropriate to levy progressive taxes?
This is an altogether different question from traditional ones of timing,
and the answers it leads to - the ways it leads us to think about tax are fundamentally different as well. The new understanding of tax
follows a different logic than the traditional view. It begins with a
commitment to progressivity and moves out to questions of timing. I
explore this later. But first let us dwell a bit longer in the intellectual
history of tax, to better understand where we are, and how we got
here.
C.

The Modern Income-Versus-Consumption Debate

The contemporary origins of the income versus consumption tax
debate, which has raged for centuries, lie in the works of two Harvard
law professors, William Andrews and Alvin Warren, beginning in the
1970s. This debate repays a close and careful visit.
1.

The Case for Consumption

The Haig-Simons definition (I C + S), and its manipulation to
show the essential structure of a consumption tax ( C I S), was
central to two important articles by Andrews, each published in the
=

=

-

78. See, e.g. , Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 167 (1991); Alan J. Auerbach, Commentary, 48 TAX L. REV. 529 (1993); Fellows,
supra note 73; Shakow, supra note 73; Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 77; Strnad,
Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37.
79. See, e.g. , Halperin, supra note 73.
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Harvard Law Review in the early 1970s. In the first, published in 1972,
Andrews used the relationship to suggest that while source neutrality,
or the idea that the type of inflow should not matter to judgments
about tax, was a compelling norm, use neutrality was far less obviously
so.8° Features of the "income" tax, such as deductions for
extraordinary medical expenses81 or charitable contributions,82 could
be understood as appropriate normative refinements of the right-hand
side of the Haig-Simons identity. In other words, not all
"consumption" ought to count equally, at least in accordance with
well-settled practices in tax. This is an important insight, and one that
should be extended to differentiating between the uses of savings as
well as the uses of consumption:83 that is a principal aim of this Article
and the new understanding of tax.
Andrews's second article, published in 1974, profoundly changed
the course of tax scholarship and policy.84 Again looking to the right
hand side of the Haig-Simons definition, Andrews generalized an
important real-world observation: what we call an "income tax" does a
very poor job of getting at savings or, in Simons' words, "the change in
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of
the period in question."85 Andrews argued that we ought to
systematically give up the attempt to tax the yield to capital,
subtracting savings from income to generate a postpaid consumption
tax, on the model of Equation [2), above.
Andrews's article rekindled the income versus consumption
debate, which had its roots in Hobbes, Smith, and Mill. Andrews drew
especially on Nicholas Kaldor's important and more recent work on
consumption or expenditure taxation.86 In the event, Andrews's article
opened a floodgate for reconsideration of the case for adopting a
consumption tax. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, an influential
Treasury Department study, largely authored by the public finance
economist David Bradford (who later collaborated with Andrews),
sketched out two routes for tax: perfecting the nominal income tax,
and adopting a progressive postpaid consumption tax, a la Andrews's
1974 article.87 By the mid-1990s, the latter idea had ripened into a full-

80. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 331-37 (1972) [hereinafter, Andrews, Personal Deductions].
81 . I.RC. § 213 (2004).
82. I.R.C. § 170 (2004).
83. See MCCAFFE RY , FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2; McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 23,
at 1 175-218.
84. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8.

85. SIMONS, supra note 29, at 50.
86. NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955).
87. BRADFORD, ET AL., supra note 8.
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scale legislative proposal, the Nunn-Domenici USA (for "unlimited
savings allowance") Tax, which made it to the House floor in 1995.88
For all its power and influence, however, the reformulated Haig
Simons definition of "consumption" taxation has led to an analytic
confusion. It is true that a postpaid consumption tax does not tax the
act of savings, or the use of available resources to save. But a
progressive postpaid consumption tax can, and - this Article argues
- ought to, under the appropriate circumstances, tax the yield to
capital as the source of present consumption. It is all a matter of the
fair timing of tax. This was an insight that Andrews himself made, in
passing, in his 1975 reply to Alvin Warren's critique of his 1974
article.89 But by then, perhaps, it was too late. As with the Haig
Simons definition, the analytics had morphed into a norm: an is had
become an ought.9()
Andrews, like Mill in the prior century, had grounded the case for
consumption taxation on the principled basis that the yield to capital
should not be taxed. He had chosen a postpaid as opposed to a
prepaid tax model partly on the grounds of administrative concerns:
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, like Andrews, was content to change
over to a prepaid consumption tax model when it was more
convenient to do so.91 As Andrews put his "most sophisticated
argument" for consumption taxation in his 1974 article:
[T]he lesser burden of a deferred tax is more appropriate because it
ultimately imposes a more uniform burden on consumption, whenever it
may occur, than does an accretion-type tax . . . . Neutrality with respect to
consumption is important not only because it promotes efficiency in the
allocation of income, but because it keeps the tax from bearing more

88. USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995); see SEIDMAN, supra note 41;
David Wessel, Nunn-Domenici 'USA Tax' Puts Levy on Consumption to Encourage Saving,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1995, at A2; see also David Wessel, Another Round: Talk of Tax
Reform is Gaining Momentum, But Plans Vary Widely, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
89. Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 949; see Warren, supra note
13, for the critique, and Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, for the original 1975
article.
90. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
2d ed. 1978) (1739) (presenting Hume's famous dictum that an ought cannot be derived from
an is); Liam B. Murphy, Liberty, Equality, Well Being: Rakowski on Wealth Transfer
Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 473, 473-74 & n.4 (1996) (arguing that popular opposition of the
estate tax does note necessarily mean it should be replaced); Eric Rakowski, Transferring
Wealth Liberally, 5 1 TAX L. REV. 419, 421-22 (1996) (same, invoking Hume).
91. BRADFORD, ET AL., supra note 8. Andrews protests considerably that a postpaid or
cash-flow consumption tax is not equivalent to a prepaid consumption or wage tax,
especially under variable rates - the insight behind the new understanding of tax. See
Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 953-55. But the point was not
systematically developed by Andrews, by Bradford in Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, or by
later writers in the tradition.
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heavily on one person than another on account of differences in need or
taste for particular goods or services, now or in the future.92

There is no denying the sophistication of this argument, or of
Andrews's elegant formulation of it. Ultimately, it is its rightness - its
claims to being foundational to the argument for consumption
taxation - that is in question.93 Under the new understanding of tax,
Andrews's most sophisticated argument becomes, quite simply, the
wrong reason (the principled nontaxation of the yield to capital) for
the right tax (the postpaid consumption tax); advancing this argument
has had a harmful influence on the development of tax policy.
2.

The Income Empire Strikes Back

There is also no denying Mill's facts of the matter. An income tax
falls twice on wealth that is saved; a consumption tax falls once, as the
equations set out above have shown. But there is, of course, much
room to argue about the normative consequences of this analytic fact:
Is Mill's second tax a good or a bad thing?
Alvin Warren answered Andrews's 1974 article arguing for a
postpaid consumption tax in a tremendously influential fashion.
Warren's first response was a brief comment, in 1975, later expanded
in a 1980 article.94 A major part of Warren's effort was to tum Mill on
his head. Yes, an income tax imposes a second tax on savings, Warren
conceded, but that was a good thing: the yield to capital was an
additional increment to wealth that differentiated its recipients from
those who did not get it. Andrews had made a "horizontal equity"
argument in defense of the postpaid consumption tax, arguing that the
"most sophisticated" argument for a consumption tax was to preserve
the pretax equality of savers and spenders.95 This argument was to get
Andrews - and the case for consumption taxation generally - in
significant trouble. Warren rightly pointed out that its logic led to a
case for flat, or nearly flat, rates.96 For under progressive or variable
tax rates, as a descriptive, analytic matter, the equivalence of the
92. Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1167-68.
93. Actually, in its final clause, this quotation suggests the argument advanced by
Vickrey, and this Article: Tax should not fall more heavily on any person on account of the
morally arbitrary time path of her earnings pattern. See VICKREY, supra note 50. But under
a progressive postpaid consumption tax, tax does fall more heavily on taxpayers with higher
tastes for goods and services; that is the very thing being taxed, and progressively.
94. Warren, supra note 13; Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an
Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
95. See supra text accompanying note 92. On horizontal equity, see generally MURPHY
& NAGEL, supra note 6, at 37-39; MUSGRAVE, supra note 46; STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 10;
for criticism, see Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992);
Kaplow, supra note 9; Griffith, supra note 9.
96. Warren, supra note 13, at 944-45.
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prepaid and postpaid consumption tax models can be destroyed, and
the yield to capital can bear some tax.
Warren responded to Andrews by primarily making a vertical
equity argument to counter Andrews's horizontal equity ("most
sophisticated") argument. Warren also importantly shifted the analysis
from the ex ante equality of present and deferred consumers
(spenders and savers, like Ant and Grasshopper) to ex post
outcomes.97 The saver has more than the spender in the second time
period, after all; it is thus fair and appropriate to tax her more. This
was an argument whose roots could be found in the writings of
prominent public finance economists.98 More important, it resonated
with popular sentiment and with the very reason for the income tax in
the first place. Only wealthy persons have the capital to generate any
significant yield at all. The vast masses of people living from paycheck
to paycheck are hard pressed to understand an argument of ex ante
equality suggesting that this yield should escape tax altogether when it
comes to their distant, and rich, fellow citizens. Ordinary citizens are
even less likely to understand or accept arguments that the stream of
value had already been taxed (as Mill would have it) or that the
lingering psychic benefits of present consumption - the memory of
things past - were not being taxed, so they had no real complaint vis
a-vis the savers even if the yield to capital was tax-exempt.99 In siding
with popular morality and common sense, Warren was invoking what
the new understanding of tax calls the yield-to-capital norm.
Meanwhile, Andrews's argument for horizontal equity haunted the
consumption tax crowd, although Andrews tried, tentatively, to back
off from it in his 1975 reply to Warren's critique.100 Warren's argument
for vertical equity was more powerful than Andrews's horizontal
equity defense of consumption taxation, suggesting that attitudes
towards progressivity and the redistributive force of tax drive
conceptions of "fairness" more than the always tricky semantic or
rhetorical comparisons of putative equals.101 The new understanding of
tax involves putting the commitment to progressivity front and center:
the central end of any broad-based tax is to effect some redistribution
of material resources. While the case for a postpaid consumption tax
has an element of horizontal equity within it, as seen by the Ant97. See Warren, supra note 13, at 941-44. For a discussion of ex ante versus ex post
perspectives, see KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 21, at 28-30; Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post,
supra note 76.
98. See IRVING FISHER & HERBERT W. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION
(1942); KALDOR, supra note 86.
99. See Kelman, supra note 8, at 659; Warren, supra note 13, at 936; Warren, supra note
94, at 1 100.
100. See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 953-56.
101. See Griffith, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 95.
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Grasshopper example, as we shall see, even that element of horizontal
equity is better understood as specifying the appropriate basis of
comparison for the more fundamental vertical equity judgments.
3.

Why It Matters

In the intellectual back-and-forth over the income-versus
consumption debate, something important had been lost. Andrews
had begun his 1974 article with a critique of the current "income" tax
as not getting at the yield to capital at all: most of the article is
concerned with a careful, critical analysis of the status quo in tax, with
the claims for the "fairness" of a postpaid consumption tax more or
less tacked on at the end. Warren had counterpunched with an attack
on Andrews's "most sophisticated argument" - an ideal argument for
a consumption tax based on the principled nontaxation of the yield to
capital. This left open the intriguing possibility that Andrews was
right, but for the wrong reason - he was actually right for Warren 's
reason. In practice, a consumption tax, of the right sort, is the best
real-world tax precisely because it does, and the actual income tax
does not, get at the yield to capital. Part V, below, extends Andrews's
critique of the so-called income tax to illustrate how the tax has
become a specifically prepaid consumption one. In theory, the ideal
income tax "double taxes" all savings, whereas a postpaid
consumption tax burdens some but not all savings, and in j ust the right
cases -where capital and its yield are elevating lifestyles (a vertical
equity norm), and not where capital and its yield are compensating for
arbitrarily uneven labor market earnings (a horizontal equity norm).
A consumption tax of the right sort best upholds the principles of
source neutrality and vertical equity, all while making a better use of
the ordinary moral intuitions about horizontal equities in
comprehensive tax system design.
By resting the case for consumption tax on the preservation of the
pretax equality of saver and spender -a horizontal equity argument
- Mill and Andrews were inclining the tax system towards flat rates.
In order to preserve this pretax equality, a postpaid consumption tax
must work like a yield-exempt or prepaid one: t1 must equal t2 in
Equation [7], above. The new understanding of tax turns on what
happens when t1 does not equal t2, by design. At a crucial minimum,
the argument structure for tax changes. Prepaid and postpaid
consumption taxes are no longer automatically equivalent. Only the
prepaid model features yield exemption by design. Postpaid
consumption taxes sometimes burden the yield to capital, at other
times do not. The case for choosing a progressive postpaid
consumption tax must therefore rest on arguments different from
Mill's "double tax" point or Andrews's "most sophisticated
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argument," or, for that matter, arguments about the appropriate levels
of individual or aggregate social savings. Indeed, they do.
The result of the intellectual history of tax has been, from a public
policy point of view, unfortunate. Both canonical forms of
consumption tax have been linked, viewed as broad equivalents, and
tethered to both flat tax rates and the principled argument for the
total nontaxation of the yield to capital. The case for consumption
taxation has suffered on the altar of our prior commitment to
progressivity. In the traditional view, the progressive income tax
stands alone against the barbarian, nonredistributive flat consumption
taxes at the gates, and doubly so: both because the income tax features
progressive rates, whereas there is a (wrongheaded) tendency to pair
flat rates with consumption taxes (the rate argument), and because
consumption taxes are assumed to exempt all or most of the yield to
capital on purpose (the base argument). This has put liberals and
progressives in the intellectually and politically untenable position of
defending a highly flawed, highly unpopular status quo in tax, against
any and all structural reform. Yet, ironically, once we accept
progressivity in the rate structure as the first commitment of a
comprehensive tax system, the very equivalence of yield-exempt and
postpaid consumption taxes no longer holds. Our eyes can open: the
case for consumption taxation need not be about the importance of
capital in the small or large at all.
A final and related point: In the grip of both the income-versus
consumption debate and Andrews's (and many others') horizontal
equity argument for consumption taxation, the analysis of the yield to
savings has been source driven. The literature at least implicitly looks
to the left side of the Haig-Simons equation, Equation [1], and asks
from whence a particular return to savings came. Was the return to
capital merely compensation for inflation, the real riskless rate of
return, compensation for risk, a windfall, or yet something else? These
are questions and classifications based on the nature of the input. The
new understanding of tax firmly shifts the analysis - as Andrews
generally had begun to do, in both his 1972 and 1974 articles - to the
uses, or right-hand, side of the Haig-Simons identity. A postpaid
consumption tax consistently finesses questions of where, exactly, the
funds for private preclusive use or (equivalently) consumption come
from: it is source neutral in this important sense. What matters - and
all that matters - is how the returns are used, or what level of lifestyle
they finance.102 The focus is on outputs.
102. For example, a taxpayer who engages in high-risk investments might indeed receive
some high or supramarginal returns, but this same taxpayer is likely to lose on other
investments so that, on balance, he or she will not "beat the market." See BURTON G.
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (rev. ed. 1999) (relaying a popular
account of the "efficient market hypothesis"). A tax system designed somehow to isolate
supramarginal returns faces a practical problem. To be fair, it ought to allow loss deductions
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Two Political Takes

Theory and intellectual history matter. Today's political world
follows the academy's lead on the understanding of tax. Crudely, most
tax politics have come down to a battle of liberals versus
conservatives, with the vast moderate middle holding the all-important
swing vote. Liberals support a progressive income tax. They are very
much concerned with the base, or what, and the rate, or how much,
parts of tax policy design, following the logic of tax set out above. A
good deal of liberal energy has been exerted arguing for an income
base, as well as for other taxes on wealth and capital - such as a
separate wealth transfer or gift and estate tax; a corporate income tax;
and, sometimes, a direct tax on wealth103 - in order to get at capital or
its yield. Liberals of various stripes have also advocated progressive
rates, to further advance the cause of redistribution.
Conservatives, meanwhile, have taken to arguing for flat
consumption taxes.104 Flat consumption taxes of various types are,
indeed, broadly equivalent in their economic effects: all work to
exempt from taxes all or most of the yield to capital under plausible
assumptions. The choice between wage taxes, sales taxes, value-added
taxes, and flat "income" taxes that exempt all capital gains, interest,
and dividends comes down to, in good faith, matters of administration
and, in less good faith, whatever the public will buy.105

as well. But loss deductions under an income-with-realization tax are problematic. See infra
Part V. especially V.C. Even an ideal income tax, without the realization requirement and
with some kind of inflation adjustment to isolate out high investment returns, faces a
temporal problem under progressive rates: What if the supranormal high and low returns
occur in different taxable periods? These problems are all solvable, of course, in theory (see,
for example, former law I. RC. §§ 1 301-05 (repealed 1986) (on income averaging); William
Vickrey, Tax Simplification Through Cumulative Averaging, 34 LA W & CONTEMP. PROBS.
736 (1969); discussion in Part IV.E, infra), but at the price of considerable real-world
complexity. Meanwhile, a postpaid consumption tax gets this all right, as a matter of design.
Since the tax only falls on actual expenditures, and since such expenditures, across a lifetime,
can only be financed by net capital market returns (as well as labor market returns and
beneficent transfers), the net yield to capital as used to finance consumption will be taxed.
103. See, e.g. , BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY
(1999); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Joseph
Bankman, Commentary: What Can We Say About a Wealth Tax?, 53 TAX L. REV. 477
(2000); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983);
Rakowski, supra note 15; Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and
Endowment, 53 TAX L. REV. 397 (2000).
104. See, e.g. , ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995);
Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, Putting the Flat Tax into Action, in FAIRNESS AND
EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 3 (1996). Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax
Reform, and Stephen Moore, President of the Club for Growth, notably, have spearheaded
the current conservative efforts. See, e.g. , Stephen Moore, Editorial, How Much Tax Would
You Like to Pay?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2005, at A12.
105. See, e.g. , SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 14-15; David A Weisbach, Ironing
Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 599 (2000).
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An important practical fact of the matter is that conservatives after scoring important victories in the 1980s, under Ronald Reagan,
to bring progressive marginal rates down - rather decisively lost the
battle to go all the way to a flat-rate system, in both politics and the
academy.1 06 While several candidates for the Republican presidential
nomination, most prominently Steve Forbes and Jack Kemp, have
championed the idea, none have been able to translate its initial
popularity into any enduring appeal. Indeed, Kemp had to back off
from the idea when he became a vice-presidential candidate under
Bob Dole, who, like George W. Bush, was to advocate an across-the
board rate cut on income taxes that would lessen, but significantly not
eliminate, progressivity in the tax. Later, when then President George
W. Bush created a bipartisan panel to study tax reform and present a
report of policy options to the Secretary of the Treasury, he included
among several charges that the panel proffer only plans that offered to
tax in "an appropriately progressive manner."107 Meanwhile, inside the
academy, critics of "flat" have scored decisive intellectual victories,
virtually unopposed by reasoned argument on the other side.108 The
idea of progressivity in tax burdens would appear to be here to stay.
Still, this popular center may not hold. Incremental reform within
the so-called income tax, by moving the tax system towards a prepaid
consumption tax model, has also been flattening tax rates, and tying
the hands of future generations that might want to restore more
meaningful rate progression. 109
How can this be - that progressivity is desired and disappearing at
one and the same time? The answer to the apparent paradox lies in
the choice of tax base. Although the base and rate structures are
logically, analytically distinct matters,110 they are, of course, politically
106. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233
(1999); Weisbach, supra note 105; Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The
Dubious Link Between Rate and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197 (1999); Clay Chandler, Taking a
Democratic Cue, GOP Rivals Declare 'Class War' on Forbes, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996, at
Al2; John Harwood, Forbes Plans to Drop Out of GOP Presidential Race, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 1996, at A20; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Party Favors: Why Tax Reform Won ·; Top the
Agenda of the Next President, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2000, at Al; Lester, supra note 2 1 . (poll
results indicating popular opposition to flat tax).
107. At least one of the plans had to include an income tax base. Exec. Order No. 13369,
70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005).
108. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP.
L. REV. 157 (1999); The State of Federal Income Taxation Symposium: Rates, Progressivity,
and Budget Processes, 45 B .C. L. REV. 989 (2004).
109. See Grover Norquist, Step-By-Step Tax Reform, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21;
Bruce Bartlett, Bush's High Five, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2003, available at
http://www .nationalreview.com/nrof.bartlett/bartlett021003.asp ("By Bush's second term, it
is possible that we will have made enough incremental progress toward a flat rate
consumption tax that we may finally see fundamental tax reform fully enacted into law. If so,
it will be a testament to a very clever, yet bold strategy that was initially invisible . . . . " ).
1 10. Zelenak, supra note 39; MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 11.
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and economically connected. This is so, not simply in the sense that
Stanley Surrey was fond of pointing out, namely, that any shrinkage to
the tax base, ceteris paribus, has to lead to an increase in tax rates.111
On a deeper, more fundamental level - at the stage of initial tax
system design - the nature of the tax base shapes and constrains the
practical political possibilities for progression in the rate structure.
Taxes on wages are especially constrained because high tax rates,
especially high marginal tax rates, deter the socially important and
morally unobjectionable activity of working. In the new understanding
of tax - contrary to the traditional opposition of income and
consumption taxes - income and prepaid consumption taxes stand on
one side of a divide, as taxes on inflows, which means, principally,
taxing labor market earnings.112 Postpaid consumption taxes stand on
the other side of the divide, as taxes on outflows. It is far easier, and
better, in both theory and in practice, to predicate progressivity on
outflows rather than on inflows. High marginal tax rates on spending
deter only high-end spending, but this pattern of disincentives can be
good for a liberal society.113 Today, the principal challenge to
progressivity comes not from the movement away from the income tax
- which, as we shall see, has been too long in coming to question
seriously now, even if one wanted to - but rather from the movement
to the wrong kind of consumption tax base. Conservatives have shifted
their attention to this critical battlefield, and are diligently working to
create a prepaid - and, not coincidentally, a relatively flat consumption tax.
Liberals, for their part, have failed to think through the
ramifications of their victory on the how much front. They continue to
fight for an income tax and its traditional adjutants, the gift and estate,
and corporate income taxes. In all this, liberals have been ill-served by
the traditional understanding of tax. It turns out that there is more
than one way to skin the capitalist cat. In theory, given progressive

111. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); STANLEY S.
SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal
Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with
Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); see also Boris I. Bittker,
Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1968); Boris I.
Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV.
925 (1967).
1 12. A prepaid consumption tax only taxes labor earnings, by design. An ideal income
tax is designed to tax the yield to capital as well, but, in practice, it reaches capital income to
a far lesser extent than it does labor market earnings. The failure of the so-called income tax
to reach much of the yield to capital effectively makes it a wage tax.
113. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 232-35 (1999); Mccaffery, The Right to
Waste?, supra note 24; at 87-91 see also infra note 347 (discussing optimum consumption tax
theory) .
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rates, an income tax, per se, is no longer needed to get at the yield to
capital. Further, in practice, the actual income tax is not even good at
doing the very thing that liberals insist on retaining it to do - namely,
getting at the yield to capital - and it is highly unlikely ever to
improve in that regard. There are deep, structural reasons for this
failure, sounding not just, or even primarily, in practical or
administrative concerns - though these are profound - but far more
so in normative reasons. To wit, most liberals do not want to perfect
the income tax, for they do not want to get at the yield to capital in all
instances: tax-favored savings plans have been as much, if not more, a
feature of Democratic, rather than Republican, tax policy for many
decades.114 Advocates of redistributive taxes must wake up and realize
that their end is in jeopardy on account of their poor choice of means:
they are fighting, and losing, the wrong war.
E.

Three Neutralities

The three forms of taxation - income, prepaid and postpaid
consumption taxes - do not map up as traditional tax theory would
have them do under progressive tax rates. Each tax is unique. Each tax
corresponds with a particular instantiation of a "neutrality" norm, and
it is worth considering these norms. First, however, we need to ask
why we should care about neutrality at all.
1.

Why Even Care A bout Neutrality?

Neutrality - of the right sort - is an attractive feature of tax-law
design. Neutrality is an important element of fairness to political
philosophers such as Rawls, even though all thoughtful theorists are
now aware that social institutions inevitably have disparate impacts on
differing conceptions of the good.115 Rawls reconciled this apparent
dilemma by insisting, with others, on "justificatory neutrality" - the
idea that social institutions must be j ustified by appeal to reasons not
sounding in the advancement of any particular comprehensive

114. See Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Put Tax Proposals in Context of Systematic
Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2004, at A5; Rob Wells, Bush Tax Panel's Breaux Seeks
Income-Consumption Hybrid, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at A2 (discussing the support of
John Breaux, Vice-Chairman of President Bush's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform and
former Democratic Senator from Louisiana, for a hybrid-based tax).
115. See John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
251, 262 (1988); see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV.
787 (1989); Kelman, supra note 8; Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry
of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811 (1990); Richard Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response
to David Luban, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 75 (1996).
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doctrine.116 Neutrality, in such a sense, is a constitutive element of the
fairness and legitimacy of state action.
Tax policy typically invokes neutrality in a specifically economic
sense. Economic efficiency is obtained when tax systems are neutral
relative to a hypothetical no-tax world.117 This means that taxes do not
distort the relative prices that emerge from such a no-tax state; it is
those prices that operate to make for a competitive general
equilibrium achieving first-best, Pareto-optimal, aggregate social
welfare.118 As long as any tax equally impacts all pretax prices, there is
no relative change in prices, and hence no distortion in the allocation
of resources, which is the exclusive concern of economic efficiency.
An attempt to obtain neutrality in this sense is suggested by
Andrews's "most sophisticated" argument for consumption taxation,
for the preservation of the pretax equality of savers and spenders. A
consumption tax of any form - under the critical assumptions that the
tax rate, t, and the rate of return, r, remain constant - preserves the
pretax equality of future and present values, and hence is "neutral" in
regard to the decision to save or spend. The income tax double taxes
savings and thus hurts savers vis-a-vis spenders, both within the
income tax regime and relative to a hypothetical no-tax world.
This is true so far as it goes. But there are serious challenges in
moving from the is generated from these analytic facts to any
compelling ought. One such challenge derives from the simple
economic fact that all real-world taxes have distorting effects.119
Avoiding a distortion to the saving-spending decision runs the risk of
skewing the work-leisure tradeoff, for example, as Warren and others
pointed out in response to Andrews. Any move from an ideal income
tax to an ideal consumption tax would require raising tax rates to keep
revenues constant, on account of the principled omission of an
element of the tax base, the yield to capital, increasing the tax's
distortions.120 Tax, because of its incentive effects and the limited
116. See Rawls, supra note 115; see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 38
(1996); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PAITERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 40-68 (1987); Bruce A.
Ackerman, What is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372 (1983).
1 17. See FULLERTON & HENDERSON, supra note 33; FuLLERTON & ROGERS, supra
note 33.
1 18. This was proven many years ago by the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow and
Gerald Debreau. Kenneth Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium
for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 205 (1954).
119. Slemrod, supra note 12, at 157, 159.
120. This, however, is not to say that a move from the actual income tax to a consistent
consumption tax would work this way; the current tax is not an ideal income tax or anything
too close to it. Adopting a consistent postpaid consumption tax would have very important
base-broadening features, including the inclusion of debt-financed consumption, and the
elimination of preferential capital gains rates and the "stepped-up" basis for assets
transferred on death. Tax rates might well decrease in any conversion to a consistent
postpaid consumption tax.
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information of government policymakers - not to mention
administrative concerns121 - is in a deeply "second-best" situation.
There is simply no a priori way to say that welfare would improve,
ceteris paribus, by moving from an ideal income tax to a consumption
tax.
What to do? The general problem of maximizing social welfare or
economic efficiency in tax is best solved by the highly intricate,
sometimes counterintuitive, optimal tax literature, begun by Frank
Ramsey in 1927 and importantly extended to income taxation by the
Nobel Laureate James Mirrlees in 1971.122 This literature - and this
literature alone - points the way towards a thoroughly welfarist
conception of tax. Under such a conception, the question of the
appropriate timing of tax - as of the appropriate tax base, the
appropriate rate structure, and so on - is a technical one for the
experts. There is no a priori reason to favor the neutrality of any one
tax over the neutrality of another, on economic grounds.
But adding to the difficulties with Mill's and Andrews's particular
"neutral" argument for a consumption tax, and complicating the
economics-based first objection, neutrality, as a construct of fairness,
is a different matter from the narrowly economic welfarist perspective.
There are two large reasons for this. First, judgments of fairness need
not take the pretax status quo as normatively appropriate, although
the standard economics or welfarist account, with its Paretian
constraint, typically {though not universally or necessarily) does.123
Second, and more important, the "optimal" welfare-maximizing tax
answer may clash with ordinary moral intuitions and reflective
normative commitments. A quick example helps to illustrate this latter
point. The core insight of the Ramsey optimal tax literature is the
"inverse elasticity" rule. The government should tax goods in inverse
proportion to their price-elasticities. The economic intuition for the
rule is straightforward: The demand for goods that are inelastically
desired is less distorted by a tax, and hence pretax prices are less
affected by that tax.124 In terms of "neutrality," Ramsey taxation aims
for equal and minimal distortion in the pretax, competitive general
equilibrium allocation of resources. Applying the Ramsey rule to the
case of income or labor taxes, as Mirrlees did in 1971, the principle
becomes that we should tax inelastic suppliers of labor more than
elastic ones. This is one among several reasons to consider more tax

121. Slemrod, supra note 12.
122. F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927);
Mirrlees, supra note 12. See also VICKREY, supra note 50.
123. This is a central theme of THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra
note 6, at 31-37.
124. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 72, at 170-73.
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breaks for working married women, who tend to be more elastic
suppliers of paid-market labor, than their husbands.125 But such is a
case where the precepts of fairness and efficiency happen to converge
(making it all the more puzzling that real-world tax policy has gone in
the opposite direction).126 Convergence will not always be obtained so
felicitously, however, so that we cannot avoid a more finely tuned
moral reasoning in tax - we cannot turn the tax system over to a
computer responding to elasticity data alone.127 The theory of optimal
income tax suggests, for example, isolating persons with especially
high work ethics, such as recent immigrants or, perhaps, members of
certain cultural groups placing a high value on work. Ordinary moral
intuition - supported by liberal and social-contractarian political
theory - should revile the thought.
The analysis shows that "neutrality" is not itself a trump, but
rather a claim to be investigated empirically, and a call, but not
necessarily a decisive call, on our reflective normative judgments.
With these thoughts as background, another large and disturbing
feature of the landscape emerges: all comprehensive tax systems have
a claim to "neutrality" of some sort. Any consistently applied tax
system is neutral in regards to its intended base. A tax on apples, after
all, would (or should) tax all apples. A tax that fell only on Macintosh
or Golden Delicious apples would violate this neutrality norm unless it could be recast as a normatively appropriate tax on
Macintosh or Golden Delicious apples alone, and so on. We cannot
avoid considering the neutrality of each of the three principal taxes
under consideration.
2.

Three Taxes, Three Neutralities

The neutrality of an ideal income tax is familiar: It falls on all
inflows, whatever the source. Broadly speaking, the sources of present
or future consumption (consumption plus savings) are the returns to
labor or capital, whether one's own or another's. Thus, gifts are
certainly "income" in a Haig-Simons sense: they are resources
available for consumption or savings.128 Add in windfalls, or manna found value - and the ideal income tax base is more or less complete.
125. Id. at 175-82.
126. Id. at 183-84.
127. See Slemrod, supra note 12, at 159-62.
128. The income tax has never included gifts in gross income, though. See I.RC. § 102
(2004). See also Douglas Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts " - The Income
Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a Principled Policy
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003);
Carolyn C. Jones, Treatment of Gratuitous Transfers: Unraveling the Case for a Consumption
Tax, 29 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1155 (1985); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. l , 102 (1992).

852

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:807

Any resources available for a taxpayer's personal use, whether they
are presently consumed or saved, are taxed at the moment of inflow.
Labor and capital market returns, and beneficent transfers, are the
three primary sources of wealth. An ideal income tax would attach to
all three.
This is a general norm of source neutrality. But, it is also - a point
far less noted in the traditional tax-policy literature - one of use
neutrality. Since sources equal uses (Equation [la]), taxing all sources
means taxing all uses. While Mill and Andrews each point out that an
ideal income tax is not neutral relative to savers and spenders, that
observation arises only in a dynamic, or two-period, model. An
income tax is use neutral in a static, or one-period model: It simply
does not matter, in the Haig-Simons definition, what one does with
her available resources, any more than it matters from whence these
resources came - you need not tell the government what you do with
your income under an ideal income tax.129 But as Andrews pointed out
in his 1 972 article, it is far from clear that we ought to have use
neutrality in taxation: medical expenditures and charitable
contributions may not strike us, for example, in reflective equilibrium,
as the kind of uses we ought to be taxing.130 So, too, not all uses of
capital transactions are created equal. While the income tax is use
neutral in a one-period setting, it is not neutral in a multiperiod one:
Savers are "double taxed," whereas present spenders need not pay
taxes again on any lingering psychic yield from their pleasures past.131
Prepaid consumption or wage taxes apply to all of one's own labor
earnings, period. The yield to savings is never taxed, in the spirit of
Mill's anti-double-tax argument. Nor are other people's capital,
windfalls, or manna, taxed: All value must trace back to someone's
labor earnings, at some point in time, when (and only when) it was
taxed. A prepaid consumption tax puts pressure on sorting out the
labor-capital (as well as the labor-beneficent) distinction, which can
get tricky in hard cases. But it, too, is neutral, in theory, relative to its
intended base: All and only labor earnings get taxed.
A prepaid consumption tax is not, therefore, source neutral; it
ignores all sources other than own labor market earnings. But a
prepaid consumption tax is even more use neutral than an income tax
129. Of course, you would need to tell the government how much of your gross receipts
was spent on generating income, so that you would be taxed on your net income (the
movement from I.RC. § 61 (gross income) to § 62 (adjusted gross income) (2004), in sum),
and therein many difficult issues of mixed business-personal expenses, timing, and so on
would remain. But once we had gotten to this net figure, the resources available to you to
save or consume, the government would be indifferent to your particular mixture of savings
and consumption activities under a pure income tax.
130. Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra note 80; see also l.R.C. § 213 (2004)
(extraordinary medical expenses); id. § 170 (charitable contributions).
131. Kelman, supra note 8.
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because it is dynamically as well as statically use neutral, thus avoiding
Mill's and Andrews's criticism of the income tax. It simply and
consistently never matters what one does with her resources under a
prepaid consumption tax, whether within a one- or a multi-period
model. Even under variable and progressive effective or marginal tax
rates, a prepaid consumption tax is "neutral" as between savers and
spenders - Andrews's most sophisticated argument again - because
of its consistent yield exemption. It preserves the pretax equality of
present and deferred consumers, ex ante to the actual distribution of
capital market returns for savers.
Progressive rates do, however, change things dramatically. Under
progressive rates, neither the prepaid consumption nor the income tax
is neutral as to the time path of labor market earnings, at least absent
some averaging provision.132 Taxpayers who earn their wages - or,
under the income tax, receive any inflow - in relatively small,
concentrated bunches will be hurt by progressive tax rates, vis-a-vis
lower but steadier earners.133 Artists, athletes, doctors, lawyers, and
others with skills of limited temporal duration or high human capital
requirements, and people who are dependent on whimsical consumer
demand or other markets, will suffer on account of the interrelation
between their patterns of labor market realizations and progressive
marginal rates. 134 Most generally, any gap between inflows and
outflows in constant real terms will increase one's average annual
effective tax rate. This becomes a central theme in the new
understanding of tax.
Finally, postpaid consumption taxes are neutral, too, and in a
morally significant regard: They are neutral relative to the source of
funds for financing present consumption. Since all that matters is the
use - the fact of spending, or of "private preclusive use" as Andrews
called it - postpaid consumption taxes are not use neutral, statically
or dynamically, under progressive rates. They are not statically use
neutral because savings are not taxed at all in the period of savings.
They are not dynamically use neutral once we have relaxed the
assumption of constant tax rates, by design. Some acts of savings will
result in higher tax burdens than if they had not been engaged in;
others will lower the burden of taxation. But in giving up use
neutrality, postpaid consumption taxes find genuine source neutrality.
Whether consumption is funded by labor or capital market returns, or

132 See prior law I.RC. §§ 1301-05 (1982) (repealed 1986); see infra Part IV.E for a
discussion of averaging.
133. Klein, supra note 14, at 463.
134. Id. at 470-79. See also BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 44; VICKREY, supra note
50, at 165-68.
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by beneficent transfers, it is taxed at the same rates as all other
consumption at the same level.135
Postpaid consumption taxes, in contrast to the two other
comprehensive taxes, are indeed neutral as to the time path of labor
(or capital) market earnings. It does not matter when a taxpayer earns
or receives her lifetime resources; it matters only when she spends
them. Thus, the person who earns a high salary over a short period of
time - like the well-educated but highly worked lawyer - is not
burdened vis-a-vis the slow but steady earner, given equal lifetime
aggregate earnings and the use of capital market transactions to
balance out the books.
In sum, an ideal income tax is both source and use neutral,
although the use neutrality wanes in a dynamic setting, leading to
Mill's critique. A prepaid consumption tax is not source neutral, as it
ignores all but one's own labor earnings - it ignores all capital market
earnings and beneficent transfers - but it is use neutral, both
statically and dynamically. A postpaid consumption tax is not use
neutral, because it differentiates between savings and consumption,
but it is source neutral because it includes all sources of financing
present consumption: labor, capital, and beneficence. Adding
progressive rates into the mix adds an important dimension to the
neutrality analysis. Progressive income taxes are not neutral as to the
time path of inflows (earnings) or outflows (consumption); the former
on account of the interaction between progressive rates and the base,
the latter because of the double taxation of savings needed to effect
certain patterns of consumption flows. Progressive prepaid
consumption taxes are neutral relative to the time path of outflows
(consumption) but not inflows (earnings). Progressive postpaid
consumption taxes reverse this dynamic neutrality: they are neutral as
to the time path of earnings but not of consumption. It does not
matter under a progressive postpaid tax when or how one earns or
receives her wealth; what matters - and all that matters - is when
and how she spends it.
IV. A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF TAX
The critical step in attaining a new understanding of tax is putting
progressivity in the rate structure first, as the foundational
commitment of the comprehensive individual tax system, the primary
means to achieve the end of a fair distribution of social resources.
Things change once we presume progressivity in tax - once we no
longer assume that the tax rate will be the same at the moments of
first earning and of subsequent use. No longer are a prepaid and

135. See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 949-50.
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postpaid consumption tax equivalent, even given constant rates of
return and the relatively simple behavioral assumptions of the
traditional view. A tax designer now faces three choices of income,
prepaid, and postpaid consumption taxes, each with fundamentally
different properties.
Under this new understanding, at least part of the "best, most
sophisticated argument" for a consumption tax of the right sort is that
it is a far better, and far more consistent, tax, on the yield to capital,
under just the conditions in which it is fair and appropriate to tax such
yield, than any other broad-based tax, certainly in practice and almost
as certainly in theory. An ideal income tax double taxes all savings,
whatever their use. A prepaid consumption tax never taxes savings,
whatever their use. A consistent, progressive postpaid consumption
tax - a progressive sales or spending tax, in short - burdens capital
when savings and investments are used to enhance lifestyles (one's
own or another's); but it does not burden capital when savings and
investments are used to smooth out lifestyles (one's own or another's).
A close, reflective reading of our tax practices reveals that this is what
the actual tax system has been trying to do, but under the ill-fitting
guise of maintaining an income tax: The nonideal income tax is at best
a mishmash in regards to the taxation of capital and its yield.136 Theory
and practice happily converge under a consistent, progressive postpaid
consumption tax.137
This argument structure stands the traditional view on its head: It
argues for a consumption tax for the very reason that the traditional
view clings to an income tax - to get at the yield to capital. The
argument proceeds on both first-best grounds, namely that an ideal
136. See infra Part V.
137. This answers the question of whether the critique of the income tax and the
argument for a progressive postpaid consumption tax throughout this Article is ideal, or
first-best, as opposed to nonideal, or second-best, a confusion rampant in tax policy. My
answer is both. The argument is that the problems with the actual income tax flow, in large
part, from the failure of ordinary moral intuitions to support the income ideal; many of the
inequities and distortions noted in Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, followed
from an unwillingness to tax all savings. By keeping to the form of an income tax while
attempting to implement both the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, we created an
incoherent nonideal system. A progressive postpaid consumption tax, on the other hand,
implements the first-best ideals of the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, and so its
nonideal, real-world instantiation will not be in conflict with its animating ideal. It is true, as
some commentators have pointed out, that we may continue to want deviations from the
taxation of all consumption under a postpaid consumption tax; there will continue to be
arguments for medical expense and charitable contribution deductions, and so on. But recall
that these arguments also apply to an income tax, which aims to tax all consumption and all
savings. See e.g. , BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8; MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note
2, at 130-38, 148-50. There is no change, ceteris paribus, in the analysis of consumption terms.
The progressive postpaid consumption tax simply puts the taxation of capital or savings on a
more principled footing, implementing the yield to capital and ordinary-savings norms, and
does so by design. Both the first-best and second-best arguments for such a resolution are
compelling.
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consumption tax is preferable to an ideal income tax, as a matter of
fairness - specifically in terms of its fairness at getting at the yield to
capital - and on pragmatic or second-best grounds, namely that the
best obtainable real-world tax system is a consumption not an income
based one, again specifically insofar as the taxation of the yield to
capital is concerned.
This Part sets out the analytics of the new understanding of tax,
anticipating, at the same time, the normative argument for a consistent
progressive postpaid consumption tax.
A.

Two Norms

Critical reflection reveals two seemingly conflicting norms about
the taxation of savings. In some cases, we desire to get at the yield to
capital, contra Mill, because we view such yield as the domain of the
socially fortunate. Those with more capital have more ability to pay,
and more benefits received from the state, than those without capital.
In other cases, pace Mill, we do not want to doubly tax savings,
because savings is a normal, even laudable, activity in the course of an
ordinary life, and it seems unfair to penalize savers but not consumers,
Ants but not Grasshoppers. These two norms, introduced above as the
yield to capital and ordinary-savings norms, respectively, are in
tension - fatal tension - under an income tax, which is committed to
double taxing all savings. Neither is met under a prepaid consumption
tax, which ignores all savings. But the two norms come into perfect
harmony under a progressive postpaid consumption tax, which can be
understood precisely as implementing them simultaneously. This is not
the only, or even necessarily the best, reason to favor such a tax, but it
furthers the main point at hand: a commitment to progressivity in tax
changes the traditional analysis of tax policy, especially in regard to
the taxation of capital, and most advocates of an income tax should
instead prefer a suitably designed consumption tax for the very
reasons leading them presently to think otherwise.
1.

A Note on Reflective Equilibrium

This is an argument, and an argument structure, that appeals to
our enlightened common sense, one that can result in a reflective
equilibrium, in Rawls's helpful epistemic term.138 Such an equilibrium
occurs when we have gone back and forth between relatively abstract
·
political and moral theorizing, on the one hand, and paying close
attention to our actual practices and ordinary moral intuitions, on the
138. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 19-21, 48-51. Actually, Rawls credits Nelson Goodman
with the development of the term and concept. Id. at 20 n.7 (citing NELSON GOODMAN,
FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 65-68 (1955)).

March 2005]

A New Understanding of Tax

857

other; theory is checked by practice, and vice versa. This style of
thinking looks to our actual practices for source material to interpret
the way to a better - fairer - set of rules.139 It is a mode of analysis
familiar to lawyers and law students reasoning in the domains of
common and constitutional law - where practitioners of the method
read cases to try to discern principles within them that they then
endeavor to render consistent from a theoretical point of view - but
curiously absent from our thinking about tax.140 Yet precisely the same
style of analysis can open up promising avenues for reform obscured
by more conventional approaches. Consider the following abstract and
admittedly stylized account of where we are in tax, and how we got
here.
Theory, at first, suggested some form of redistributive taxation to
help effect social justice while financing important public goods including possibly the redistribution of income itself. This is a
plausible, compelling end for tax. But a commitment to progressive or
redistributive taxation is not nearly specific enough. Society still must
answer each of the inevitable questions of tax: what, when, whom,
how, and how much. Theory suggested an income tax as the best
vehicle for redistribution, precisely because such a tax reaches the
yield to capital, which is nearly the exclusive domain of the socially
fortunate. Theory had read Mill;141 the base argument was born. At an
early historical moment where theory dominated - there was after all
a paucity of practice at the time - the United States adopted an
income tax. It was a limited tax, with modest and modestly progressive
rates on the economically privileged few.
Practice grew up in the shadows of this prior theory. But over time,
these practices - nearly one hundred years of them by now - began
to show an unease with the very idea of an income tax, especially as
both tax rates and the breadth of the tax's application increased far
beyond their initial bounds. As the tax grew from its humble roots,
compromises and deviations piled on each other, generating over time
a badly flawed tax, with multiple holes in its commitment to taxing the
yield to capital. Unreflectively, as is its way, practice tried to patch up
these holes, as by adding on corporate income and wealth transfer
taxes to the income tax as "backstops" to its inherent desire to tax the

139. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Gregory C. Keating,
Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857
(2004); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71 (1996) [hereinafter, McCaffery,
Tax's Empire].
140. I am here following a methodology I have laid out elsewhere, one that consciously
draws on a model of normative constitutional and common law argument. See McCaffery,
Tax's Empire, supra note 139.
141. See MILL, supra note 1. For an overview of the history of the desire for
progressivity in tax, see Jensen, supra note 4; Bank, supra note 4.
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yield to capital. The system attempted to close some of the widening
loopholes to clamp down on certain attempts to avoid its theoretical
commitment to taxing the yield to capital, such as through complex
rules regarding "original issue discount" and so on,142 while at the
same time widening the holes in other cases, as through provisions for
tax-favored savings accounts.143
Confronted with practical incoherence and conflict, we return to
theory. Theory sees that something has gone badly awry in the
progressive income tax - that is why we are where we are, reflecting
over what to do next. Some take this as an occasion to argue against
progressivity itself. Theory will soon see that this is a mistake. For one
thing, rather little of the practical morass of tax is directly traceable to
the decision to have progressive tax rates.144 More important, our
normative commitment to at least moderate progressivity in tax
burdens remains as solid as ever: indeed, a large part of the
disillusionment with tax relates to the sense that the rich are, in fact,
not paying their fair share, and that the burdens of tax fall all too
heavily on the middle, laboring classes.145 Progressivity is an end, ill
served by the means of the present tax system; we have not changed
our ends. Further, this sense of unease with the status quo, however
inchoate it is, is right in its factual predicates, and directly related to
deep structural features of the so-called income tax - this is a lesson
that theory can learn from a detailed consideration of our practical tax
system, as considered further below.146 Clinging to a commitment to
progressivity is not a scholarly fiat: political attempts to cash in on
disdain for the progressive income tax with a flat tax of some sort have
not, in fact, resonated with the people.147
If progressivity is to remain, theory next considers whether
something is wrong with the "income" part of the progressive income
tax. Here, indeed, things have gone amuck, and the practical mess
relates almost entirely to the erratic treatment of savings or
accumulation, a point that Andrews had seen and made forcefully
142. See, e.g. , I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (2004) (o.i.d. rules); see also Halperin, supra note 73.
143. See, e.g. , I.R.C. §§ 401 (qualified pension plans), 408 (traditional IRAs), 408A
(Roth IRAs) (2004); see infra Part V.B for an analysis of the current system's ad hoc
deviations.
144. Bankman and Griffith make this point well. See Bankman & Griffith, Debate, supra
note 12; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12.
145. In a 2003 CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll, 63 percent of respondents thought the rich
pay too little in taxes, while only 7 and 12 percent, respectively, thought middle- and lower
income taxpayers pay too little. KARLYN H. BOWMAN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,
PUBLIC OPINION ON TAXES 18 (2004), http://www.aei.org/publication16838 (last visited Jan.
14, 2004); see also GRAETZ, supra note 6, at 10-13; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 5;
Graetz, supra note 6, at 282-83.
146. See infra Part V.
147. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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nearly three decades ago - theory reads law review articles.148 We are
not, in fact, taxing all savings equally. Worse, the practical
compromises we have made are theoretically incoherent, leading to
the sorry state of affairs in which we fail to tax consumption financed
out of the yield to capital, and cannot even predictably induce more
savings, on an individual or an aggregate social level, when we try.149
And so theory asks an obvious question: Should we be taxing the
yield to capital? This is the question at the core of the income-versus
consumption debate, which has been needlessly, and unfortunately,
all-or-nothing. Theory sees that a prepaid consumption tax, namely, a
wage tax, can never get at the yield to capital, within or between
generations. This bothers theory; it seems to violate a core reason to
want progressive individuated taxes in the first place. But theory also
sees Mill's point, and the practical resistance against a willy-nilly
double taxation of all savings. Theory sees much principle in the
income tax's consumption tax provisions, such as for retirement
savings, and so becomes disenchanted with the extremes in the debate.
Should we be taxing all yield to capital in the same manner? Is it the
case that all savings are created equal? Are we equally normatively
committed to double taxing - or altogether exempting - all forms of
savings, as the stark income-versus-consumption tax debate would
have it? If not, is a principled middle ground practically obtainable?
2.

The Norms of Capital

Asking j ust these questions brings theory to a critical epiphany. It
leads abstract theory to understand what practice has been trying
inchoately and imperfectly to express for scores of years by now. We
do, in fact, want to burden some but not all savings. Further, on
reflection, we see that our best normative judgments and ordinary
moral intuitions flow naturally to the uses and not to the sources of
such savings.150 It is not, that is, that our reflective judgments counsel
for taxing those savings that come from stocks versus bonds versus
real estate and so on differently. Here, I put aside the far lesser in

148. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 128-29.
149. The reason is that it is possible to save on the one hand and borrow on the other,
resulting in a deduction with no net savings, or to move existing savings into tax-favored
accounts, thereby obtaining a similar bottom-line result. See Edmund L. Andrews, Savings:
Lots of Talk, but Few Dollars, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at § 3, p.6; Elizabeth Bell, Adam
Carasso, and C. Eugene Steuerle, Retirement Saving Incentives and Personal Saving, 105
TAX NOTES 1689 (2004) (reporting that tax breaks for retirement programs cost $112 billion
in 2004, according to the Office of Management and Budget; personal savings, for all
purposes, totaled $100.8 billion).
150. See McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 23, at 1148 (arguing for a hybrid income
consumption tax "because of the different values we place on the different types of
savings").
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magnitude, and more technical or economic, question of whether or
not, in some special instances, because of market failures or for some
other reason, we actively want a tax-based policy of inducing capital to
flow to certain uses or areas, such as "empowerment zones."151 These
are technical questions best left to technical experts. Theory is, in
contrast, crafting the broad contours of a socially just comprehensive
tax system; we are getting the individuation of tax down right, in the
spirit of Vickrey. Of course, tax can do other things, such as correct for
market failures here and there. But the task of the major
comprehensive individual tax system as a central component of a just
social structure is wider and deeper than ad hoc corrections for market
failures.
Back to the broader strokes of comprehensive tax policy: It strikes
our ordinary moral intuitions that some uses of savings paradigmatically, for retirement, but also for medical and educational
needs, and so on - are appropriate on an individual and, perhaps, a
social level, and, if anything, ought to be encouraged, certainly not
double taxed. Other uses of savings - as to enable grander lifestyles,
in this or later generations - strike us as not deserving of our
sympathies in the same regard. How can theory reconcile these
seemingly opposing intuitions? To further advance its practical
project, theory needs a better, more specific, understanding in regard
to the competing ideas about savings manifest in today's tax system.
On critical reflection, the two distinct norms anticipated above
emerge. Note that these are norms about the taxation of the activity of
savings, that is, about the flow of funds going into and out of a
taxpayer's household, as befits Mill's focus on such flows and
Andrews's focus on uses. Different norms might apply to the stock of
capital, that is, to the very possession of wealth, or to how and where
the value is invested. I shall revisit these concerns later.152
One norm is that capital and its yield, as a general matter, ought to
bear some tax; those fortunate enough to be able to live off interest,
dividends, capital gains, and so forth ought not be further privileged
by way of exemption from the public-regarding burdens of tax. This is
the yield-to-capital norm. Indeed, if anything, there is an urge to tax
the yield to capital more than the yield-to-labor. The general intuition
behind the yield-to-capital norm is reflected in the very choice of an
income tax, as we have seen, and in the periodic attempts to plug up

151. Empowerment zones are regulated by I.R.C. §§ 1391-13970 (2004). Of course,
such regulations have complicated and sometimes counterproductive effects. See Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Updating Urban Policy, in CONFRONTING POVERTY 226, 228-30 (Sheldon H.
Danziger et al. eds., 1994); Jeffrey S. Lehman & Timothy M. Smeeding, Neighborhood
Effects and Federal Policy, in 1 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES
FOR CHILDREN, 251, 259-62 (Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al. eds., 1997).
152. See infra Part VIl.B.4.
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certain "loopholes" in the actual income tax's commitment to taxing
the yield to capital. This intuition is also shown in the misguided, if
understandable (given the traditional view of tax), categorical
resistance to any comprehensive conversion to a consumption base.
The yield-to-capital norm is further manifest in the insistence on
maintaining separate gift and estate, and corporate income taxes: an
insistence that may well also be misguided, on the better view of tax's
possibilities. The more particularized intuition that the yield to
financial capital ought to bear, if anything, a higher burden than labor
earnings, or the yield to human capital, reflects an ordinary moral
intuition that such financial yields come more easily, without the
psychic disutility of physical work. These attitudes were widespread at
the time of the adoption of the modern income tax, and they sensibly
fit with the choice of that tax.153 We can understand the yield-to-capital
norm as a vertical equity one: it reflects an intuition that the yield to
capital is a privilege of the economically fortunate.
A second norm, seemingly inconsistent with the first, is also
evident in our practices of tax. This is the ordinary-savings norm,
which rests on an intuition that some savings are different. Broadly,
these are the savings that take place - or ought to - in the ordinary
course of an ordinary life. Savings for one's own retirement, for one's
children's education, for medical and other emergencies, fit into this
norm. There is a strong and widely held intuition that such savings
should not be subjected to Mill's double tax, whether or not
proponents of the norm are aware of the canonical mappings of
traditional tax policy. Such savings should be encouraged, if anything,
and certainly not discouraged. To reconcile the ordinary-savings norm
with the yield-to-capital norm, in theory, we can understand ordinary
savings as moving the yield to human capital - that is, labor earnings,
wages - evenly through time. The ordinary moral intuition to burden
the yield to financial capital more than the yield to human capital, as
the latter involves psychic disutility to work (and so on), does not
extend so compellingly to labor earnings that are simply saved at a
normal rate of return for some later day. This distinction will become
clearer in the next section, with a practical analytic vocabulary
regarding the uses of capital transactions before us.
In any event, the ordinary-savings norm is, of course, reflected in
the many provisions of the law that favor (or do not disfavor) such
savings: pension plans such as 401(k) plans, IRAs of various types,
medical and education savings accounts. These elements began in the
1940s.154 A large and very important trend of the 1990s was the
expansion of such prosavings provisions. (The fact that some such
153. See generally, e.g., Bank, supra note 4; Jensen, supra note 4.
154. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
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provisions are structured along a prepaid model, as in the "Roth"
IRAs, while others continue to come in a postpaid fashion, as with
"traditional" IRAs, is yet another sign of the analytic muddle of tax.155
This move towards prepaid and away from postpaid consumption
taxation has also characterized the contemporary conservative assault
on progressivity in tax.) In any event, in the traditional normative
language of tax policy, we can see this second norm as a horizontal
equity one. "Ordinary" savers are not the privileged elite. Rather, they
are regular workers choosing to do a perfectly sensible - indeed,
admirable - thing with some of their earnings: save them for a later,
perhaps rainy, day. Here, the familiar pair-wise comparisons carry
normative force: Why should the thrifty Ant be taxed more heavily
than the spendthrift Grasshopper, when both have the same resources
as of a critical moment in time, and when Ant is actually doing what a
reasonable society should want her to do at that time?
There is another and important sense in which this ordinary
savings norm reflects a horizontal equity perspective. It is that the
vertical equity judgments made by the basic rate structure - and the
choice of an income tax, with its yield-to-capital norm - ought not fall
on individuals only temporarily elevated into the higher "ability to
pay" or high tax-rate regions because of morally arbitrary patterns of
labor market earnings. In order to make sure that we are taxing equals
equally under the progressive rate structure - in order to best (most
fairly) determine who are indeed "equals" - we need a wider time
frame than the arbitrarily chosen twelve calendar month one of
practical tax administration.156
The yield-to-capital norm was present at the dawn of the income
tax: It was a large part of the reason for choosing such a tax. The
ordinary-savings norm favoring - or, perhaps better put, opposed to
disfavoring - certain classes of savings, in contrast, became apparent
much later, after income tax rates had risen and the tax's breadth had
expanded to reach the majority of adult Americans.157 It was then that
the horizontal equity issues became problematic; it was then that the
call to escape Mill's curse became more clarion. But herein seemingly
lay a rub: The ordinary-savings norm is inconsistent with the choice of
an income tax, made to further the yield-to-capital norm. As a
practical matter, the coexistence of the two norms about capital and its
yield under a nominal income tax has generated a highly flawed status
quo. As an analytic matter, it has left us in the grip of incoherence.
The particular ce:pter we have chosen cannot hold.
155. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 50.
156. See generally D A VID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX {1986);
BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8; VICKREY, supra note 50; Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and
Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE 123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002).
157. See Jones, supra note 65.
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Now, theory has a sharpened practical question to ponder: Is it
possible to design a tax system that gets at some, but not all, of the
yield to capital, in just the way we want it to? That does, consistently
and logically, what our imperfect real-world tax system attempts to do
inconsistently and illogically? That is, a tax system that implements the
yield to capital and ordinary-savings norms concurrently?
Surprisingly - especially to those in the grip of the traditional
view - the seemingly inconsistent popular attitudes towards savings
can be rendered perfectly coherent and consistent under a properly
designed tax system. Those forms of savings that ordinary moral
intuitions favor are precisely those that smooth out life-cycle
consumption: that move wealth from high-earning periods into lower
earning ones, such as retirement, or into those of greater urgency or
objective need, such as times of increased education or medical
expenses.158 At the same time, the urge to tax some of the yield to
capital plausibly relates to material resources used to finance higher
standards of living, namely, greater discretionary expenditures, within
or between individual lifetimes. How can we relatively favor the one
form of savings, which smoothes out labor earnings, while not favoring
the other, which enhances lifestyles? It turns out that a progressive
postpaid consumption tax does exactly this. It is the mechanism of
progressivity under the tax that does the bulk of the normatively
desired work.
B.

Two Uses of Capital

The analysis of the prior section suggests an analytic distinction not
presently drawn in the tax policy literature. Capital transactions borrowing, saving, and investing - can in fact be put to two broad
(and analytically exclusive) uses within a taxpayer's lifetime. One is to
smooth out one's labor earnings, which are earned over a limited
period of years, into a steady consumption pattern over one's entire
life. This smoothing perspective solves a certain personal financial
equation: it sums up an individual's earnings in constant dollar terms,
and then divides this total by the years in one's life. The result of this
exercise is to generate the same level of consumption, in real dollar
terms, for each year of life; it balances out an individual's books, so to
speak, as if her life were self-contained and devoid of any windfalls,
gifts, and the like. Smoothing effectuates the ordinary-savings norm.
The other use of capital transactions is, in short, to do anything
other than smooth out earnings. Capital transactions can shift
consumption patterns: to make one better (or worse) off than she
could be on the basis of labor market earnings alone, for certain
158. For a philosophical discussion of urgency and objective needs, see T.M. Scanlon,
Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 660-61 (1975).

864

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 103:807

periods of her life or throughout her entire life. Consumption shifting
corresponds to the yield-to-capital norm.
A simple graphical example helps to see these points.
1.

An Untypical Picture of a Typical Life

Figure 1 shows, in stylized and financial terms, how many of us
live. The solid line shows labor earnings, while the dotted line shows
spending or consumption. Simply to get an easily tractable example,
Figure 1 reflects a world with no inflation, which solves the problem of
translating fluctuating nominal dollars into constant real ones.159 There
are also no taxes - yet - in the story.
FIGURE 1
Typical lifetime labor earnings and consumption
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The hypothetical taxpayer in the figure lives for 80 years. She
works for 40 of those years, from age 20 to age 60, but, of course, she
consumes for all 80 years. Assume that she has no benefactors, such as
parents, and no beneficiaries of her largesse, such as children; she acts
as a self-contained financial unit, balancing her books of inflows and
outflows within her lifetime alone. Later I shall relax this assumption,
with a corresponding expansion in generality of the normative points.

159. The assumption does not materially affect the analysis. Inflation can be generally
accounted for by indexing the rate brackets, which is how progressivity will be achieved:
Fully indexed, the system maintains a constant effective tax rate on constant real value
dollars, as the no-inflation assumption also effects. Further, under a progressive postpaid
consumption tax, the full deductibility of principal and interest washes out the time value
effects at least at the normal rate of interest.
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In any event, during her labor market earnings years, the taxpayer
makes a constant $60,000; throughout her life, she spends $30,000
annually. In such a fashion she can balance the books, with her $2.4
million of lifetime earnings and spending.
2.

Smoothing Transactions

The stylized picture of Figure 2 adds onto Figure 1 to show one
very important use of capital: to smooth out consumption patterns
over a lifetime. The hypothetical taxpayer effectuates this smoothing
by capital transactions. She borrows $30,000 a year for the first
quarter, or 20 years, of her life, at 0 percent interest.160 For the second
quarter, the first 20 years of her working life, from age 20 to 40, she
pays off this debt at the rate of $30,000 a year, living on her remaining
$30,000 annually. For the third quarter, the final twenty years of her
working life, from age 40 to 60, she sets aside $30,000 a year for her
retirement, once again, in the simplifying assumptions of the story, at
no nominal interest, and spends the remaining $30,000. When she
retires at age 60, she draws down her retirement savings to finance
continued consumption during her last quarter of life, once again at
the rate of $30,000 a year.

160. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption, but it does not affect the analysis.
Recall the 0 percent inflation in the story; at a positive rate of inflation, the wages would be
higher to reflect the inflation in the principal of the debt. Consider also that many loans are
intrafamily transfers, as I shall discuss below. Any real interest, in fact, reduces the amount
of lifetime consumption (below the posited $2.4 million in the example), but then any real
positive rate of return on the savings in the third and fourth quarters of the taxpayer's life
increases it.

Michigan Law Review

866

[Vol. 103:807

FIGURE 2
Smoothing Transactions
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In this stylized example, we see that both "normal" borrowing and
savings transactions - those that carry a normal rate of interest,
principally (and in the simplified example, exclusively) compensating
for inflation - help the taxpayer to smooth her consumption pattern.
Borrowing shifts labor earnings forward in time, so that one can
consume before she earns; savings shift them back, so that one can
continue to consume after she ceases to earn. In Figure 2, with no
inflation, the taxpayer will simply borrow $30,000 a year for the first
20 years of her life, pay this debt off over the next 20 years, save
$30,000 for the next 20 years, and draw this down for the final 20
years.
In a simple setting with perfect knowledge, no transaction costs and no other humans in the picture - the smoothing of Figure 2 can
be achieved by well-functioning financial capital markets. Of course,
the world is not so perfect. In its imperfection, smoothing does not
occur so precisely. In practice, families often function as annuities,
insurance, and other capital markets.161 By social norm or otherwise,
our parents pay for our consumption in our youth; we may or may not
pay them back in later years, but in any event, we are expected to pay

161. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1988, at 41, reprinted in WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 68 (Laurence J. Kotlikoff ed.,
1989); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak, The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market,
89 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1981), reprinted in WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 88 (Laurence J.
Kotlikoff ed., 1989); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1981),
reprinted in WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 43 (Laurence J. Kotlikoff ed., 1989).
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for the consumption of our children in their early years. Families also
provide important mortality insurance should grandparents outlive
their finances, and so on. In an "overlapping generations" model, as
illustrated in Figure 3, the smoothing of consumption shown in Figure
2 occurs between generations.162
FIGURE 3
Intergenerational Smoothing
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This Figure adds a second generation to the smoothing
transactions of Figure 2. The darkened arrows indicate transfers across
generational lines, from parents to children, or vice versa. The story

162. Robert J. Barro, A re Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1095, 1 1 1 6
(1974); Kotlikoff, supra note 161; Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 161.
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behind Figure 3 is a common one, where parents help their children in
their youth, and then these same children help their parents - paying
them back, in essence - in their old age. Another familiar story of
intergenerational annuities markets is where parents continually help
their children, so the support received from one's parents is turned
over to the third generation, as it were, in an infinitely overlapping
generations model. The idea here is to sketch out rough possibilities;
note that these intergenerational transfers can be smoothing or
shifting.
Smoothing is simply an analytic possibility that almost all wage
earners engage in to some extent: one has to smooth, somehow, if a
limited period of labor market earnings is to support a full lifetime of
consumption, unless one is a significant beneficiary of some sort (more
on this, which affects the yield-to-capital norm, anon). What is morally
significant to theory is that smoothing strikes our ordinary moral
intuitions - as reflected, in fact, in the practices of the actual income
tax - as a perfectly normal and appropriate thing to do. Smoothing
effects the ordinary-savings norm. A reasonable political and moral
theory can certainly accept this norm revealed from practice, bringing
about a reflective equilibrium; Mill and Rawls seem to have done so,
for example. Smoothing balances out the morally arbitrary ups-and
downs of labor markets.163 Adding progressivity into the mix - as the
first, foundational commitment of the comprehensive tax system's
claim to justice - makes this critically important. Income and prepaid
consumption (wage) taxes fall on the unsmoothed lines of Figures 1-3;
postpaid consumption (spending) taxes fall on the smoothed lines.
Under progressive marginal or effective rates, taxpayers pay more tax
based on the particular pattern of their earnings profile under prepaid
consumption or income taxes, but not under a postpaid consumption
tax, when they engage in ordinary smoothing activities.
It is for these reasons that many scholars have long advocated
taking a "lifetime" perspective on the imposition of tax burdens. This
is an idea advanced by Vickrey, through a very clever proposal for the
lifetime averaging of tax burdens, and picked up in recent years by
those, such as David Bradford and Daniel Shaviro, discussing

163. BRADFORD, supra note 156; BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8; VICKREY, supra
note 50. Of course, the position that these ups and downs are indeed morally arbitrary
requires argument, which this Article does not provide in any length or depth. Suffice it to
say that it is hard to imagine a compelling moral argument that a putative taxpayer should
pay more taxes strictly on account of her uneven pattern of labor market earnings vis-a-vis
an equal but steadier earner, yet a system of progressive average rates has precisely this
effect under a prepaid consumption or income tax. The practical prevalence of the ordinary
savings norm - the widespread allowances under the "income" tax for backward smoothing
- further testifies to the moral insignificance of particular patterns of labor market
realizations.
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"endowment" taxes.164 The smoothed perspective looks to this lifetime
average: What is significant is the $2.4 million of lifetime consumption
spread over 80 years, not the particular - and generally morally
arbitrary - pattern of earning it. Any tax on inflows, such as a prepaid
consumption or an income tax, that does not somehow allow for
smoothing is penalizing those whose human capital gets realized in
short periods and in bunches - artists, athletes, doctors, and lawyers,
say - vis-a-vis more regular, steady lifetime earners. This point was
anticipated, in traditional horizontal equity terms, by Andrews, and
developed by William Klein.165 Indeed, Mill's double-tax critique is
most compelling when a taxpayer is simply trying to break even within
her lifetime, and so too with Andrews's "most sophisticated"
argument for consumption tax.
By moving to a lifetime perspective, allowing smoothing to lower
tax burdens reflects as much a "vertical" as a "horizontal" equity
norm. If we base a tax on outflows, thereby allowing people to
smooth, and assume (only for now) no net transfers in or out of the
taxpayer's combined, total pool of resources available for her own
personal lifetime consumption, then a taxpayer can solve a personal
tax minimization problem by perfect smoothing. Note that rough or
imperfect smoothing comes out much the same way, on account of the
width of the progressive marginal rate brackets: there is no need for
taxpayers to be precise actuaries.166 Taxes are then set - equals are
then measured - on the basis of this smoothed consumption line,
reflecting a sustainable standard of living across a lifetime. Rather
than a single year, or a short period of years, of high earnings elevating
one into higher tax brackets, it is this smoothed, sustainable pattern of
consumption that sets one's level of taxation. Then those who, after
smoothing their labor earnings, are able to live a more costly lifestyle,
are taxed more than those who are not: these are, necessarily, people
who have enhanced their consumption by capital market returns or
beneficent transfers. "Equals" are measured by their lifestyles;
lifestyles are financed by labor, capital, and beneficent transfers, and
the consistent postpaid consumption tax does not mark the
distinctions among sources.
The smoothed perspective as a measure of taxable ability is
appealing to ordinary moral intuitions and in reflective equilibrium: it

164. See BRADFORD, supra note 156; Shaviro, supra note 156. Note that these ideas are
predicated on individual levels; a somewhat parallel macroeconomic idea can be found in
Laurence Kotlikoffs and others' writings on "generational" accounting. See supra note 161.
165. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1170; Andrews, Reply to
Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 957-58; Klein, supra note 14; Edward J. McCaffery, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 350-51 (1994) [hereinafter
McCaffery, Uneasy Case].
166. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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happens to map up perfectly with a postpaid consumption tax, but the
argument is not a matter of semantic definitions. It is not, that is, the
case that a postpaid consumption tax is independently desired for
some reason and therefore that smoothing becomes the appropriate
normative baseline against which to discuss increasing or lowering tax
burdens. It is, rather, that smoothing strikes us as an appropriate
normative baseline, because it does not take into account the morally
arbitrary pattern of labor market earnings on a year-to-year basis, but
rather rests its decisions about taxability on a sustainable lifetime
pattern of consumption. A postpaid consumption tax implements this
norm.
3.

Shifting o r Enhancing (Diminishing) Transactions

A second use of capital and its yield, already anticipated, is to
change one's average level of lifetime consumption: to enhance or
increase one's lifestyle by spending out of "surplus" capital funds, or
to diminish it by being a net saver throughout one's life or by
transferring wealth to others - personal or institutional (e.g.
charitable) beneficiaries. Shifting is the complement to smoothing.
Smoothing takes the taxpayer's average labor market earnings in
constant real dollar terms as its baseline. Shifting moves this baseline
up or down.
In moving from a description of capital transactions to a normative
position, a norm of self-sufficiency emerges: Capital transactions that
are "simply" and "normally" translating uneven (by time) labor
market earnings into even, smooth cash flows should not bear the
sting of Mill's double tax or, indeed, any positive tax burden at all. In
the simple smoothed profile, there is no "luck" in the capital markets,
no largesse from or to any other individual. Smoothing is what an
ordinary person can do, with the fruits of her own labor, and access to
normal, well-functioning capital markets with little or no risk. But
capital transactions can change things, too. One can do better or worse
than the smoothed profile, by being the beneficiary of good luck or
someone else's largesse, or by being the recipient of bad luck or a net
benefactor to others.
Figure 4 presents a simple picture to illustrate this. Figure 4 adds
onto Figure 3's intergenerational example the possibility of taxpayers,
within or across generations, living on more or less than what their
average annual labor market earnings in constant dollar terms would
allow. Beginning at age 30 in each generation, the Figure shows
"enhanced" consumption, where a taxpayer is living at $40,000 a year,
more than her average annual labor market earnings, in constant
dollar terms, and a "diminished" consumption pattern, where the
taxpayer is living at $20,000 a year, below her average annual labor
market earnings. The intergenerational setting helps to illustrate that
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there are several sources of this enhanced or diminished consumption
profile. Good fortune in the capital markets - supranormal returns,
in the language of recent tax policy analysis167 - is one.
Intergenerational transfers can also either elevate or diminish
consumption patterns, and altruism - transfers to charities - can
diminish them.168 Diminished consumption might result from a simple
mistake, a failure to "die broke" out of an excess of caution, a failure
of annuities markets, or a combination of all three factors.169 It could
also result from bad luck in the capital markets: from a failure to earn
even normal returns on savings, or excessive payments for the use of
capital early in life.
FIGURE 4
Intergenerational Smoothi n g, Enhanced
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167. See generally Bankman & Griffith, Debate, supra note 12; Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
How Much Capital Income Taxes Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?,
52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996).
168. All this depends, of course, on supporting the semantic claim that such personal or
institutional (charitable) giving is not "consumption;" a position that the present income tax
law takes, at least relative to charitable giving. See Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra
note 80, at 346.
169. STEPHEN M. POLLAN & MARK LEVINE, DIE BROKE (1997); see also Kotlikoff &
Spivak, supra note 161, at 372-73.
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A compelling case can be made that the enhanced lifestyle profile
is "vertically" above the smoothed one: anyone who has received
additional resources to consume, one way or another, is in fact more
"able to pay" than someone who has not. Indeed, this is an animating
norm of an ideal income tax, a logical concomitant of Henry Simons's
(and many others') "source neutrality" norm. It is more arguable that
the "diminished consumption" profile represents a lower rung on the
vertical equity, or "ability to pay," ladder; an ideal income tax
generally treats people on the basis of their potential to consume170 or,
somewhat equivalently, treats savings, gifts, bequests, and even many
capital market losses as instances of consumption. But note that,
under a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax, the
diminution in private consumption must be permanent, across
generations, to result in a lesser tax burden. In lying in wait for
ultimate private preclusive use, the progressive postpaid tax holds out
the possibility - by design - of an increased tax burden on certain
patterns of intergenerational transfer.171
Now it is time to ask a pressing question: Why should the norms
of capital apply inter, as well as intragenerationally? This is a point
that distinguishes a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax
from a progressive income tax with averaging, as discussed below.
Once more, second-best concerns loom large: policing and taxing
intergenerational transfers is hard. But still as a matter of first-best
theory, and with the various pictures to help us, we can see that
intergenerational transfers, like intragenerational savings, also differ
in their intended and ultimate uses. Much intergenerational transfers
smooth across generations, making for within-family annuity markets.
Such transfers can save on certain transaction costs compared to third
party mechanisms, and there is no compelling reason to burden them
with a double or even triple tax, on transfer. Other transfers simply
bring children up to a lifestyle level closer to their parents, arguably
maximizing utility .172 Yet other transfers create dynasties, allowing
generations to live off the yield to capital, without labor. The current
system, with a wealth transfer tax rife with exceptions, once again
reflects two norms, one allowing, the other seeking to tax, these
transfers, 173 but implements them erratically, at best. A consistent

170. See Warren, supra note 13, at 934.
171. In this way, the progressive postpaid consumption tax acts as an accessions tax,
falling on heirs. See Mccaffery, Being the Best, supra note 15, at 631. Of course, this might
not address all of the concerns of advocates of wealth transfer taxation, because the postpaid
consumption tax can facilitate greater stores or stocks of private wealth. I discuss this issue
infra Part VIl.B.4.
172 See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469 (1995).
173. See infra Part VI.B (criticizing current wealth transfer tax system).
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progressive postpaid consumption tax perfectly implements both
norms, at the same time, and across as well as within generations.
Back to the reasons for diminished consumption at the parental, or
putative donor's level: The parent who self-sacrifices to enable her
child to live an enhanced lifestyle is not solving an intergenerational
tax minimization problem; she is like the intragenerational taxpayer
who fails to smooth. Her family's total tax burden will go up, in
constant dollar terms, on account of her financial behavior. The
progressive postpaid consumption tax - consistent with its focus on
uses, or the right-hand side of the Haig-Simons identity differentiates among the reasons for diminished lifestyles. Those who
have had bad luck in the capital markets, or who are benefactors of
qualified institutional charities, say, will see their and their family's tax
burdens go down; those who are building private dynasties will see
their familial tax burdens increase. While an ideal income tax would
also adversely affect private dynasty creation, it is worth noting that
neither the actual income tax, where we are, nor a prepaid
consumption tax, where we are heading, would.174
C.

Progressivity

The key insight of the new understanding of tax is that, in devising
a just and practicable comprehensive tax system, the commitment to
progressivity in individuated tax burdens ought to come first and be
foundational. It is not sufficient to meet this commitment through the
choice of base, alone. We do not have and have never had an income
tax, and largely for the reason that we do not want one - we do not
want the double taxation of all savings. Within the tax system,
progressive rates have become the primary engine of effecting
fairness.175 The next question is to what should we apply these rates: a
question that can be restated in the temporal terms used above,
namely as asking when, in a taxpayer's flow of funds, it is fair and
appropriate to levy progressive taxes. Under progressive rates, the
traditional view of the mapping between income and consumption
taxes, and between types of consumption taxes, is wrong. Each tax has
very different properties. These properties can be understood as
affecting capital smoothing and shifting- transactions differently: as,
that is, differentially implementing the yield to capital and ordinary
savings norms.
The principal mechanism for implementing progressivity in the
income tax - for meeting the vertical equity norm - is its system of
174. See infra Part V for a critique of the current "income" tax.
175. Another idea for effecting justice in social systems is to abandon progressivity in
tax, per se, and to obtain redistribution via transfers or expenditures. See Bird & Zolt, supra
note 5 1 (commenting on this strategy for the developing world).
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progressive marginal rates. Such progressive marginal rates work like
a ladder. As one ascends into the higher-rate brackets or rungs of the
ladder, she does not lose the benefit of the lower-rate brackets or
rungs. Consider the very basic marginal tax rate schedule set out in
Table 2. The first $10,000 of income (or whatever is being taxed in the
base) generates no tax. The next $20,000
the dollars that take one
from $10,000 to $30,000 of total income - are taxed at a 15 percent
marginal rate. Thus by the time a taxpayer has made $30,000, she has
paid $3,000 (not $4,500) in tax: 0 on her first $10,000, and $3,000, or 15
percent, on her next $20,000. Once one exceeds $30,000, the next
dollar is taxed at 30 percent. So a taxpayer making $30,001 is taxed
$3000.30 (not $9000.30); the $3,000 paid on her first $30,000, as
calculated above, plus $.30 on her last, or marginal, dollar.
-

TABLE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE MARGINAL TAX RATE SCHEDULE

Marginal tax rates are important for their marginal incentive
effects.176 Social justice, however, is more concerned about average or
(equivalently) effective tax rates: ensuring that the more able to pay,
in fact, pay a higher percentage of their wealth in taxes than the less
able to pay. Average tax rates are simply the total tax paid divided by
the total income (or alternative base). In our running example, using
Table 2, the taxpayer who has made $30,000 and paid $3,000 in tax while she stands on the brink of entering the 30 percent marginal rate
bracket - is paying 10 percent taxes on average. (It is a common
mistake to confuse average and marginal tax rates; this explains the
emphasis on "not" numbers in the parentheses in the prior
paragraph). While progressive marginal rates necessarily lead to
progressive average tax burdens, the converse does not hold: we can
achieve progressivity in effective burdens with a combination of lump
sum grants and declining marginal tax rates, a key insight of Mirrlees
and the optimal income tax literature.177

176. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 78-81; Bankman & Griffith, Social
Welfare, supra note 12.
177. See, e.g. , Mirrlees, supra note 12; Berliant & Rothstein, supra note 12.
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FIGURE S

Effective Tax Rates Under Progressive Marginal Rate Brackets
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Figure 5 translates the simplified marginal rate schedule of Table 2
into effective tax rates. Having a progressive tax system means that
such a figure, plotting income (or any alternative tax base) along the
X-axis against effective tax rates on the Y-axis, will show a constant
increase. That is, higher levels of income, or labor wages, or
consumption - respectively in each of the three taxes we are
considering - will be taxed higher, on average, asymptotically
approaching the highest marginal tax rate.178

178. That is, as x (income) approaches infinity, a taxpayer gets closer to paying the
highest marginal rate, here 30%, on average.
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FIGURE 6
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The central argument of this Article can be seen by superimposing
Figures 1-4 onto Figure 5, as Figure 6 does. I do not mean to suggest
that tax rates would or could be the same under the three tax systems.
It can be hard, for macroeconomic reasons, to compare rates across
different taxes.179 Rates might differ under an income, prepaid, or
postpaid consumption tax in order to raise the same amount of
revenue; this depends on the breadth of the base, and so on, and is a
complicated empirical project. Further, and very importantly, as a
normative matter, the nature of the case for progression changes with
the nature of the tax base; this is another central insight of the new
understanding of tax obscured by the traditional view. Once again, we
can think differently about taxing uses than sources. But fortunately it
is not necessary to make the rates comparable - to "score" a revenue
neutral result - in order to see the main points. Figure 6 simply
illustrates how capital smoothing and shifting transactions are taxed
within each tax system, against a backdrop of not engaging in them.
A prepaid consumption tax taxes along the solid labor wage line
and ignores all variations. Under the tax rates of Table 2, this means
that the taxpayer in the running example will pay $12,000 per year for
the 40 years in which she works, a 20 percent average rate over her

179. Rates might also change over time on account of the greater efficiency of a new tax,
a point David Bradford impressed on me. See David F. Bradford, Transition to and Tax Rate
Flexibility in a Cash-Flow Type Tax, in 12 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 151-72 (James
Poterba, ed., 1998). This complicates but does not fundamentally alter the analysis.
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lifetime ($480,000 out of $2.4 million).180 Such a tax ignores all shifting,
upwards or downwards, and smoothing. The "spikier" the inflows line
- the greater the variance in the realization of labor market returns
- the higher the lifetime tax. Any enhancements due to success in the
capital markets or someone else's beneficence get ignored.
An ideal income tax would also tax on the basis of this labor
market earnings line, and would add a further tax - Mill's second for any positive returns to the savings needed to effect a constant
lifestyle going forward.181 In general, a progressive income tax burdens
both shifting and smoothing capital transactions. Compare a taxpayer
under an income tax who in fact earns and spends $30,000 a year, with
one who earns $60,000 over 40 years and spreads it across 80. The
latter, smoothing taxpayer is hit hard by progressive rates: she pays
$480,000, just as under the prepaid consumption tax example of the
prior paragraph, a 20 percent effective rate. The naturally-smoothed
taxpayer in contrast pays $240,000 in lifetime taxes - $3,000 a year for
80 years; her labor market earnings generate a 10 percent effective tax
rate. The smoother is also hurt by the double taxation of savings
needed to effect her backward smoothing: any positive interest here
will bear Mill's double tax. She is also harmed by the tax treatment of
debt in effectuating her forward or anticipatory smoothing, given the
limitation on the deductibility of interest.1 82 And, of course, any
enhancements above her labor market earnings will be taxed, while
diminutions may or may not be relevant.
A postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, applies to the actual
consumption line. The perfect smoother, living at $30,000 a year,
would pay $3,000 a year, a 10 percent rate across her entire life
($240,000 out of $2.4 million), just like the naturally smoothed
taxpayer. The enhanced consumption profile would pay more: under
progressive tax rates, a postpaid consumption tax does get at the yield
to capital, as well as beneficent transfers, when these are used to
upward shift. The diminished consumer would pay less. But if the
diminished consumption was due to the transfer of resources to
another taxpayer, the tax will lie in wait, to fall on this heir's enhanced
consumption.
We can cash these observations out with some simple,
paradigmatic examples. Imagine three putative taxpayers: Steady
Earner, who earns $50,000 annually for all relevant periods; Lumpy
Earner, who earns $100,000 annually for half of the relevant period,

180. Once more, she pays 0 on her first $10,000; $3,000, or 15%, on her next $20,000;
and $9,000, or 30% on her "last" $30,000.
181. This second tax is not reflected in the picture because of the simplifying assumption
of a 0% rate of return.
182. See l.R.C. § 163(a), (d), (h) (2004).
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borrowing and saving, as in the example above, to consume $50,000
annually throughout the period; and Trust Fund Baby, who lives off
$50,000 of investments returns from an ancestral trust.183 An ideal
progressive income tax falls hardest on Lumpy Earner, treating Trust
Fund Baby and Steady Earner alike. A progressive prepaid
consumption or wage tax falls hardest on Lumpy Earner and
altogether ignores Trust Fund Baby.184 (The actual income tax we have
treats Trust Fund Baby quite well, too, as Part V illustrates). A
progressive postpaid consumption tax treats all three taxpayers alike.
In sum, an income tax double taxes both shifting and smoothing
capital transactions; a prepaid consumption tax ignores both; and a
postpaid consumption tax accommodates smoothing but differentiates
between upward (which lead to higher taxes) and downward (which
lead to lower taxes) shifting transactions. By ignoring smoothing,
progressive income and prepaid taxes make the time path of earnings
economically significant. By accommodating smoothing, a postpaid
consumption tax does not.
D. Debt, A gain
Debt, or borrowing, is critical to smoothing, and also to the
distinctions among the three types of ideal taxes.185 Positive savings
allow an individual to defer the enjoyment of labor-market earnings,
to push them backward in time. Borrowing, as negative savings, serves
a symmetric function: it allows one to shift forward her labor market
earnings, to consume before earning, as Figure 2 and subsequent
figures had shown. An income tax is inconsistent in its treatment of
debt and savings, because it "double taxes" the latter but not the
former, although the technical analysis depends on the deductibility of
interest.186 Both prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes are
consistent: the former ignores all savings, and the latter deducts all
savings. This leads under a postpaid consumption tax to the inclusion
of debt as a taxable inflow (as negative savings) and a deduction for all
repayments of principal and interest.

183. $50,000 represents a 5% annual yield on a $1,000,000 corpus, a sum easily
transferred tax-free under today's wealth transfer system. See infra Part VI.B.
184. Some one might have once paid some tax on Trust Fund Baby's fortune, of course,
but not necessarily. See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or Does the
Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, 28 NAT L TAX J. 416 (1975), reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL
ESSAYS 547 (1989) (a charming tale of benefiting from the income tax's incentives . . . before
the tax was even enacted).
'

185. See Adam Hime, Note, Getting Schooled by the Hybrid-based Tax: Equity and
Efficiency in the Federal Tax Treatment of Debt-financed Post-Secondary Educational
Expenditures, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 871 , 889-91 (2004).
186. See generally Auerbach, supra note 42.
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All this takes on significance when progressive rates are in play. By
ignoring both the initial incurring of debt and its subsequent
repayment, the prepaid consumption and income taxes each penalize
those whose uneven pattern of labor-market earnings require them to
borrow in their youth to finance their lifestyles. An important class of
taxpayers in this situation is, of course, students. The postpaid
consumption tax solves this problem by including debt as a taxable
inflow and allowing a systematic deduction for all repayments of
principal and interest; it allows a taxpayer to smooth forward in time,
just as retirement savings provisions under the so-called income tax
allow her to smooth backward.
Students often recoil at the notion that the proceeds of their
borrowing will be included in their tax base, as would be the case
under a consistent postpaid consumption tax. But such an inclusion,
logically followed by a deduction in the year of repayment, in fact
effectuates the ordinary-savings norm going forward; it is traditional
IRA or qualified-pension-plan treatment in reverse. Given progressive
rates, the difference is significant. In the running example, the student
borrower will pay a 10 percent effective tax on her loans under a
postpaid tax, while she would pay 20 percent under an income or a
prepaid consumption tax model to generate the after-tax dollars to
pay off those loans. In practice, today, law students must earn twice
their student-loan balances in order to pay off their debts, because
they must also pay Uncle Sam out of the earnings - first.
Within the new understanding of tax, borrowing, or negative
savings, has an important symmetry with positive savings. Both
typically effectuate the ordinary-savings norm. Just as savings allow
the wage earner to shift some of her labor earnings backward in time,
to finance her retirement, so borrowing allows her to shift her labor
market earnings forward in time, to finance her youth and
education.187 Progressive income and prepaid consumption taxes
burden these shifts - they disfavor smoothing transactions - because
the tax falls, and hence the appropriate level of progressivity is set, at
the moment of labor market earnings, which is arbitrary and uneven.
Income taxes further burden smoothing transactions by the double
taxation of savings used to effect them. A postpaid consumption tax,
in contrast, accommodates smoothing because the moment of ultimate
private use is the moment when decisions about rate progression are
set. On the other hand, savings that finance enhanced lifestyles or debt
that enables taxpayers to live "beyond their means" are disfavored by
the ordinary operation of the tax: the former phenomenon effecting
the yield-to-capital norm, the latter creating a "paternalistic push" to

187. Note that intergenerational smoothing allows family annuities markets to effect this
result.
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even out lifestyles within the structure of a progressive postpaid tax,
and to use debt wisely.
E.

Vickrey's Cumulative Lifetime A veraging, Compared

A consistent postpaid consumption tax is not the only means of
effectuating smoothing or averaging to avoid the problem of the
uneven time-path of labor market (and other) earnings. Vickrey
proposed a mechanism of smoothing by accounting conventions, a
"cumulative lifetime averaging" technique that helped to put tax
burdens on what Vickrey took to be a normatively appropriate
lifetime basis.188 Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform also contained some
discussion of the idea, 189 and the Internal Revenue Code contained
limited income averaging provisions for a number of years.190 Despite
Vickrey's frequent protestations to the contrary, the idea is
complicated in practice. It entails choosing a certain period for
smoothing, adding up cumulative income (or consumption) within the
period, subtracting previously taxed income (or consumption) and
then applying a rate structure, which could lead to negative taxes
(refunds) as well as positive taxes (payments) in the immediate period
of the return, depending on how this period fit with the average.
Human events such as marriage, divorce, and death were subjects of
some concern, and so on. A consistent progressive postpaid
consumption tax without cumulative smoothing is far easier to
implement.
Let us set aside, however, these practical or second-best concerns
for a moment. For present purposes, imagine that Vickrey's proposal
could be implemented seamlessly, by summing up lifetime income,
dividing by the years of the taxpayer's life, and basing a payment
(annual or lump sum) on the average annual income level. So stated,
there are two issues at the level of first-best, or ideal, theory to
differentiate the proposal I am pressing, for a consistent, progressive
postpaid consumption tax, from Vickrey's proposal for cumulative
averaging - though we importantly share the end of effecting
meaningful progression in the allocation of tax burdens, and hence
have much more in commpn than sets us apart.
To see the two issues, note that Vickrey's plan is set in the context
of an income tax, where the problem of uneven labor earnings is made
more acute by arbitrary patterns of financial capital realizations as
188. See Vickrey, supra note 102.
189. See BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 74-75. I thank David Bradford and Jim
Hines for a discussion of this and related points.
190. I.RC. §§ 1301-05 (1982) (repealed 1986). For a discussion of how these (complex)
provisions operated, see BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS (1981) 'JI 11 1.3.13, pp. 111-70 to 111-75.
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well. Taxing earnings consistently throughout a lifetime, however,
effectuates a smoothing, by design, such that an income tax with
cumulative averaging begins to resemble a consistent postpaid
consumption tax. The simplest way to see this point is that if a
taxpayer balances her books within her lifetime - neither leaving nor
receiving any net beneficent transfer - then lifetime income equals
lifetime consumption (consider the Haig-Simons definition, Equation
[1 ], across a lifetime, with no net savings, so that income
consumption). So there is no net difference, in the aggregate amounts
taxed, between a Vickrey-income tax and a postpaid consumption tax
for those who do not save beyond their lifetimes. This background
points out the two theoretical differences between Vickrey's
cumulative averaged income tax and a consistent postpaid
consumption tax.
First, those who do engage in intergenerational wealth
transmissions - those whose available resources exceed their
consumption within their own lifetimes - will see their taxes, that is,
the taxes paid within their generation, go down under a postpaid
consumption tax compared to Vickrey's tax. Once again, it is not,
however, the case that total taxes, across generations, will go down by
the transmission under the postpaid model; this depends on whether
the intergenerational shift is upwards or downwards, as noted above.
The multigenerational comparison between Vickrey's income
averaging and a postpaid consumption tax also depends on the rate
structure of each. The choice - still in first-best theory - turns on
what we think of intergenerational smoothing activities. Here
reasonable minds can differ. In theory, one could certainly argue that
an incentive to transfer wealth across generations in a smoothing
fashion - or, equivalently, the absence of an incentive to consume
excessively in the present generation - is a good thing.
This is so for several reasons. One, intergenerational smoothing
implements a familial annuities market that need not be disfavored
over third-party mechanisms (consider Figure 3, with its overlapping
generations). Transfers from grandparents to parents and parents to
children stand in lieu of each generation's annuitizing for itself,
forward and backward within its own lifetime. Two, transfers to
otherwise lesser-consuming individuals are, in a straightforward
application of utilitarian theory, welfare-enhancing. Nor are these
inducements somehow illiberal - after all, an incentive for the first
generation to consume everything and die broke is problematic, too. If
the intergenerational transfers turn out to allow for greater
consumption at the second and lower generations, the mechanism of
progressivity under the postpaid consumption tax will burden them. A
consistent progressive income tax with Vickrey averaging, in contrast,
will double-tax the transfers - in the first generation at a high level
because of the potential to consume, in the second generation as a
=
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source of use. A single tax, set at a level individuated by the user,
seems preferable. Once again, a consistent progressive postpaid
consumption tax, applied across generations, implements both the
ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, simultaneously, by design.
These norms are as compelling between as within generations.
Whereas this first difference turns on our thoughts about
intergenerational savings, the second difference between a consistent
postpaid consumption tax and Vickrey's cumulatively averaged
income tax relates to the taxation of consumption itself, within a
generation. A move to a consistent postpaid consumption tax avoids
the problem of having the morally arbitrary pattern of inflows dictate
the level of progressivity. But it only does so if the taxpayer actually
does smooth his consumption. If Lumpy Earner makes and spends
$100,000 a year, he foregoes the benefits of smoothing under a
postpaid consumption tax. Vickrey might well ask here why the actual
pattern of consumption should matter, as opposed to an average
lifetime measure that would reflect the vertical equities of the wider
view without the happenstance of uneven earnings or spending
patterns.191 In other words, even if Vickrey or a disciple should
concede the first point, that consumption and not income is the right
thing to cumulatively average, why should we not do the averaging
within a consumption tax design? Why, that is, should the government
differentiate between someone who spends an even $30,000 every year
and someone who alternates years of $40,000 in spending with years of
$20,000 in spending? The Vickrey lifetime averaging mechanism,
applied to a consistent consumption tax base, would alleviate this
problem.
Now as with the first point, reasonable minds can certainly differ.
There is nothing in the new understanding of tax that would or should
reject a cumulatively averaged consumption tax out of hand. Far from
it: This is a serious idea, and an attractive means to a meaningful
progressivity in tax, where the new understanding of tax aims. Once
again, however, I suspect that the practical answers are decisive:
Cumulative averaging is too complex, and its benefits over a
nonaveraged postpaid consumption tax are too minor, to mandate it.
But we can also once again proffer several arguments suggesting that
an averaging mechanism is not needed, and that the relatively simple,
unadjusted, progressive postpaid consumption tax model, applied
across and within generations is, indeed, an attractive ideal.
First, it is important to note that a taxpayer's smoothing need not
be precise to effectuate lifetime tax minimization, on account of the
marginal rate bracket mechanism. The very width of the rate brackets,

191. I thank Jim Hines and David Weisbach for their persistence in pressing these
points on me.
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and the slope of their graduation, can be set to mitigate the effect.
Consider again the marginal rate structure set out in Table 2. A
considerable part of the virtue of a consistent postpaid consumption
tax is that there can continue to be rate brackets at higher levels of
consumption because the disincentive effects do not fall on work
effort per se.192 Suppose, for example, that there was a 40% bracket
extending from $100,000 to $200,000. A taxpayer who spent $120,000
in one year and $180,000 in the next would bear no burden on account
of not consuming an even $150,000 in each year.193
Second, capital market mechanisms can rather easily and
effectively deal with many consumption-smoothing problems, such as
consumer durables, an issue that haunted Andrews and Blueprints.194
The problem is that a taxpayer who makes a large purchase in one
year, say of a house or a car, will show a certain "lumpiness" in her
consumption, which might indeed trigger higher taxes under a
consistently progressive postpaid consumption tax. But capital
transactions, such as leasing or buying over time, can fairly readily
solve these problems - in a manner that is not always possible with
self-help labor market averaging.195 Rather than spending $20,000 on a
car in a single year, for example, a five-year payment plan will
effectuate a $4,000 annual charge. And housing, which is a complex
item to tax under any broad-based tax, because of its mixture of
consumption and savings elements, can be handled in several different
ways to avoid the specifically lumpy consumption problem.196

192 See FRANK, supra note 113, at 228-31; Edward J. McCaffery, The Tyranny of
Money, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2126, 2129-30 (2000) [hereinafter McCaffery, Tyranny] (reviewing
FRANK, supra note 113). This point also relates back to the first argument against Vickrey's
position, specifically his use of an income tax base as default. A well-designed tax system, I
am arguing, should allow an "escape valve" for excessive lifetime earnings - it should allow
and perhaps even encourage the wealthy to continue to work and save, hoping that they not
spend their "surplus" funds on themselves. A tax system that taxes spent and unspent
resources does not do this; it disincentivizes work effort by those who have already funded
their own generation's needs and wants.
193. Even a taxpayer who slightly straddles the line will not pay a grave price, on
account of the slope of the marginal rate brackets. For example, a taxpayer who consumes
$230,000 one year (in the 50% bracket, say), and $170,000 the next, would pay an extra
$3,000 (10% of $30,000), or 1.5% of income, for the imprecision. If the brackets increased
in 5% intervals, the "problem" would be even smaller. I thank Reed Shuldiner for the
example.
194. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1150, 1155-57; BRADFORD ET
AL., supra note 8, at 81, 108-09, 117.
195. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 134-36. Reed Shuldiner has
pressed me on this need for advice. But, of course, taxpayers today need much advice on
shifting labor and capital market returns around in time. Consumption smoothing, in
contrast, seems more natural and largely within a taxpayer's control. See SMITH, supra note
54, at 778.
196. See BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 78 (ignoring the imputed income of home
ownership "for the sake of simplification"); MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2.
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Third, once the modifications suggested by the first two points
(wide rate brackets, gradual progressivity, and capital market
transactions) are understood, a strong argument exists that the pattern
of household consumption is not morally arbitrary. Determining the
appropriate spending level is importantly a matter of choice, and one
that affects the wider body politic.197
Fourth, and related, there are paternalistic reasons to try to get
individuals actually to smooth their consumption - certainly a good
deal of current American socio-economic policies are designed with
this goal in mind, not the least being the forced retirement savings
effected by the social security system.198 Vickrey, as a classical
economist, was drawn to the neutrality of the income-averaging
scheme; it does not matter whether a taxpayer does smooth because
all taxpayers with equal lifetime material resources, measured in
constant dollar terms, pay the same lifetime tax, irrespective of how
they choose to spend their wealth. On the other hand, ordinary moral
intuitions may question this proposition. It is prudent and good to live
within one's means, to borrow sensibly in youth and to save
responsibly in middle age.
Once again, to be clear and fair, these various arguments against
Vickrey's very clever cumulative lifetime averaging proposal, at least
when set in the context of a consumption tax (that is, after the first
point, on the income-versus-consumption difference, is set aside) may
be more a matter of making a virtue out of a near-necessity, for
Vickrey's proposal is complicated, and would make annual tax
reporting more burdensome and counterintuitive, while a consistent
postpaid consumption tax is comparatively straightforward. Still, a
compelling case can be made that what the progressive postpaid
consumption tax does simply, by design, is also the right thing to do.
We should celebrate the fortuity.

197. McCaffery, The Right to Waste?, supra note 24; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra
note 165; Smith, supra note 54, at 778. It is curious that some argue against this moralism,
while advocating, explicitly or implicitly, for progressive income tax rates. It is difficult to see
why the harm from unequal earnings is greater than the harm from unequal spending,
especially when a tax system can constrain what can be done with the earnings. The problem
of the accumulated capital itself is, of course, a different matter, which I have addressed
elsewhere and note again below, infra Part VII.B.4. See McCaffery, Being the Best, supra
note 15; Edward J. McCaffery, The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF . 281 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Political Liberal Case]; but see Rakowski,
supra note 15; Deborah Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top
One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99 (2003).
198. Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
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IN PRACTICE: THE MESS WE'VE MADE,
PART ONE - THE INCOME TAX

We now leave the comfortable towers of ideal theory, and descend
into the devilish details of practice. The key insight of Andrews's 1974
article was that the income tax was badly deficient when it came to
getting at the savings component of the right-hand side of the Haig
Simons definition of income,
Income

=

Consumption + Savings. [1 )199

Andrews argued for a more consistent treatment of savings, in the
form of its systematic exclusion, on essentially second-best grounds:
even if we should tax all savings, as a matter of ideal theory, the fact
that we do so only erratically, as a practical matter, suggests that we
abandon the attempt in the name of consistency and fairness. Andrews
ran into trouble when he tried to superimpose a possible first-best
justification for the logically concomitant shift to a consumption tax.200
But there was no denying the facts of the matter: the so-called income
tax was erratic in getting at savings, at best. Under the traditional
understanding of tax, any failure to get at savings results in a
consumption tax. Thus scholars and commentators, beginning with
Andrews himself, began calling the existing tax a "hybrid" one, a mix
of income and consumption tax elements.201
The new understanding of tax shows that the conflation of prepaid
and postpaid consumption tax models in the traditional view has
limited the understanding of the status quo. Once we have come to
understand that prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes are not
equivalent under progressive tax rates, we want to know, specifically,
what kind of consumption tax we have and should have, in whole or in
part. The new understanding opens the door to a more nuanced
critique of the present tax.
Much of tax policy since the 1970s, and especially in the last few
years, has involved a steady drift towards a specifically prepaid
consumption tax. Tax falls fully on labor earnings as they come into
199. Professor Andrews wrote:
[T)he ultimate policy choice to be made is between achievable ends, not abstract ideals.
Most of my prior article [Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8) was designed to
show that the most intractable difficulties in the existing income tax arise from the virtual
impossibility of achieving a satisfactory reflection of real accumulation in a practical income
tax base, and that these difficulties could be readily avoided by pursuing the goal of
consumption instead of accretion.

See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 947.
200. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 167-68.
201. The phrase was first used in Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 1 17.
See also Auerbach, supra note 42; McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 23.
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households, but any subsequent taxation on accumulated financial
capital or its yield is easily avoided. Taxes on the yield to capital have
become voluntary in important ways. This is a fact, and one we ought
to be confronting far more forcefully in our practical as well as
normative tax policy.202 Over time, the real fault line in practical
income tax policy has become to preserve the tax as an effective wage
tax, while making sure that the gaps on the capital side - holes that
the system seemingly lacks the will, the way, or both, to fill up - do
not spill over to engulf the labor side. The Tax Reform Act of 1 986,
considered at some length below, is the grand example of this
phenomenon. We are slowly, seemingly inexorably, drifting towards a
prepaid consumption or wage tax. We will wake up soon with a flat
tax, seemingly against our very own wishes.203
The traditional view of tax continues to argue for an "income" tax
as if we have had, have now, or ever will have one, in opposition to the
movement towards a prepaid consumption tax. But the real choice the only choice - is what kind of consumption tax to have. This Part
aims to drive this point home, loud and clear. It canvasses what is
wrong with the actual income tax as a practical matter. There are both
structural and seemingly ad hoc deviations from the income tax's
commitment to taxing savings. Ironically, it is the ad hoc deviations
that point the way towards a better future for tax; the structural gaps,
nightmares of tax past, haunt its present. We start with these
deficiencies.
A. Structural Gaps
The problems with the "income" tax begin - and, to some
considerable extent, end - with Eisner v. Macomber,204 a 1920
decision of the United States Supreme Court that dealt with the timing
of taxation, although the Court itself and the parties before it were
slow to see the true stakes involved.205
Mrs. Macomber, a shareholder in Standard Oil, had received a
"stock on stock" dividend. To simplify the actual math of the matter,
assume that this was a one-for-one stock "split." In other words, Mrs.
Macomber, who one day held 100 shares of stock, found herself

202. See Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? Revisited, Proceedings, 93rd Annual
Conference of the National Tax Association, 2000, 268 (2001) (hereinafter McCaffery, A
Voluntary Tax?); see also ROBERT T. KIYOSAKI & SHARON L. LECHTER, RICH DAD, POOR
DAD (1997).
203. Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform, notes that piecemeal tax
measures are bringing us ever closer to a flat tax. See Norquist, supra note 109.
204. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
205. For additional detail, see Majorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The
Continuing Legacy ofRealization, in TAX STORIES 53 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
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owning 200 shares the next day. Since every other shareholder
received the same split, the occasion was not itself an accession to
wealth. The number of outstanding shares of stock had simply doubled
across the board and - minor frictions aside - the value of each
share of stock, necessarily, fell by half. If each of Mrs. Macomber's 100
shares had been worth $10 each before the split, she would have had
200 shares worth $5 each after it. Mrs. Macomber's total value of
Standard Oil stock holdings would be $1,000 before and after the
paper transaction.
The much-watched case made it all the way to the Supreme Court.
It was clear that the government was having a hard time articulating
its reasoning for imposing a tax on the unlucky Mrs. Macomber, and
the case actually went through two hearings before the Court. 206
Finally, the government got to the crux of the matter. Conceding that
the actual stock dividend was not an accession to wealth, and that it
was not the "new" shares of stock, per se, that it was attempting to tax,
the government argued instead that the "income" had come from the
antecedent rise in value of Mrs. Macomber's shareholdings, which the
government could have taxed whenever it chose to; the moment of the
stock on stock dividend was merely a "convenient" time to do so. This
argument sounds in Haig-Simons income. The words Simons actually
used to describe the savings component of income were, after all, "the
change in value of the store of property rights between the beginning
and end of the period in question. "207 Suppose Mrs. Macomber had
purchased the stock some years ago for $200. It was now worth $1,000.
Mrs. Macomber had "income" of $800 in the Haig-Simons sense - at
some time - because of the "change in value of the store of her
property rights."
Unfortunately for the government, by the time it got around to
making its argument, the Justices rejected all of its claims by a five-to
four count. Mrs. Macomber would have no taxable income until and
unless she "realized" the gain in her stock, as by selling it. The
"realization requirement" announced in Macomber is simple enough
to understand. Its logic is compelling, even: Why should taxpayers pay
a tax without a transaction generating the cash with which to pay it?
Why not wait until a sale or other disposition to get at the gain?208 The
answers given to these rhetorical questions in the context of an income
tax - that it was indeed alright to wait and see, and pay later - are
devastating. The time value of money suggests that a tax paid later is

206. Macomber was first argued before the Court on April 16, 1919, restored to docket
for reargument May 19, 1919, and reargued October 17 and 20, 1919. The decision was
handed down March 8, 1920.
207. See SIMONS, supra note 29, at 50.
208. See I.RC. § lOOl(a) (2004).
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better, to a taxpayer, than the same tax paid sooner.209 Worse yet, the
confluence of the realization requirement with two other structural
features of the income tax combine to make any tax on the yield to
capital, however and whenever used, voluntary. Macomber marked
the end of the income tax, still in its first decade of existence; as
Andrews later put the matter, the realization requirement was "the
Achilles' heel" of the income tax.210 Recall that, with Achilles himself,
the seemingly minor flaw proved fatal.
1.

Tax Planning 101

The realization requirement has a simple, intuitive appeal: indeed,
a postpaid consumption tax operates much along a realization model,
deferring the time of tax until capital is converted into cash for
consumption.211 The problem is that the realization doctrine given
birth by Macomber did not spring into existence under a postpaid
consumption tax. It was engrafted onto a theoretical income tax. This
is a fatal flaw.
Recall the income tax's principled nontaxation of debt. Combined
with Macomber's realization requirement, this means that one can
borrow - directly or indirectly using appreciated assets like Mrs.
Macomber's stock as collateral
and consume, tax-free.
Consumption financed by debt backed by capital assets falls out of the
tax base for an income-with-realization tax. Far from simply missing
an element of savings, or the yield to capital, the actual income tax fails
to reach the personal spending of the propertied classes. In such a case,
there can in fact be no savings: if the borrowing to consume precisely
offsets the rise in value of the assets - as it will in the numeric
example set out below - there is no net accretion to wealth. There is
simply consumption without taxation. The perverse result derives
from the conjunction of two timing rules under the flawed income tax:
first, the "wait until realization" doctrine of Macomber, and, second,
the "wait until debt is repaid" doctrine inherent in the Haig-Simons
definition of income. By using unrealized assets to help obtain debt
financing now,212 the savvy taxpayer gets to have her cake and eat it,
tax-free, too.
209. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 56, at 2-3; Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8,
at 1123-24; see generally Halperin, supra note 73.
210. See William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in
NEW D IRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 278, 280 (Charis E. Walker
& Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983).
211. For an interesting discussion of the realization requirement, see Terrence R.
Chorvat, Perception and Income: The Behavioral Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36
CONN. L. REV. 75 (2003).
212. Note that the result does not turn on any literal pledging of assets as security,
though this might lead to more favorable credit terms.
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Eventually, it would seem, things must work out and the books
become balanced: the debt must be repaid, with nondeductible or
after-tax dollars from fresh labor-market earnings or realized capital
transactions, and a tax will be paid. Later is better than sooner, so the
taxpayer has still gained an advantage from holding and borrowing,
but at least a tax will get paid eventually. Yet "later" may never come
when we add a third doctrinal feature of the status quo, not unrelated
to the Macomber story: the "stepped-up basis" for assets acquired on
death.213 This statutory doctrine provides that assets acquired from a
decedent shall have a taxable "basis" equal to the fair market value of
the property on date of death.214 This means that an heir, who acquires
the property itself tax-free,215 can also sell it the next day, tax-free.216
The stepped-up basis rule structurally follows from the realization
requirement. Macomber alone gave taxpayers an incentive to acquire
the kind of assets that rise in value without producing taxable cash, in
the form of interests and dividends: Such disfavored assets walk head
on into Mill's second tax, whereas the realization requirement gives a
way to defer the government's second bite at the apple for non-cash
generating property. The realization requirement destroys the source
neutrality of an ideal income tax. Assets that go up in value via price
appreciation alone, such as growth stocks, land, art, and so on, have an
advantage over simple bonds and bank accounts that produce readily
observable cash flows to their holders.217 In the wake of Macomber,
the rich and well advised could be expected to acquire capital assets;
the financial markets could be expected to generate such assets. They
did. Further, Macomber gave wealthy taxpayers an incentive to hold
onto their "winners," even as they could sell their "losers."218 The
ability to borrow tax-free meant that holding onto appreciated assets
need not entail any personal sacrifice in consumptive lifestyle. And so
it came to pass, predictably enough, that the economy became full of
assets with "built-in gain;" that is, assets that had a tax "basis" equal to
their initial cost, but a fair market value far in excess of this historic

213. See I.RC. § 1014 (2004).
214. See id. For a definition of "basis," see MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2,
at 30 ("Basis means, in essence, after-tax dollars."). I prefer this definition to the often-used
definition of "cost" in part because of the stepped-up basis rule.
215. I.R.C. § 102 (2004).
216. The stepped-up basis under I.RC. § 1014 (2004) means that the gain calculated
under I.RC. § 1001 (2004) will be zero.
217. See KIYOSAKI & LECHTER, supra note 202. The holders of appreciating assets that
do not produce cash flows can simply borrow against the increase in value of such assets,
thereby gaining access to cash without the tax liability of assets that generate realized
proceeds.
218. The tax benefits of this strategy are subjec�. to capital loss offset rules, discussed
infra Part V.B.2.
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figure. Just like Mrs. Macomber's stock, in the numbers given above,
had a basis of $200 and a fair market value of $1,000.
This built-in gain had to be preserved in the case of gifts among the
living, or any taxation on capital assets would be trivially avoided.
Mrs. Macomber could simply give her stock to her husband or child,
who could sell it, tax-free, and perhaps later gift the cash back to her.
Hence the law instituted a "carryover" basis regime for gifts,
preserving the donor's basis in the donee's hands.219 But what of assets
passed on after death? Heirs complained that it was unfair to saddle
them with the inherent tax liability; it was also a practical nightmare to
figure out the deceased's basis in the assets. The tax system
compromised by putting in place a separate gift and estate tax to get at
the net wealth of the truly rich decedents, and allowing everyone to
acquire assets from a decedent with a basis equal to their then fair
market value - the stepped-up basis rule.220
As with the realization requirement, the stepped-up basis rule for those who can understand it at all - makes a certain sense, in
isolation. Yet when put together with the realization requirement and
the nontaxation of debt, one has all that she needs to understand "Tax
Planning 101." This is simple tax planning doctrine that tax students
can learn on the first day of a course in basic federal income taxation
- doctrine that underscores how easy it is for those with stocks of
financial capital to avoid all federal taxation.221 Tax Planning 101 is
elegantly simple:
• Buy,
• Borrow,
• Die.
That is it. By buying capital assets that appreciate without producing
taxable dividends; selling one's losers and holding one's winners;
borrowing to finance present consumption; and continuing the game
straight on to death, the rich and well advised can avoid all federal
taxes. Tax Planning 101, as just set out, avoids income tax to the
spender and to her heirs. It avoids the increasingly important social
security or payroll tax system, as discussed in the next Part below, for
its wealthy practitioners by the simple expedient of their never
actually working. Tax Planning 101 avoids the estate tax because that
is a net tax levied on assets minus liabilities held at death - but if Tax
219. I.R.C. § 1015 (2004); see also Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929) (upholding
carryover basis for gifts).
220. See I.RC. § 1014 (2004). Joseph Dodge and Jay Soled have suggested that
taxpayers may not even be waiting until death to avoid gain legally. Instead they seem to be
inflating the basis of assets sold during life, knowingly or unknowingly cheating on their
taxes. See Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Inflated Basis and the Quarter- Trillion Dollar
Revenue Question, 106 TAX NOTES 453 (2005).
221. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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Planning 101 is taken to its limits, there is no net estate. Tax Planning
101 means no taxes, notwithstanding a comfortable lifestyle for those
with the assets in hand to play it.
2.

An Example

To illustrate Tax Planning 101, consider the curious case of Artful
Dodger.222 Imagine that Dodger somehow has $1,000,000 after taxes.
How he got it does not really matter, although it is worth noting that
he could have gotten it tax-free from his parents.223 With this stock of
cash, Dodger buys assets. Not just any assets, but the kinds of assets
that rise in value without producing taxable cash dividends: growth
stocks, say, or land, art, sports franchises even. Dodger sells any assets
that go down in value, taking tax losses when he can, carrying them
forward when he cannot.224
Suppose that the general return on investments is 10 percent.
Dodger's $1,000,000, prudently invested, rises in value to $1,100,000
after one year. He pays no tax on this "mere appreciation" under
Macomber. This might appear to be all fine and good, because Dodger
is continuing to save, and so should not be taxed under the logic of a
consumption tax, and can await taxation under the logic of an income
with-realization-tax. The trouble is, Dodger need not be saving at all.
He could be consuming away.
Dodger borrows $100,000. He pays no tax on this because
borrowing is not income under the Haig-Simons definition. Dodger
can spend away, living as well as a wage earner making $200,000, but
subject to a 50 percent combined federal, state, and local income and
payroll tax burden. At the end of Year 1 , Dodger's net worth is
$1,000,000: his $1,100,000 portfolio minus his $100,000 principal debt
balance.
Dodger must pay interest on his debt. But he also has his assets,
which he has maintained by borrowing.225 So, in Year 2, the $1,100,000
portfolio goes up by another 10 percent, or $110,000, to a net of
222. This example is borrowed from id. at 33-34.
223. See I.R.C. § 102 (2004). Of course, his parents would have, at one time, paid tax on
the initial labor market earnings, see Warren, supra note 13, at 934-41, unless they happen to
have received these before the initial imposition of the tax. See Bittker, supra note 184.
224. I.R.C. § 1211 (2004).
225. Suppose, for example, that Dodger has $1 million worth of assets. He can sell the
assets, pay the tax now, and spend what is left, say $600,000 with a 40% effective tax. Or
Dodger can instead borrow against the asset and consume tax-free. If he borrows $600,000 at
a 5% interest rate, he also retains the asset, worth $1 million and appreciating at its own rate.
He can buy a "collar" or enter a "stop loss" order should his assets ever fall in value, which
would leave him in the same financial position as he would have been in with an initial sale.
But if the assets do not fall in value, he wins. The net cost of borrowing is i - r, where i is the
interest on the debt and r the return on the asset. If r exceeds i, as it typically would, Dodger
makes real value on the strategy. He has his cake and is eating it, too, tax-free.
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$1,210,000. Dodger promptly borrows this $110,000. He uses $10,000
to pay off the interest on his Year 1 debt, and $100,000 to consume. At
the end of the year, his net wealth is $1,000,000: a portfolio of
$1,210,000 minus $210,000 in debt.
As long as his portfolio rises by the same amount as the interest on
his debt, Dodger never pays tax, always has $100,000 of consumption,
and always maintains his $1,000,000 net wealth. If he can borrow less
principal than the rise in his portfolio - live at a $50,000 level, say, or,
in the case of Bill Gates, a few billion - and if the appreciation in his
portfolio exceeds the interest rate on his debt over time, he keeps
getting richer. If he needs to diversify his portfolio, not to worry:
clever tax lawyers and accountants have devised ways to do just that,
such as by various "mixing bowl" transactions, tax-free.226 Too much
risk? Not to worry: various financial instruments, such as "cuffs" and
"collars" come to the rescue.227 Much simpler devices, such as
universal life insurance policies, can do the trick as well.228
Neither Dodger nor his estate, in this example, will ever pay any
gift or estate tax. When Dodger dies, his heirs will inherit his assets
income-tax free.229 They can sell them off for no gain because of the
stepped-up basis rule.230 Then they can pay off Dodger's debts and
keep whatever cash is left over. As long as Dodger has borrowed
enough to bring his net estate below $1,500,000 or so - actually,
below $3.5 million under current law, in 2009, or infinity, in 2010231 no estate tax will be due.
This is all, of course, nice work - if you can get it. One can indeed
get it - if she has wealth to start - under today's tax laws featuring a
nominal income tax.
3.

The Practical Facts of the Matter

How many rich Americans take Tax Planning 101 to its limits,
avoiding all taxes, is an empirical question that is rather hard to
226. For a discussion and explanation of mixing bowl transactions, see Louis S. Freeman
et al., The Partnership Union: Opportunities for Joint Ventures and Divestitures, in TAX
PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 117-22 (2004).
227. See, e.g., James Bicksler & Andrew H. Chen, An Economic Analysis of Interest
Rate Swaps, 41 J. FIN. 645, 652 (1986); Phyllis Plitch, Esoteric Tactic for Investors Grows
Popular, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at B 105B (describing the use of collars).
228. See, e.g., Farhad Aghdami, Income, Gift, and Estate Tax Planning with Life
Insurance, ALI-ABA's Direct-to-Desktop CLE Course Forms, at http://d2d.ali
aba.org/_files/thumbs/rtf/ CK025-05AghdamiLifelns_thumb.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
229. I.R.C. § 102 (2004).
230. I.R.C. § 1014 (2004).
231. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
521, 1 15 Stat. 71 (2001 ).
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answer. The very rich are relatively few, and their ways are more or
less a secret.232 Certainly, plenty do follow Tax Planning 101, in some
form; the advice is readily available.233 It is also apparent, from the
facts that some estates pay estate taxes and that some among the living
do indeed pay some capital gains taxes, that not all who could take the
game to its limits do so. Quantifying the narrow bottom-line
consequences is elusive. But these very questions (i.e., how many
people avoid capital taxes?) form the analytic basis for a
consequentialist defense of maintaining the status quo with its porous
income tax.234 If few individuals actually take Tax Planning 101 to or
near its limits, perhaps things are not so bad after all, contra to
Andrews's and other critics' dire descriptions of the way things are.
Yet things in tax today are bad, and for several reasons
notwithstanding the intractability of the empirical questions over Tax
Planning 101 's actual breadth. First, there can be no doubt - certainly
none of the critics calling for more empirical analysis or pressing the
consequentialist objection raise any doubts- about the analytic facts
of the matter, that is, about the legal steps in Tax Planning 101 's
buy/borrow/die advice. This is basic tax. Yet the mere existence of this
legal structure raises troubling questions of both equity and efficiency.
If some but not all who have capital take advantage of Tax Planning
101 , in whole or in part, what does this tell us about the fairness of the
tax system? The essence of the claim that tax for those with capital is
voluntary is not that no one with capital pays taxes - people do
voluntary things, even voluntarily pay taxes - it is rather that no one
with capital has to do so.235 There are perfectly legitimate ways for
people with property to avoid paying any federal taxes. This is not so
- it is dramatically not so - for people earning labor wages, as we
shall see. A system of tax that marks radical distinctions between the
sources of present consumption, and that turns further on wealthy
taxpayers' varying degrees of tax aversion and access to information
- not even terribly sophisticated information, for the basics of
buy/borrow/die are indeed fairly basic - is at best a highly suspect
system.

232. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Uneasy Empirical Case for Abolishing the Estate
Tax, 5 1 TAX L. REV. 495, 509-11 ( 1996) (discussing the difficulty in gleaning the motives and
techniques of wealth transfers).
233. The advice can be found readily enough, for example, in such bestsellers as
KIYOSAKI & LECHTER, supra note 202; POLLAN & LEVINE, supra note 169; see also
MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2 (describing and referring to numerous popular
tax planning books). Evidence from sophisticated econometrics that we collect little if any
revenue from capital taxes also suggests the point. See Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now
Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income? 89 J. PUB. ECON. 981 (2004).
234. See Geier, supra note 197.
235. See McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202; Gordon et al., supra note 233.
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Second, and central to the analysis to follow in this subsection, the
mere analytic facts of Tax Planning 101 - and not the breadth of their
actual incidence - constrain important matters of practical tax design.
In the language of economics, features such as low tax rates on
realization are "endogenous" to an income-with-realization regime.
There is simply no very good way, under an "income" tax with the
realization requirement as now construed, to heavily burden capital: If
taxpayers are not flocking to advisers to avoid a 15 percent capital
gains tax, might they not do so at a 40, or 50 percent level? Evidence
that some taxpayers pay some capital gains taxes at the favorable rates
that persist today does not contradict the fact that these are, indeed,
favorable capital gains rates.236 The present structure of tax haunts the
possibilities for tax's better future.
Third, the discussion might be effete, lacking in practical urgency,
if the present regime, with its income-plus-estate taxes, embodied the
only meaningful promise of getting at capital and its yield at all. The
most strident critics of any form of consumption tax insist on the yield
to-capital norm, though they do not use this language.237 To such
critics, getting some tax on some capital is better than getting no tax
on any capital, which is what they take a consumption tax to offer. But
this false dichotomy follows only from the flawed traditional view of
tax. Once we understand that a progressive postpaid consumption tax
gets at some of the yield to capital, and in j ust the cases in which it is
most compelling to do so - and also as we come to see that the
structure of a postpaid consumption tax changes the nature of the
arguments over the rate structure, allowing for more, not less,
progression in them - we are no longer left clinging to a porous
income tax as the sole hope for reaching capital and its yield. On ideal
terms, an income tax overshoots its mark by double-taxing all capital
come what may; in nonideal terms, an income tax fails minimal
standards of fairness and rationality by taxing the yield to capital only
among those most willing to pay it, or unwilling or unable to plan
around it. A better way exists.
The balance of this subsection traces out a few of the analytic
elements of the present income tax regime that have followed in the
structural wake of Macomber.
a. Capital gains preferences. The leading example of a provision in
current law that follows from Macomber - a practical concession to
the fact that we have an income-with-realization tax - is the
preferential rate for capital gains.238 This is the tax rate that gets
236. And see Dodge & Soled, supra note 220, for a suggestion that taxpayers are
dramatically under-stating their true capital gains.
237. See, e.g. , MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6; SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 7, at
10-13; Alstott, supra note 6; Deborah A. Geier, supra note 197; Rakowski, supra note 15.
238. l.R.C. § l(h) (2004).
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imposed when and if a taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of her
long-held, capital assets.239 This rate has long been set at a fraction of
the "ordinary" tax rates that fall on labor and the regular yield to
capital in the form of interest and dividends. It is now capped at a
maximum 15 percent, having been reduced from 20 percent in 2003
tax legislation.240
Of all the arguments mustered in favor of a capital gains
preference, the only truly compelling one is brute necessity in the face
of Tax Planning 101: Who would ever sell an asset and incur a 90
percent, or 70 percent, or even 40 percent tax when she could borrow
against it and spend away, tax-free?241 The realization requirement
generates a so-called lock-in effect, set in motion by Macomber: a
wedge between an owner's willingness to sell a given asset and a
buyer's willingness to pay for it, all on account of the built-in tax
liability. Suppose, for example, that Mrs. Macomber had a personal
subjective valuation in her stock of $800; a third party buyer would
willingly pay her $1,000. This is a deal that wealth (and welfare)
maximizing suggests ought to happen. But if, on sale, Mrs. Macomber
would have to pay $400 in taxes, her personal gain from the exchange
would be only $600, less than her subjective valuation. Since Mrs.
Macomber quite rationally cares only about her after-tax return, the
deal does not transpire. At high enough tax rates, there are many
deals that do not take place. The resulting lock-in effect threatens to
shut down the economy: assets will not trade and, therefore, will not
go to their highest and best use and users. This problem, in simple
terms, is a function of the timing of tax: by making sales and exchanges
trigger tax, an income-with-realization requirement deters sales and

239. See l.R.C. §§ 1221 (2004), 1222 (2002) for a definition of capital assets.
240. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 301,
117 Stat. 758 (2003).
241. Other common arguments for a capital gains preference are simply not convincing.
For example, there is an argument that much of the gain from the sale of an asset reflects
compensation for inflation. This argument, made before general rate-bracket indexing,
lacked a strong claim to fairness, because much of the return to human capital, too,
compensated for changes in the inflation or monetary rate. After rate-bracket indexing
became fully effective, the capital gains argument lacked much force. Further, indexing of an
asset's basis for inflation is a far better reaction to the "problem" of inflationary gain than a
crude discount to all assets held a year or more. Another argument is that capital gains can
result in "bunching," or the temporary elevation of a taxpayer into a higher-rate bracket. In
fact, the evidence on bunching of capital realizations is slim; and capital market transactions,
such as installment sales, (see l.R.C. § 453 (2004)) can deal with the problem, as could a
more targeted averaging mechanism in the tax laws. And again, it is unclear why there
should be solicitude for the taxpayers with financial capital who suffer this problem, when
there is no adjustment for those with human capital who also fall victim to bunching. This
Article is an attempt to make the smoothing phenomenon general, and to be indifferent to
the financial/human capital source of the problem. All that said, however, the lock-in effect
is a compelling argument for a capital gains preference. See Edward J. McCaffery, Capital
Gains: What's the Point, and Are We Missing It?, 43 TAX NOTES 223 (1989).
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exchanges. This is not the case under a consistent postpaid
consumption tax: sales or exchanges of any investment asset followed
by reinvestment of the proceeds in other assets do not trigger tax think of making adjustments inside an IRA or 401(k) plan. All that
triggers a tax under a postpaid consumption tax is the decision to
spend resources on private preclusive use.
Under an income-with-realization tax, some preference for capital
gains is needed to lubricate the wheels of commerce, to keep the game
going. All that is left is to haggle over the price, as the saying goes, and
the political system is indeed constantly flirting with lowering the rates
further. By deferring Mill's "second" tax, Macomber moves the system
toward a prepaid consumption tax; by lowering the magnitude of the
ultimate second tax hit, capital gains preferences - which follow from
Macomber and the lock-in effect that a realization requirement
generates - take us further in that direction. Of course, holding assets
until death in the manner of Tax Planning 101 's buy/borrow/die
strategy is the limiting case: Here, the second tax, like Beckett's
Godot, never comes.242
Capital gain preferences are a microcosm of what is wrong with the
status quo. We have seen, with Vickrey, that the principal reason to
have a comprehensive individual tax system is to make individuated
judgments of the appropriate progressivity of effective tax burdens.
But the low rate on capital gains, dictated by the flaws of an income
with-realization tax, is a crude and across-the-board affair - it is not
individuated at all. A capital gains preference is also source driven, a
distinction based on the type of asset held and sold. It does not matter
how one uses the proceeds - to smooth or to enhance, for oneself or
another. Progressivity suffers, and individuation suffers, on the altar of
the practical constraints of analytic tax system design.
b. Corporate dividend preferences. The 2003 tax act - one of
several leading exhibits in making out the case that practical tax policy
is moving towards a flat wage tax - not only lowered the capital gains
rate to 15 percent, as discussed above, but it also extended this rate to
corporate dividends, which had traditionally been taxed at ordinary
income levels.243 The lowered or nontaxation of corporate dividends is
an intricate economic matter that turned out to be an intricate political
one as well. For present purposes, two themes are important.
One, this development plausibly follows from the structure of an
income-with-realization tax. Just as Macomber generated a lock-in
effect at the level of individual asset owners - generating a
242. Dodge & Soled, supra note 220, suggest taxpayers aren't waiting for Godot, either:
They are taking matters into their own hands, overstating basis and thereby understating
gain. l.R.C. § lOOl(a) (2004).
243. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act § 302; see also, STEUERLE, supra
note 9, at 224-25.
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disincentive for them ever to sell their holdings - so too did it
generate a lock-in effect, dubbed a "retained earnings trap," at the
corporate level. Focusing solely on the individual tax consequences, a
wealthy investor like Dodger would understandably look askance at a
corporation paying him large cash dividends, taxable at ordinary rates
that hit 90 percent and higher in the twentieth century. Better for the
corporation to keep the cash itself and reinvest, so that the value of
Dodger's shares would grow tax-free, like Mrs. Macomber's, until and
unless he decided to trigger a realization event by a sale, at which time
the tax would fall due at the much lower individual capital gains rates.
The retained-earnings trap gave American corporations a good reason
to hoard cash; at one point recently, Microsoft had $56 billion in cash
on hand.244 One way to get corporations to disgorge their cash holdings
- making companies smaller in the process - is to lower or eliminate
the tax on corporate dividends at the individual investor level.245
Two, the corporate dividend tax rate reduction is yet another step
towards a relatively flat prepaid consumption tax. Tax Planning 101
points the way for those with capital to avoid paying any further
federal tax whatsoever.246 But for those with stocks of capital unwilling
or unable to take this advice, life continues to get better, tax-wise, in
any event. Virtually all subsequent taxes on capital are being
eliminated or reduced. And as with the capital gains preference, an
argument for the normative propriety of a corporate dividend
preference is not an individuated argument at all: anyone who owns
corporate stocks will see her dividends taxed at 15 percent, however
wealthy she is, and for whatever use she puts the cash.247
c. Other consumption-tax elements. Preference for those capital
gains actually realized and corporate dividends received are just two
tips of a large iceberg. As Andrews was well aware, consumption tax
elements abound in the so-called income tax. But what has not been
generally noticed, on account of the continued hegemony of the
traditional view of tax, which has equated all forms of consumption
tax, is how much of the current income tax is in fact a specifically

244. Brier Dudley, Microsoft's $75 Billion Plan: Share Wealth with Investors, SEATILE
TIMES, July 21, 2004, at Al; Gary Rivlin, Microsoft to Pay Special Dividend to Stockholders,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at Al; see also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Companies With Cash
Hoards Don't Necessarily Pay It Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at C7.
245. The incentive appears to have worked. See CHRIS EDWARDS, REPLACING THE
SCANDAL-PLAGUED CORPORATE INCOME TAX WITH A CASH-FLOW TAX 23 (Cato Inst.,
Policy Analysis No. 484, 2003), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-484es.html (Aug.14,
2003).
246. See supra Part V.A.1.
247. Del Jones, CEOs, Heirs to Stock Fortunes Win Big with Cut, USA TODAY, Jan. 9,
2003, at 3B (noting that each of the five Walton heirs would save $197 million annually in
taxes if dividends were tax-free).
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prepaid consumption or wage tax model. Consider a few more
doctrinal matters.
In cash-value life insurance, a taxpayer overpays for the pure
actuarial or "term" component of insurance. The insurance company
then invests the excess, on her account. The taxpayer pays no tax,
basically because of Macomber, on the "inside build up" of
appreciation, even if the insurance company buys assets such as bonds
that would produce ordinary income in her hands. When she dies and
her heirs get the proceeds, these are income tax-free to them,248 and
with rather trivial planning, the policy's value will not count in her
estate for federal tax purposes.249 As with most instances of clever tax
planning, this device does not work only for the altruistic or
intergenerationally minded; taxpayers are free to borrow against the
cash value of their policy, tax-free. In such a case, when the insured
dies, the insurance company first pays itself off, and her heirs - if she
has taken this game to its limit - get nothing.250 This is simply a one
stop shopping way to play Tax Planning 101, buy/borrow/die. It is also
prepaid consumption tax treatment: the taxpayer pays taxes on her
wages, uses them to pay insurance premia, and never again pays tax.
For a good many Americans, their most significant asset is a house.
Although home mortgage interest is deductible, principal payments
are not. The economics of home ownership work under a prepaid
consumption tax model. One buys the asset with after-tax funds, but
does not pay tax on its yield - the very important opportunity cost
benefit of not having to pay rent. Further, when a married couple sells
their house, they get to take away up to $500,000 of gain, tax-free.251
That will cover most homeowners, of course; for those with larger
shares of appreciation, there might be a 15 percent capital gains tax on
the excess of gain over $500,000. The saga of the taxability of home
sales under the income tax, like so much of tax today, owes much to
Macomber. The realization requirement means that capital
appreciation in personal residences gets ignored as it accrues, awaiting
an ultimate sale or disposition. But here too there is a lock-in effect,
deterring families from "trading up" to get larger homes, or moving to
a different area for job-related or other reasons. To deal with these
problems, the law employed a "rollover" provision for many years,
allowing the built-in tax gain to follow the family's real estate moves.252
248. I.RC. § 101 (2004).
249. See generally I.RC. § 2042 (2004).
250. Cf Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1960) (describing a scenario in
which borrowing against a life insurance policy would have left a "relative pittance").
Although Knetsch lost his case, much sophisticated planning with life insurance persists to
this day.
251 . I.RC. § 121 (2004).
252. I.RC. § 1034 (1988) (repealed 1997).
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But then the elderly had a problem: Once the kids had left the nest,
and they wanted a smaller home or to relocate to a less expensive
area, they faced an exploding tax time bomb. So Congress dealt with
their problem, excluding gain when taxpayers older than 55 sold a
residence.253 Perhaps mercifully, President Clinton swept away many
of the subtleties, allowing the $500,000 per couple exemption
discussed above. Each step in the story made some sense. B ut,
sweeping all details aside, what we are left with is an important asset
fully taxed for most taxpayers on the prepaid consumption tax model:
houses are bought with after-tax dollars, and their yield is never again
taxed.
Retirement savings are a final and very important example of
consumption-tax treatment. I shall discuss them below, as an ad hoc
deviation from an income tax. For these provisions follow not so much
from the structure of an income-plus-realization tax, as from conscious
decisions to deviate from either an income or an income-plus
realization ideal. It is noteworthy, however, that there has been a
trend in the retirement savings area, which began on the postpaid
consumption tax model, towards the prepaid one. Together with the
basic tax planning of buy/borrow/die, lower tax rates on capital
realizations and corporate dividends, cash-value life insurance, and the
taxation of home-ownership, the new developments in retirement
savings help to move tax towards a world in which citizens will pay
taxes on their wages, under a compressed rate structure, and never
again. This is the world of prepaid consumption, or wage, taxation.
B.

A d Hoc Deviations

This section discusses a variety of more conscious, deliberate
prosavings provisions, such as pension plans and IRAs, that have been
features of the income tax since the 1940s.254 Unlike the structural
elements just canvassed, which followed from the income-plus
realization tax in the wake of Macomber, these prosavings
mechanisms have resulted from a deliberate rejection of the income
tax model. Policymakers wanted to encourage savings and wanted to
avoid Mill's double tax. They added statutes to achieve this effect.
Significant technical problems follow from engrafting prosavings
provisions onto an income tax, however, on account of the analytic
253. I.R.C. § 121 (1988) (repealed 1997).
254. The Revenue Act of 1942. Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) first made employer pension contributions tax deductible.
IRAs were introduced in 1974 in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 202, §§ Stat. 829, 958-66 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 219, 408 (2000)). See generally Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Government Policy and
Personal Retirement Saving, 6 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1, 37-38 (1992) (data suggests IRA
program induces "substantial new saving").
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inconsistency. Because one can borrow tax-free under an income tax,
there is no logical assurance that savings will, in fact, increase with any
nominal prosavings provision within such a tax: a taxpayer can open
up an IRA with $2,000, using one hand, and borrow $2,000 on a credit
card, using the other. The evidence is mixed in terms of the empirical
questions of how much various retirement and other savings
provisions actually increase sayings.255 But the claim that the center we
have chosen cannot hold is once again not a narrowly empirical one; it
is not based on aggregate macroeconomic statistics and our varying,
imperfect understanding of them.256 The critique is based instead on
the analytic structure of tax, and what this says about tax's fairness,
efficiency, complexity, and possible reform. It is simply a difficult and
scattershot affair to try to encourage and reward savings within a tax
system ideally designed to double tax savings.
Still, the mere presence and persistence of the ad hoc deviations
from an income tax, however ineffective, underscore the appeal of the
ordinary-savings norm. The structural gaps followed, more or less
from brute necessity, after Macomber. The ad hoc deviations, in
contrast, have been repeatedly chosen, consciously and deliberately,
by tax policy makers. This makes their implicit norms all the more
compelling.
1.

Retirement Savings

Retirement savings - which, with home equity, are the major
assets for most Americans who have any assets at all (and many
Americans do not)257 - are taxed primarily on the postpaid
consumption tax model; a taxpayer gets a deduction when she puts
money into a tax-favored account, and she pays tax when she
withdraws funds. A growing trend in tax is to allow an option for
taxpayers to choose a retirement savings plan structured under the
prepaid consumption tax model, such as the Roth IRA, instead of the
traditional postpaid approach. Under these variations, there is no tax
deduction up-front, and there is no back-ended tax on withdrawal: this
is an equivalent matter, assuming constant tax rates, as Ant and
Grasshopper helped us to see.
255. See Bell, Carasso & Steuerle, supra note 149 (reporting that tax incentives for
retirement programs in 2004 cost the government $112 billion in 2004, while all personal
savings were $100.8 billion that year); but see generally, Venti & Wise, supra note 254, at 25
(suggesting IRA programs do induce new saving).
256. Our understanding is imperfect in large part because the problems are intractably
hard. There are problems of joint causation and a great deal of noise in the economic
statistics.
257. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2003, at 469, 742 (123d ed. 2003). Nearly half of all American families do not have a
retirement plan while about a third of all American families do not own a primary residence.
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The proliferation of retirement savings provisions resulting from
the addition of a prepaid track to the longstanding postpaid one is
another side effect of the influence of the traditional view, equating
prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes, and it has added
considerable complexity and confusion to tax. It is also not irrelevant
that Congress gets its one tax today under the prepaid, Roth-style
account model, and thus it has a short-term incentive under
contemporary budgeting rules to prefer this approach.258 Prepaid
consumption tax savings plans also avoid the arbitrage problem noted
above: there is no reason to borrow funds with one hand in order to
"save" with the other, since there is no immediate tax benefit to
savings.259 There is also no reason to borrow in lieu of making
withdrawals from a qualified account (or in lieu of realizing gains), as
Artful Dodger might do,260 because there is no tax on withdrawal,
aside from penalties for early withdrawal in some cases. And yet
moving towards a prepaid consumption tax model has a cost, one
obscured by the traditional view but recognized by the new
understanding of tax. This model does not allow for smoothing. Recall
Figures 1-3, above, representing the typical pattern of earnings and
spending in a taxpayer's life. The single tax under the prepaid model
falls due at the time of labor market earnings, typically in a worker's
peak income - and hence most highly taxable - years. Because there
is no way to escape the burden of wage taxation, prepaid consumption
tax savings plans are in tension with highly sloping marginal tax rates,
whereas a postpaid consumption tax gives taxpayers a mechanism for
avoiding the burden of higher rates - save, do not spend. It is not
therefore surprising that the contemporary conservative tax reform
movement has been moving towards prepaid consumption tax savings
plans - as a step on the path towards flat taxes.
The general tax treatment of retirement savings, under traditional
IRAs and pension plans such as 401(k)s, reflects the appeal of the
ordinary-savings norm and the appeal of favoring (or not disfavoring)
capital-smoothing transactions. The original idea was to take some
otherwise taxable income out of a worker's high-earning, middle-aged
years and move it backward to the time of retirement: backward
smoothing, in the manner of Figure 2. As noted above, these
structures lack coherence under an income tax. When a taxpayer
borrows and also opens an IRA, there is no net saving, just a tidy tax
deduction. This is yet another instance where we can now understand
258. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 50; Elizabeth Garrett,
Accounting for the Federal Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 192-93 (2004).
259. On the other hand, one can easily shift existing taxable savings into a prepaid
account, eliminating capital taxes without new savings. See Roger Gordon et al., Toward a
Consumption Tax, and Beyond, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 161 (2004) .
260. See supra Part V.A.2.
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that the true problem with the status quo, which seems as if it lies in
the inconsistent treatment of savings - where Andrews had seen its
"worst inequity and distortion" - actually relates to the inconsistent
treatment of consumption. The taxpayer who both borrows and opens
a deductible IRA is able to consume today, without any savings, and
pay tax tomorrow; so too with the taxpayer who borrows in lieu of
withdrawing from her tax-favored account. In both cases, there is a
deferral and a possible lowering of the ultimate tax rate, but no
savings.261
2.

More and More

There have been two important recent developments in the field of
ad hoc, prosavings deviations from the income tax. First, these
accounts have extended beyond retirement uses. There are now
medical and educational savings accounts,262 and the Bush
Administration has proposed further savings accounts unlimited as to
their use.263 Second, the accounts are more and more likely to be
structured on the prepaid consumption tax model.
Consider, for two important examples of both trends, the
Coverdell Educational Savings Accounts (ESAs), formerly known as
the Education IRAs, and the Section 529 Qualified Tuition Plans
(QTPs) .264 The former works along an IRA model, but one of the
Roth or prepaid variety. An ESA can be set up for each "qualified
beneficiary," or child, and persons can contribute up to $2,000 per
year per account. There is, of course, the usual array of mind-boggling
provisions, such as ceilings for those who make too much income, and
rules for coordination with other proeducation features, such as the
"Hope" or (not equivalently) "Lifetime Learning" credits.265 QTPs are
more complicated still: they must be maintained by a state or a
261. It is worth noting, however, that the taxpayer who plays this game, using traditional
IRAs or pension plans, cannot escape tax altogether, as can the taxpayer with financial
capital who plays Tax Planning 101: some tax must be paid on the withdrawal of funds from
the IRA or qualified pension account, even if the taxpayer dies before the withdrawal. I.R.C.
§ 691 (2004) (income in respect of decedent). This is yet another example of the system's far
greater solicitude for taxing wages than the yield to capital.
262 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 969, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND
OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANS (2004), at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p969/ (last
visited April 5, 2005); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 970, TAX BENEFITS FOR
EDUCATION (2004), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf (last visited April 5, 2005)
[hereinafter TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION].
263. See Daniel Altman, Taxes and Consequences: The Second Term Begins, N.Y.
nMES, Nov. 7, 2004, § 3, at 4 (discussing inter a/ia Bush Administration proposals for
lifetime savings and universal retirement accounts).
264. I.RC. § 529 (2004).
265. See I.RC. § 530 (2004); TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION, supra note 262, at 9-24,
40-49.
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"qualified educational institution," and their coordination provisions
are intricate. Still, at the end of the day, QTPs have more generous
contribution limits than ESAs. QTPs, too, work along the prepaid
consumption tax model: taxpayers can put in large sums of money
with after-tax dollars and rest assured that the investment yield will
not be subject to any second tax on withdrawal, provided that the
formidable terms and conditions of the statutory grant are met.266
An interim bottom line is that the model of allowing savings to
escape double taxation, begun in the 1940s for retirement savings, has
continued to grow and develop under the so-called income tax, by
conscious government policy. The theme now extends beyond
retirement savings to medical- and educational-related savings. And
there has been a dramatic shift, barely noticed by those working under
the traditional view of tax, towards having the single tax fall at the
time of initial labor market earnings, not the time of ultimate use.
C.

Tax Shelters and the Noble Failure of TRA 86

Both the deep structural gaps and the increasingly ad hoc, pro
savings provisions move the income tax towards a consumption tax, as
Andrews and others have long pointed out. Further, in a distinction
made salient by the new understanding of tax, the law is increasingly
moving towards a specifically prepaid consumption, or wage, tax. All
"second" taxes on the yield to capital are voluntary under Tax
Planning 101; those that do fall are deferred and come due at low
marginal capital gains rates - rates whose very existence owes to the
presence of the structural gaps themselves. More and more ad hoc
savings provisions add to the trend, especially as they are created
more and more frequently on the prepaid consumption tax model.
The other side of the coin in tax is what has been happening with
labor market returns, or wages. The income tax per se makes no
attempt to reach beneficent market returns,267 and we have just
considered its seriously porous commitment to taxing capital market
returns. If the taxation of wages were porous, too, there would be
nothing left to tax. But it is not porous: Even as the so-called income
tax system has weakened in its taxation of capital market returns, it
has strengthened its commitment to taxing wages. Ad hoc savings
provisions along the prepaid model do exactly this: by denying any
current deduction, they ensure that wages are taxed, and taxed now;
by not taxing withdrawals, they assure that the yield to capital is never
taxed. On the other hand, nothing in Tax Planning 101 is relevant to
266. See I.RC. § 529 (2004); TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION, supra note 262, at 50-53.
The terms and conditions may include making the withdrawals before 2010, when the law is
presently set to expire.
267. See I.RC. § 102 (2004).
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citizens who must live off the yield to their human capital, that is, off
of their labor market wages, often paycheck to paycheck. Indeed, for
many who are building up such human capital by borrowing and
schooling themselves - law students, say - a depressing reality lies in
wait. These unlucky wage-earners-to-be will have to pay off their
student loans with after-tax dollars drawn from their high bracket
years ahead. Their chosen path through life makes them income
bunchers, who must rely on capital transactions to smooth
consumption - which neither an ideal income tax nor a prepaid
consumption tax accommodates their doing. The actual income tax,
meanwhile, accommodates smoothing only erratically, allowing
backward smoothing to some extent, at a price of the complexity of
the retirement and other ad hoc savings provisions, but not forward or
anticipatory smoothing via debt at all. And as the actual income tax
moves ever closer to a prepaid consumption or wage tax, even this
accommodation for backward smoothing is at risk.
Much of the history of tax planning in the United States has been
concerned with the situation of high wage earners and their search for
"tax shelters." The general strategy of a tax shelter (at least before
1986)268 is to get some of the benefits that the propertied classes have
long enjoyed under the basic structure of an income-with-realization
tax as a wage earner: to hide or "shelter" one's wages from the tax
collector. The propertied classes do not need shelters, by and large,
because the realization requirement, and the simple steps in Tax
Planning 101 that follow from it, serve to keep their material resources
away from the tax collector perfectly, effectively, and legally.269 It is
those with large labor market gains who need help. Prior to the
epochal Tax Reform Act of 1 986 ("TRA 86"),270 sheltering for such
wage earners had become almost as easy as avoiding taxes for
property owners: it was simple enough to play the game with other
people's money, or, indeed, with no money at all. The gaps in tax
opened up on the capital side had leaked over to the labor-market
side, threatening the entire system as a revenue-raising vehicle. But
slowly, systematically, as marginal tax rates have come down (a top
rate of 70 percent when Ronald Reagan took office in 1 981 has now

268. In the 1990s, a new generation of "corporate tax shelters" arose to offset corporate
income taxes, but also to shelter the large capital gains occasioned by the boom time 1990s.
In the latter case, the corporate form exploited a gap in the coverage of I.RC. § 469 (2004).
See Symposium, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 54
SMU L. REV. 3 (2001).
269. See generally DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT
CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER-RICH - AND CHEAT
EVERYBODY ELSE, 1-19 (2003).
270. Tax Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 99-5511, 100 Stat. 7085 (codified as amended
in scattered setions of 26 U.S.C.).
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been cut in half271), and as the structural and ad hoc opportunities to
avoid "second" taxes on the yield to capital have expanded, the means
for sheltering wage income have dried up. This continues the central
theme of the practical critique of the status quo: the so-called income
tax system has morphed into an effective wage, or prepaid
consumption, tax. To understand this point fully, consider the shelter
game, then and now.
1.

Some Quick and Dirty Examples

Let us reflect on the way things were, prior to the 1986 Act, in
order to understand where we are and where we are heading. Simply
to make the point, take four fairly basic tricks of the ancient trade of
tax sheltering, here given evocative names and hypothetical taxpayers
to illustrate.
The interest dodge: Susie, who has no capital, is about to earn
$100,000 a year as an associate in a large law firm. She borrows
$1,000,000 at 10 percent interest. With an unlimited interest
deduction,272 she offsets her $100,000 salary completely on her tax
return. With her $1 ,000,000 in cash, she plays Tax Planning 101, just
like the Artful Dodger. Susie buys capital-appreciating assets, such as
growth stocks, and borrows against the appreciation to get cash to
consume. She has no net wealth, because her liability offsets her
assets. She consumes $100,000. She pays no income tax.
The simple straddle: Joe is in the same boat as Susie: about to
make $100,000 a year as a lawyer, with no cash in his pocket. He
borrows $200,000 on a margin account, and buys perfectly offsetting
stock positions - in essence, he puts $100,000 on each side of a "heads
or tails" coin flip. (He can do this with a put and a call option on the
same commodity, or by going long and short on the same stock.) One
position is guaranteed to double in value; the other to become
worthless. Joe sells and then writes off the worthless one, claiming a
$100,000 loss that, with unlimited loss offsets,273 wipes out the tax
liability on his salary from the law firm on his tax return. Joe holds his
$200,000 winner, which precisely offsets his loan balance. Like Susie,
Joe has no net wealth. Also, like Susie, he pays no income tax on his
$100,000 salary. He, too, can consume away, tax-free.
The classic shelter: Sara is graduating from medical school, and is
about to start earning $100,000 with no assets in hand. She buys an old
271. In 1981, the highest rate was reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent. Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). Under the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, the top rate was cut to 35 percent.
272. Prior law I.RC. § 163 ( 1982) (amended 1986).
273. The present law does not contain such unlinyted loss offsets. See l.R.C. § 1211 (first
added in 1954, amended to current assets in 1986) (2004) (capital loss offset rule).
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hotel in Arizona for $3,000,000, giving the owner a nonrecourse note
for virtually the whole amount (no money down! ).274 Sara leases the
hotel back to its owner, setting the rent she is owed on the hotel equal
to the interest she owes on the note, which has a balloon payment due
and payable in 30 years. Meantime, with a 30 year depreciation
schedule, Sara gets $100,000 in ordinary income deductions each
year.275 Sara, too, like Susie and Joe, has no net assets; the liability
offsets the gross value of her holdings. Like her friends, she also pays
no tax on her $100,000 salary. She will worry about what happens
much later, in Year 31.276 For now, she consumes away, tax-free.
The kiddie shift: Torn is about to become a doctor, too, earning
$100,000. He has four young children. Torn decides to buy a small
office building, perhaps using debt financing, which would generate a
nice tax deduction277 to sweeten his basic plan, and then gifts fractional
shares of the building to his children. Torn then pays each of his
offspring rent. The rent is a business deduction for Torn,278 bringing his
taxable income down, and just so happens to fall in each of his
children's "zero bracket." Tom and kin pay no tax on the transferred
amounts, which Tom directs his children to use for their basic food
and clothing - indeed, he can do this himself, as their natural
guardian.279
More elaborate examples of the ancient sheltering art could be put
forward, but these four simple tax-planning strategies serve to
illustrate the point perfectly well. All were alive and flourishing, in one
form or another, for long periods in American tax law. The interest
dodge, the classic shelter, and the kiddie shift were pretty much in full
flower corning into the 1986 Act; either of the first two alone was
sufficient, taken to its limits, to make the entire income tax voluntary,
even for those without their own financial capital stakes to play Tax
Planning 101.

274. Facts based on Estate of Franklin v . Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976),
which did not work. But see Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (illustrating a simple case
that did work).
275. See I.RC. §§ 167, 168 (2004).
276. Under Tufts, she will have capital gains of $3,000,000 - a small price to pay for
$3,000,000 worth of tax-free ordinary income for 30 years. And, in any event, she can always
find another shelter, holding them until she dies, thereby playing Tax Planning 101. See
supra Part V.A.l.
277. See I.RC. § 163 (2004); supra note 272 and accompanying text. Under an unlimited
interest deduction, as generally obtained prior to 1986, even a loan to finance a gift would
generate deductible interest. But see I.RC. § 265 (2004).
278. See I.RC. § 162 (2004).
279. See, e.g. , Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1 155 (1972).
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What TRA 1986 Did, and Did Not, Do

The traditional view of tax sees the choice of broad-based systems
as one of income versus consumption. Andrews's important articles
from the 1970s had opened up an attractive avenue for tax reform, in
the form of a progressive postpaid consumption tax. The influential
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform had traced out the two perceived
forks in the road, perfecting the income tax or moving towards a
consistent consumption tax.280 TRA 86 ostensibly took the income-tax
path.28 1 This epochal legislation's general strategy was to widen the
income tax base, by eliminating scores of exemptions, exclusions, and
deductions, in order to bring tax rates down. In particular, TRA 86
shut down all the shelters mentioned above, with the exception of
those already shut down.282
There is thus no longer a general deduction for personal interest,
and investment interest is subject to a "netting" rule:283 the interest
dodge is dead. Susie can still borrow money, but she cannot use the
interest to offset her salary for tax purposes. Pure straddles had
already been attacked, and the capital loss offset rules generally limit
the usefulness of Joe's simple straddle idea.284 The sweeping passive
activity loss rules of section 469 effectively shut down the classic
shelter in most of its incarnations.285 Susie can still run a rundown
hotel, but she cannot use the tax losses generated thereby to subtract
from her salary as a doctor on her tax forms. The "kiddie tax" killed
Tom's clever idea, again in most instances, by putting children in the
same marginal tax bracket as their parents for unearned income.286
Tom can still give his office to his children and pay them rent, but he
will find them paying the same tax he otherwise would. In sum, TRA
86 was systematic in curtailing tax shelters, thereby stopping the
bleeding in tax and enabling lower tax rates on a broader tax base.
But - and herein lies the rub - the watershed TRA 86 did
nothing about Tax Planning 101 or any of its three simple steps. TRA
86 did not touch the realization requirement of Macomber, although

280. See BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8. Note that these are exactly the options that
the Bush Administration, early in its second term, seems to be considering again, this time
with a prepaid consumption tax model ascendant. See Altman, supra note 263.
281. See BRADLEY, supra note 6.
282. There had already been anti-straddle legislation, I.RC. § 1092 (added in 1981) and
the "at risk" rules limited some shelter games. I.RC. § 465 (added in 1976).
283. See I.RC. § 163 (2004), especially 163(d).
284. See I.RC. § § 121 1 (first added in 1954, amended to current limits in 1986), 1092(c)
(f) (introduced in 1981, 2002) (anti-straddle provisions).
285. I.RC. § 469 (2004).
286. I.RC. § l(g) (unearned income of minor children, a/k/a "kiddie tax").
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Congress clearly has the power to do so.287 TRA 86 did not make debt
taxable, or a deemed realization event for people with appreciated
assets. TRA 86 did not alter or repeal the stepped-up basis rule for
assets acquired on death. It is true that TRA 86 repealed the capital
gains preference, which resulted in an interim rise in its rate. Capital
gains had for a significant time been set at 40 percent of the ordinary
income tax rate; thus, the top capital gains rate was 28 percent when
Reagan took office with a 70 percent top ordinary rate bracket. When
Reagan oversaw his first major tax-cutting bill, the Economic
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, the ordinary rate fell to 50
percent. The capital gains rate fell in step, to 20 percent. TRA 86,
which instituted a marginal rate bracket of 28 percent on the highest
incomes,288 eliminated any further and specific capital gains rate
preference, thus, in essence, restoring the pre-ERTA rate of 28
percent on capital gains. Interestingly, this created a natural
experiment to see if capital transactions were elastic to the tax rate;
there was, indeed, a spike in sales under the outgoing 20 percent
regime. But recall that the capital gains rate, as argued above, is a
reaction to the very existence of Tax Planning 101. Since TRA 86 left
Tax Planning 101 unchecked, its elimination of the capital gains
preference was fragile from the start. A preferential rate soon enough
reappeared, with the elder George Bush maintaining the top rate at 28
percent when ordinary income tax rates went up; Bill Clinton reducing
it first to 20 percent, then later to 18 percent; and the younger Bush
bringing it down to its current 15 percent. As this saga of capital gains
preferences played itself out, the simple advice of buy/borrow/die
lived on.
What TRA 86
one of the most sweeping acts of tax legislation
ever passed, and the subject of laudatory volumes from the popular
press289 - did was simple. It shored up the status of the "income" tax
as a prepaid consumption or wage tax. Shelters for wage earners were
shut down or drastically curtailed. Yet people with capital could still
buy, borrow, and die to their hearts' content; tax remained voluntary
for those with financial capital.
-

287. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 56, at 73 (explaining that Macomber's realization
requirement not constitutional, merely an administrative rule); see also I.RC. §§ 1271-1274
(2002) (o.i.d. provisions) (instances of Congress's imposing tax without realization).

288. See I.RC. § 1 (1986); see also McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, supra note 43,
at 1898 (discussing TRA 86's rate "bubble").
289. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH (1987).
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VI. THE MESS WE'VE MADE, PART Two:
BEYOND THE INCOME TAX
Tax policy typically suffers from blinders when it comes to taxes
other than the income tax.290 The personal federal income tax is,
indeed, the largest American tax. At least for the time being, the
income tax also features relatively high marginal tax rates and rewards
at least some sophisticated planning, even after the TRA 86 put a lot
of tax shelters out of business.291 The income tax's size and malleability
warrant its status as a relative staple in American law school
classrooms. Yet, large as it is, the federal income tax accounts for less
than one-half of all federal government revenues, and less than one
third of all taxes in America, state, local, and federal combined.292
Other taxes must be factored in to any general theory about fairness in
tax today.
The new understanding of tax helps us to see the larger context of
tax today. For while certain taxes - most importantly the corporate
income and gift and estate taxes - are meant to correct for holes in
the income tax's commitment to taxing capital, they do not effectively
do so. When we widen the lens of our inquiry to consider the state of
tax generally in the United States, a surprise awaits: the principal
theme advanced in the last Part only deepens. The American tax
system, writ large, is moving, seemingly inexorably, towards a
consumption tax - and specifically, under the new understanding of
tax, towards a prepaid consumption tax - at relatively flat rates. What
capital taxes remain are erratic in their operation, unprincipled in their
conception, and - not unrelatedly - fragile in their vitality.
This Part explains these comments, beginning with the critically
important payroll tax system.

290. This is beginning to change. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of
the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2002)
[hereinafter Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens); Andrew Mitrusi & James Poterba, The
Distribution of Payroll and Income Tax Burdens, 1979-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 765, 765 (2000);
Deborah A. Geier, The Payroll Tax Liabilities of Low- and Middle-Income Taxpayers, 106
TAX NOTES 7 1 1 (2005) [hereinafter Geier, Payroll Tax Liabilities).
291. See Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for the Tax System: The Overall Health of
the Tax System as Measured by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 13, 45-50 (2003) ; Michael L.
Schier, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to
Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 388 (2002).
292. In 2002, federal personal income taxes raised just over $858 billion, or 46.3 percent
of total federal receipts of $1.853 trillion, and 30 percent of total government receipts of
$2.847 trillion. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004,
at 29-30, 293 (2003).
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A. Payroll Taxes
No normative analysis of tax today should ignore the payroll tax
system. To begin with, the combined social security and Medicare
system is indeed a tax: not only are the exactions from wages
mandatory (the classic hallmark of a tax), but they are also untethered
from any precise benefit or payback system - social security has long
been on a "pay as you go" basis.293 This means that the benefits system
of social security, which indeed has some elements of progressivity in
it, can be separated from the contribution or tax part of the system.294
The payroll tax is also big. The employee pays 7.65 percent of her
pretax wages: 6.2 percent for social security, up to a ceiling presently
set at $90,000, plus 1 .45 percent for Medicare, with no ceiling.295 The
employer pays a matching share, but the real incidence is all on the
employee: this is an employee-specific cost, one that a rational
employer must factor into account when considering whether to hire,
and how much to pay, an employee. Consider, for example, an
employee earning $10,000. She must pay $765 out of her wages in
payroll taxes, and her employer must pay a like amount. This means
both that her employer considers her labor to be worth $10,765, and
that $1,530 has gone to the government on account of her paid work.296
The full amount of $1,530 - the total tax, including the employer's
share - could go to the employee if Uncle Sam released his hold on

293. See Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens, supra note 290; Geier, Payroll Tax
Liabilities, supra note 290; Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV.
445, 453-58 (1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Burdens]. Although payroll taxes have some
relationship to benefits - as do income taxes, of course, in some way - I analyze them here
solely in regards to their tax burden, on wages.
294. The system is not unequivocally progressive. See MCCAFFER Y, TAXING WOMEN,
supra note 72, at 89-105; DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
19-22 (2000).
295. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 05-10024, UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 8
(2004), at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10003.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). The ceiling is
$90,000 in 2005.
296. Since the employee never sees the employer's share in her pay stub, it is in some
ways more accurate to "gross up" her salary, and see that she has paid $1530 out of $10,765,
a 14.2 percent rate. See, e.g. , DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, EMPLOYMENT POLICIES INST.,
EFFECTIVE
MARGINAL
TAX RATES ON LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS,
at
http://epionline.org/studies/shaviro_02-1999.pdf (Feb. 1999). On the other hand, the $10,000
- without any deduction for her share of payroll taxes paid - is what the employee must
report to the IRS for income tax purposes, so the 15.3 percent figure used in constructing
Table 3, below, is also accurate. On reported wages of $10,000, $1530 goes to the
government. Table 3 thus does reflect the taxes paid on reported wages, although it does not
precisely track take home pay: this is set at 1 minus the tax rate net of the employer's share
of the payroll tax (so a taxpayer making $30,000, say, faces a marginal rate of 22.65 percent
and gets to take home 77.35 percent of her next dollar in reported wages, considering the
payroll and income taxes alone).

March 2005]

A New Understanding of Tax

911

it.297 (The self-employed see this all much more directly, as they must
themselves pay 15.3 percent of their wages up to $90,000, and are
allowed an income-tax deduction only for one-half of the total payroll
taxes they pay.) The net result is a flat, 15.3 percent tax on labor
earnings, starting with the first dollar earned, and extending upwards
to $90,000, after which the social security tax ceases and the payroll
tax rate drops down to the 2.9 percent (two times 1.45 percent) of
Medicare alone.
Table 3 puts together the payroll tax rate structure with that of the
basic income tax, using 2003 rate brackets after tax reform.298 Such
tables are difficult to construct with any precision, on account of the
considerable complexity within the income tax: varying "zero
brackets" based on whether a taxpayer itemizes or not299 and how
many personal exemptions she has;300 inframarginal rate changes
brought on by the earned-income tax credit and its phaseout;301 the
loss of personal exemptions;302 the alternative minimum tax;303 and so
forth. The table nonetheless gives the basic rate structure facing a
single individual taking the standard deduction.304 It ignores the
important EITC available for low-income taxpayers,305 and so
understates the degree of progression in the total tax system, although
the EITC also adds a burden onto lower middle class taxpayers.306
Still, it gives a basic sense of the matter, while helping to illustrate why
the EITC is so important. Most importantly, Table 3 shows how big
the payroll tax system is, relative to the income tax.

297. It is a mistake to think that simple supply and demand analysis affects this result.
The employer is facing the full tax in his wage decisions; the tax works like a simple
downward shift in the demand curve, as a per unit tax. The lower after-tax wage obtained by
workers may indeed affect aggregate labor supply, but this does not change the fact that
existing workers are paying the full burden of the tax.
298. Up-to-date tax rate tables can be found at http://www.irs.gov.
299. 1.R.C. § 68 (2004).
300. I.R.C. § 152 (2004).
301. 1.R.C. § 32 (2004).
302. 1.R.C. § 68(c) (2004).
303. I.R.C. § 57 (2004).
304. It uses $5000 for the standard deduction and $3000 for the personal exemption,
creating an effective "zero bracket" of $8000.
305. For general discussion of the EITC. see Anne L. Alstott. The Earned Income Tax
Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV . L. REV. 533 (1995);
McCaffery, Burdens, supra note 293, at 486-91.
306. See MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 72, at 145-48 (discussing EITC
phaseout).
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TABLE 3: PAYROLL, INCOME AND COMBINED TAX RATES, SINGLE
PERSON, 2003
Income
$0 - 8,000
$8,00 1 - 1 5,000
$ 1 5,00 1 -36,400
$36,40 1 -76,800
$76,80 1 -90,000
$90,00 1 - 1 5 1 ,500
$ 1 5 1 ,50 1 -3 1 9,500
$3 1 9,50 1 and above

Payroll Tax
1 5.3
1 5.3
1 5.3
1 5 .3
1 5.3
2.9
2.9
2.9

Income Tax
0
10
15
25
28
28
33
35

Combined
1 5 .3
25.3
30.3
40.3
43.3
30.9
35.9
37.9

An individual taxpayer begins to pay 15.3 percent in payroll taxes
right away on her first dollar of wages, with no accommodation for
family size, medical needs, or anything else. Thus, over the range from
$0 to $90,000, a taxpayer's average or effective payroll tax rate - as
well as her marginal one - is 15.3 percent. In contrast, a single person
under the income tax would have to earn over $53,000 before her
average income tax rate was as high as 15.3 percent.307 Given that the
average annual pay in 2000 was slightly over $35,000 per worker,308 it
should not be surprising to learn that between 70 and 80 percent (or
higher) of families with positive taxes pay more in payroll taxes than
in income taxes.309 Yet the payroll tax, alone among major federal
taxes - the personal and corporate income and gift and estate taxes
- has never been cut.310
In any event, it is the aggregate of payroll and income taxes that
matters to a rational taxpayer. Table 3 shows the rather compressed
rate structure under the payroll plus income taxes combined. It starts
at 15.3 percent, quickly hits 30 percent, peaks at $76,800 at 43.3
percent, and then declines precipitously at $90,000, although it never
falls below 30 percent or rises above 40 percent. Anyone who earns
between $15,000 and infinity in wages pays federal taxes in this narrow
band, between 30.3 and 43.3 percent, with the top endpoint at 37.9
percent.
Most important for the new understanding of tax, the social
security or payroll tax is a canonical instance of a prepaid consumption

307. The solution to the problem of $0 + .10($15,000 - 8,000)
.25(x - 36,400) .l53x, where x is the income, and equals $53,505.

+

.15($36,400 - 15,000)

+

=

308. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2004-2005, at 410 (124th ed. 2005).
309. See Mitrusi & Poterba, supra note 290, at 772-74 (the authors find just over 70
percent, but refer to CBO data indicating 80 percent).
310. McCaffery & Baron, Humpty Dumpty Blues, supra note 49, at 231.
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tax. Its single levy is applied up-front as money is earned in labor
markets, and never again: no social security "contribution" is asked of
returns in the capital or beneficent markets. Combined with the
understanding that the nominal income tax is largely now a prepaid
consumption or wage tax - the theme of the prior Part - this gives a
dark spin to Table 3: the United States is evolving a steep wage tax,
one that falls especially hard on the middle classes, at compressed
rates.
B.

Death - to the Rescue?

The payroll tax makes no effort to collect any tax on the yield to
capital or from beneficent transfers. The income tax also ignores
beneficent transfers to the transferee, and, although it is intended to
fall on the yield to capital, the actual income-plus-realization tax is
erratic at best in living up to its theoretical commitment. In large part
for this reason, defenders of the idea that capital ought to bear some
positive tax burden - that is, supporters of what the new
understanding of tax refers to as the yield-to-capital norm - have
long advocated other, supplemental taxes to "backstop" the income
tax, specifically in regard to the yield to capital.311 Chief among these
addenda has been the gift and estate tax.
There has been much debate of late about the estate tax, whose
supporters seem to be losing: EGTRRA, the 2001 tax act, gradually
weakens the tax, then altogether repeals it for the single year 2010,
then brings it back in full force.312 Congress has repeatedly considered
extending the repeal, to make the elimination of the tax permanent.313
There is no need to rehash here the basic arguments over repeal,
reform, or status quo. The main practical, descriptive point, for the
new understanding of tax, is simply that the estate tax has been a very
porous backstop to the income tax, indeed. The main theoretical,
prescriptive point to see is that a gift and estate tax is not needed to

311. Most prominently, see Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1177-88; see
also, Henry J. Aaron & Harvey Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts, and Bequests and
Other Strategies for Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 106, 1 1 1-12 (Joseph A.
Pechman, ed., 1984); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, 20
VA. TAX REV. 499, 503-04 (2001); Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer
Taxation After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1 183, 1 191 (1983) ("With a seriously eroded income
tax base, a transfer tax . . . serves as a 'backstop' to the income tax by taxing the wealth that
taxpayers accumulate through tax-preferred income sources.").
312. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
501, 115 Stat. 69 (2001).
313. See Edward J. McCaffery and Linda Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New
Logic of Collective Action (draft on file with author) (hereinafter McCaffery & Cohen,
Gucci Gulch]; Edward J. McCaffery, A Look into the Future of Estate Tax Reform, 105 TAX
NOTES 997 (2004).
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backstop a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax in the
first place.
Although, as with capital taxes under the income tax, decedents'
estates do pay some tax, the yield is consistently small.314 Tax Planning
101, discussed above, provides a roadmap for readily avoiding the
estate tax, by dying with net assets under its generous exemption level:
spending it all and dying broke being the limiting case. This is morally
problematic, because it is far from obvious that the spending of the
rich is to be encouraged, or is any less harmful than their passing on of
wealth - and shortly we shall see that Tax Planning 101 can be used
to pass on wealth, as well, if the wealthy person so desires.
The use of Tax Planning 101 to avoid all federal taxes _; the estate
tax in particular by dying broke, or nearly so - shows once more that
the deep problem with the status quo is not, as Andrews put it in 1974,
with its inconsistent treatment of savings or accumulation. Rather it is
with the use of capital transactions to finance consumption, tax-free.
This allows a restatement of a central theme in the new understanding
of tax: All capital is not the same, from the perspective of the quest for
individuated justice in tax. What matters, morally, is the use that
individuals make of their capital, not the source of the yield to capital.
Andrews saw the "worst inequity, distortion, and complexity" in the
income tax's treatment of accumulation, or savings. Not seeing - or
not wanting to see, under the influence of Mill - any way to split the
difference, to make distinctions among the uses of capital (as he had
made among the uses of consumption in his 1 972 article), Andrews
recommended going all the way, to the total nontaxation of capital.
Under the new understanding of tax, a surprising insight arises. What
is problematic about the status quo - what is its "worst inequity" - is
not the treatment of accumulation or savings, in and of itself; it is,
rather, the inconsistent treatment of consumption, the other term on
the right-hand side of the Haig-Simons identity. Through its structural
problems, beginning - but not ending - with its inconsistent taxation
of accumulation, the income-plus-realization tax allows the
consumption of the wealthy to escape taxation altogether. The estate
tax is not at all a "backstop" to this problem - of consumption
financed by capital - because its mere existence encourages it. A
potential taxpayer who has amassed or acquired significant portions of
capital need not pay any further tax, whatsoever, within her lifetime,
no matter what her lifestyle. This is problematic.
314. In 2004, the estate and gift taxes yielded only $25 billion, just over 1 % of federal
revenues. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States,
Government, Fiscal Year 2006 [hereinafter Historical Tables), at 43-44 tbl. 2.5, available at
http://whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX?:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE ( 1979); McCaffery, A
Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202; Martin Sullivan, For Richest Americans, Two- Thirds of
Wealth Escapes Estate Tax, 87 TAX NOTES 328 (2003).
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Still, one might support the estate tax within the context of a basic
consumption tax - even a prepaid consumption tax - model, as
ensuring that a tax gets levied at least once per generation.315
(Another, different way to support an estate tax under a consumption
tax model is as a corrective to the large accumulations of "private"
capital that a consumption tax allows, and even encourages; Andrews
followed this rationale,316 and I shall address this argument later.) The
idea is that wealth coming into an individual's possession - via labor
market earnings or beneficent transfe rs - should be taxed once, and
then all second taxes at the individual's level should be avoided, in the
spirit of Mill. If such a system were to work, the pressure on the choice
of prepaid versus postpaid consumption tax would lessen, because the
greatest problems of socio-economic inequity tend to take place, as
both Rawls and Robert Nozick, in their different ways, noticed, with a
problem of iteration over time.317 The more generations go by without
the corrective of a tax, the more the unfairness compounds. But so
long as each generation is taxed once - the estate tax serving as a
proxy for an accessions tax, making sure that a tax is paid before the
receipt of beneficent transfers - the problem of iteration is held in
check. If the gift and estate tax worked as planned, it would put labor
market and beneficent market returns on the same footing - taxed
once each generation of beneficial users - with only capital market
earnings free of taxation, the latter in accordance with Mill's principle.
The practical problem with this happy possibility is that the gift
and estate tax does not work as planned. Even without further
weakening - which seems all but certain to happen318 - the estate tax
is simply not a very effective mechanism for levying a tax on second or
subsequent generations. It has too many holes, and of such a sort, as to
make it inherently defective for the task. Consider the following two
gaps.
One is the basic exemption amount, or so-called unified credit,
now set at $1.5 million per person on death and $1 million for inter
vivos gifts. A married couple, with proper planning, has $3 million scheduled to rise to $7 million by 2009 and to infinity, at least briefly,
in 2010
to pass on death, altogether tax-free. The $1 million amount
can be given by any person, at any time, to any other person, without
-

315. See Aaron & Galper, supra note 311.
316. See, e.g. , Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8.
317. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); RAWLS, supra note 52; ROBERT
NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 28-33 (1989).
318. It seems highly unlikely that the exemption level, which is set to reach $3.5 million
per person in 2009, will return to its pre-EGTRRA levels. Not only has the exemption level
never been lowered in the history of the tax, but all current Senators, except for Russell
Fiengold (D-WI), are on record as supporting at least a heightened exemption level. See
McCaffery & Cohen, Gucci Gulch, supra note 313.
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triggering a gift or estate tax.319 Standard, sophisticated estate planning
allows a basic leveraging of the value, as by placing assets in a family
limited partnership form.320 Wealthy parents with two children can
transfer up to $2 million of prediscounted property to each child,
altogether tax-free, and the children - or their financial advisers can play the Tax Planning 101 game to their heart's content. If the
wealth is transferred when the parents are 50 years old, and invested
at an 8 percent rate of return, it will grow to being worth over $20
million per child by the time the parents reach 80.
In addition to this unified credit or exemption amount, there is a
second hole, the "annual exclusion amount,'' presently set at
$11,000.321 This is a per-donor, per-donee, per-year amount that can be
given altogether tax-free. Once again, standard, sophisticated estate
planning allows the values to be doubled, with two parents, and
perhaps quadrupled, with fractional share discounts. Two parents can
give each of their children $30,000 or more worth of value each year
- altogether apart from the exemption amount, just discussed, and
also not including qualified medical and tuition expenses322 - tax-free.
A pattern of such annual giving, begun at birth, can easily result in
each child having $8 million, tax-free, at her fortieth birthday - a
good stake for playing the Artful Dodger's game.323 Skillful use of
perfectly legitimate estate-tax planning advice can get tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars out of one's estate, tax-free. So much
for the once-per-generation norm.
These problems with the estate tax follow from its structure; it is a
back-ended wealth tax, typically imposed when someone dies, on the
wealth she has left over on her deathbed. But death is a difficult time
to tax. Given the incentives generated by the tax's high marginal rate
structure, wealthy patrons can and do plan ahead to avoid it, making it
the original "voluntary tax."324 Tax Planning 101 combines with Estate
Planning 101 - give early, often, and in trust325 - to eviscerate the
tax. It is a mistake to think that Tax Planning 101 need be practiced by
narrowly selfish individuals. While dying broke is the simplest and
319. EGTRRA keeps the gift tax exemption level at $1 million per person, so the higher
numbers in later years refer only to the estate tax, as things now stand.
320. Sullivan, supra note 314, at 332. But see Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1331 (2003) (casting family limited partnership technique into some question).
321. l.R.C. § 2503 (2004).
322. Id. ; MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 68-74; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PUB. No. 950, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 4-5 (2004), at
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p950/index.html (last revised Sept. 2004).
323. At a 5% annuity rate, this sum can generate $400,000, tax-free, every year, for life.
324. See COOPER, supra note 314; McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202.
325. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 68-73 (discussing "Estate
Planning 101" and other techniques for avoiding or minimizing estate taxes).
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surest way to avoid the estate tax, the borrowing in buy/borrow/die
can be used to transfer wealth down to the next generation, as well. In
such a case, there is no tax at all in the second (or later) generation(s).
The problems of iteration can become severe. A dramatic illustration
of the stakes and problems has been the recent trend, initiated by
estate-planning practitioners, to have states repeal the hallowed Rule
against Perpetuities, so as to allow wealthy benefactors to set up
"dynastic" - that is, potentially infinitely lived - trusts.326
As it has been argued in the past, it still may be argued that an
estate tax, with all of its holes, is better than nothing. This is parallel to
the consequentialist objection to income tax reform, considered
above: the income tax may be rather ineffective at getting at capital,
but at least it tries, and so we ought to retain it in the name of fairness.
The support for the estate tax similarly follows from the implicit
acceptance of the yield-to-capital norm: any taxes that get at capital
are better than nothing. Within the traditional view, a consumption
tax is the "nothing" in this choice set because it does not get at the
yield to capital at all, and so advocates of the yield-to-capital norm
cling to whatever is left of the income and estate taxes.
Fortunately, we do not have to face the choice of an ineffective
estate tax or nothing. The new understanding of tax changes things.
When we get the fair timing of tax down right, we see that there is a
better way - and a better time - to tax than either the moment of
initial earnings or the time of ultimate death.
C.

Corporate Taxes Too

The corporate income tax, like the gift and estate tax, has been
defended as an important "backstop" to the personal income tax.327
The argument is that the corporate income tax gets at wealth that is
left in the corporation - a tendency aggravated by Macomber
and
so cuts against the deferral of the realization requirement. The desire
to have a backstop to the basic income tax reflects the normative
commitment to taxing capital and its yield, and an understanding that
the actual income tax falls far short of implementing this goal. Yet,
even less so than the gift and estate tax, the corporate income tax is
not a satisfactory backstop to the income tax.
-

326. See, e.g. , Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule
Against Perpetuities: R.l. P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003).
327. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Learning to Live with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the
Corporate Tax, 36 U.B.C.L. REV. 621, 672 n.51 (2003); but cf Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K.
Mackie-Mason, "Why Is There Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? The Role of
Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting,'' in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, 67 at 88 (Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines, Jr., & R. Glenn Hubbard, eds.,
1995) (corporate tax is a backstop to tax on labor, not capital, income).
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To start with, like the gift and estate tax, the corporate income tax
is porous and avoidable.328 But there is a much deeper problem with
the corporate income tax. It is the problem of incidence - of who,
really, ultimately bears the burden of the tax. Corporations are legal
fictions; only real people pay real taxes. Thus the dollars remitted to
the government on account of corporate taxes must come out of
someone's pockets, somewhere along the line. There is a great deal of
uncertainty on this matter among sophisticated public finance
economists. There are two broad candidates for ultimate payors, and
each is problematic in terms of the fairness of tax. Some models
suggest that some or all of the real burden of the corporate tax falls on
wages or consumption, adding to - not counterbalancing - the
general bias of the status quo, towards a prepaid consumption tax.329
The corporate tax becomes a wage tax in drag. Other models suggest
that some or all of the corporate tax falls on capital. This burden on
capital cannot be specific, however, as in a naive partial equilibrium
model; it cannot be the case that the particular owners of particular
corporations see the corporate income tax come out of their pockets.
Capital is capital, and it seeks a competitive rate of return. Thus,
pricing or capitalization effects equilibrate the markets after the
corporate tax falls, so that all capital bears a competitive after-tax rate
of return. In other words, the incidence of the corporate income tax, to
the extent it falls on capital at all, must be felt rather generally in all
accessible capital markets.330
In this very generality lies a problem. Those who see the corporate
income tax as an important "backstop" to the income tax see it as an
important tax on capital. Yet the new understanding of tax has shown
us that we do not want to tax all capital, all the time. This leads to a
particular critique of the corporate tax: to the extent it falls on capital
at all, it is not an individuated tax - it fails Vickrey's (and our) test
for progression. The burden on capital makes it just as hard to engage

328. The avoidance is partly due to the prevalence of corporate tax shelters. See
generally, Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131
(2001); George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from
History, 54 SMU L. Rev. 209 (2001); Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance
Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177 (2001). But the
overall yield from the tax has dropped fairly steadily over many decades, from a high of
7.2% of GDP in 1945, to 4.2% as late as 1967, to 1.6% in 2004. See HISTORICAL TABLES,
supra note 314, 33-34 tbl.2.3.
329. Arnold Harberger, an early advocate of the view that some or all of the burden is
borne by capital, now feels it is mostly borne by labor. See Arnold C. Harberger, The
Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962) (the seminal piece);
Arnold C. Harberger, Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Equitable Economic Growth, in
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND HIGH-QUALITY GROWTH 203 (Vito Tanzi & Ke-young Chu
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Harberger, Monetary and Fiscal Policy]. See also Gordon & Mackie
Mason, supra note 327 (incidence on labor, given small open economy (as in Canada)).
330. See Harberger, Monetary and Fiscal Policy, supra note 329.
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in the kind of ordinary-savings or smoothing transactions that ordinary
moral intuitions favor, as well as in the kind of elevating, shifting
transactions that these intuitions want to reach - it does not split the
ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms. The corporate income tax
also does not make any differentiation based on the level of the
beneficial owner's income, consumption, or wealth; it is a crude one
size-fits all tax, a flat tax in essence, like the current capital gains or
corporate dividend tax.
If corporate taxes are to be justified, it must turn on the political
economy, or the psychological political economy, of hidden taxes,331
and not on the principled taxation of capital. Corporate taxes are
simply far too crude a mechanism to effect individuated fairness in
getting at the yield to capital or anything else.
D. State and Local Taxes
Roughly one-third of all taxes in America are collected at the state
and local levels.332 These, too, ought to play a role in any general
theory about the fairness of tax.
The three largest state and local taxes are sales (36 percent of
total), property (29 percent) and income (27 percent) taxes.333
At first glance, sales taxes are paradigmatic of the postpaid
consumption tax. But here is a place where the traditional view of
tax still holds. Because state and local sales taxes are flat taxes,
they are indeed equivalent to wage, or yield-exempt, taxes under the
traditional view, as Ant and Grasshopper helped us to see. The reason
to care about the new understanding of tax is to preserve and, indeed,
strengthen the tax system's commitment to progressivity in effective
tax burdens. State and local sales taxes more or less moot the point.
The remaining state and local taxes do not offer much of an
antidote to what is happening on the federal side. State and local
income taxes tend to simply, and by rote, track the federal income tax,
and thus contain all of the holes in the commitment to taxing savings
we have been exploring. This leaves state and local property taxes,
which do indeed effect some degree of progressivity, being based on

331. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE L.J. 325 (1995); McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, supra note 43, at 1874-86.
332. In 1999, state and local governments collected approximately $816 billion in taxes,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 308, at 272, whereas the federal government
collected approximately $ 1.828 trillion. Id. at 308 tbl.454. Of the $2.644 trillion total, state
and local taxes accounted for just over 30 percent.
333. Id. at 272. The figures for income taxes seem to include corporate as well as
individual taxes, and therefore overstate the effect of the latter. Compare id. at 272, with id.
at 270.
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the assessed value (or initial purchase price)334 of real or personal
property. But real property taxes, by far the major part of property
taxes, tend to finance local public goods,335 and often get "capitalized"
into the values of homes. Without even factoring in the income tax
deductibility of these payments, the equities of state and local
property taxes are rather crude, at best.
E.

Summing Up: A Voluntary Tax

Add together the so-called income tax, considered in the last Part,
and the panoply of taxes considered in this Part, and this is what we
have in America in the early years of the twenty-first century: a highly
burdensome wage tax at compressed tax rates. The major tax is the
federal personal income tax, but this is increasingly equivalent to a
prepaid consumption or wage tax, at historically and relatively {since
World War I) flat rates. The payroll tax is by far the second biggest tax
in the landscape, and it does not even pretend to be anything other
than a rather flat, even regressive wage tax. State and local taxes
scarcely even try to posit a counter trend, and indeed tend to rely on
flat sales taxes that feature yield exemption. The two federal taxes that
aim at capital - the gift and estate and corporate income taxes - are
scattershot affairs at best, small in their magnitude, fairly easily
avoided, and in any event crude in their ultimate equities.
In sum: taxes on beneficent transfers scarcely exist. Taxes on
capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary. Taxes on wages are
high and inescapable. This is where we have come, guided by the
traditional understanding of tax. Where to, next?
VII. THE FAIR TIMING OF TAX
Traditional tax policy endlessly debates between the income and
consumption taxes, mistakenly equating both forms of consumption
taxes, which it sees as exempting the yield to capital - or, sometimes,
falling arbitrarily on it - by design and on principle. Under the
traditional view, the only hope to satisfy both an ideological and an
ordinary moral intuition to tax the yield to capital is to cling to an
income tax. While one can blame special interest politics or other ills

334. This is the case, for example, in California, under Proposition 13. CAL. CONST. art.
XIIIA, §§ 1-6.
335. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956). For discussions of Tiebout, see Bruce W. Hamilton, A Review: Is the Property Tax a
Benefit Tax?, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER
TwENTY-FIVE YEARS 85. 90-92 (George R. Zodrow ed . 1983): George R. Zodrow & Peter
Mieszkowski, The Incidence of the Property Tax: The Benefit View Versus the New View, in
LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE nEBOUT MODEL AFTER TwENTY-FIVE
YEARS, supra, at 109.
.
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for the failure of the current tax system to address its many gaps,
another culprit lies close at hand, like Poe's purloined letter: theory,
and most importantly, the traditional view of tax itself.
When we take a closer look at the analytic muddle of tax, we
understand that we do not have, have never had, and will never have a
pure income tax, largely for the reason that we do not want one. What
we have is a mishmash of income and consumption tax elements.
The traditional view of tax would have us be forever doomed to
some such uneasy compromise. For we are, it would seem, of two
minds when it comes to the taxation of savings. With one mind, we
want to tax the yield to capital, and hence we cling to the forms of
income, corporate income, and gift and estate taxes. But with the
other mind, we do not want to tax savings, and hence we riddle the so
called income tax with exclusions and deductions, and lack the will to
strengthen the structural flaws applying to the taxation of the yield to
capital.
The new understanding of tax liberates our minds from the grip of
theoretical incoherence that dooms the present practice of tax.
Normative reflection first identifies and then reconciles the ordinary
savings and yield-to-capital norms. It turns out, mirabile dictu, that the
people are of one, not two, minds - with two norms, not one - when
it comes to the taxation of capital and its yield. It seems fair and
appropriate to burden capital transactions when these facilitate or
enable a better lifestyle, reflecting a greater "ability to pay" or more
"benefits received" from the social compact. But it does not seem fair
and appropriate to burden capital transactions when they are used
simply and sensibly to move around in time uneven labor market
earnings. These are ordinary moral intuitions that theory can easily
accept, in a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. The new understanding of
tax shows us, analytically, that a consistent progressive postpaid
consumption tax implements these two norms by design, simply, and
at the same time.
All that remains, though it has been anticipated, is a normative
argument, that this is should become an ought, and the clearing up of
some final loose ends. Those are the aims of this final Part.
A. A Better, If Less Sophisticated, A rgument
Andrews's "best, most sophisticated argument" for a consumption
tax tracked Mill's earlier observation about double taxation, which in
turn had roots as far back as Hobbes.336 Andrews's was primarily a
horizontal equity argument, about preserving the pretax equality
between present and deferred consumption, between spenders and
336. See Andrews. Personal Income Tax. supra note 8; MILL, supra note 1, at 814;
HOBBES, supra note 57, at 386-87; Fried, supra noter'ii' .
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savers, Ant and Grasshopper. Mill had elegantly made the point at a
time when taxes were few and rates were low.
A century and a half after Mill, things have changed. We have a
better understanding of capital markets. More importantly, tax has
expanded greatly in scope, and high tax rates - certainly compared to
any Mill himself contemplated - are here to stay. These changes
ought to lead to a rethinking of the grounds for consumption tax.
Under progressive marginal rates, a postpaid consumption tax does
not feature yield exemption by design. Nor does such a tax operate
randomly. Capital market transactions that elevate lifestyles bear a
higher burden of tax; those that smooth or diminish lifestyles lower
the burden. This pattern of effect on the yield to capital is not a reason
to abandon postpaid consumption taxation or progressive rates. Far
from it: on the better understanding of tax, it gives a reason to support
each. It is the argument structure for a consumption tax, of the right
sort, that needs repair. A progressive postpaid consumption tax need
not preserve the pretax equality of savers and spenders, and need not
increase savings or the aggregate capital stock at all. The tax needs a
better if less sophisticated argument to justify it. Fortunately, this lies
at hand, in common sense and ordinary moral intuition.
The answer lies not far from asking the right question: the question
of the fair timing of tax. Under the new understanding of tax, the great
divide is between taxes on inflows and taxes on outflows. The income
and the prepaid consumption taxes stand together on one side of this
divide, opposed by the postpaid consumption tax. Prepaid
consumption and income taxes each make their decisions about the
fair burden of tax at the time of inflow into a household; the difference
is that an income tax includes capital market yields (as well as,
possibly, beneficent transfers337), whereas the prepaid consumption tax
includes labor market earnings alone. But as Figures 1-6 illustrated,
and common sense confirms, the pattern of inflows is, from a moral
point of view, arbitrary. Predicating progressivity on inflows means
that one's effective tax burden turns on matters of luck and whim vis
a-vis the timing of inflows. This affects choices of life plans - it
discriminates based on patterns of study, work, and leisure, having
little or nothing to do with command over material resources, ability
to pay, or benefits received. At the same time, the income tax
constrains the progressivity in the design of the tax system, the very
thing an individuated tax system ought to be facilitating. Progressive

337. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts" - The Income Tax
Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a Principled Policy
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003).
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wage taxes can only be avoided by not working, which imposes a cost
to the wider society without apparent benefit.338 There is no way out.
A consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax, in contrast,
makes its decisions about the appropriate degree of progressivity at
the right - fair - time.339 It falls on outflows, or spending. Such a tax
favors (or does not disfavor) capital smoothing transactions, but
imposes a tax - in the form of the higher effective progressive rates
- on lifestyle enhancing or capital upward shifting transactions. There
is luck in what happens in capital markets - as there is luck, too, in
labor market earnings and beneficence340 - but, importantly, this is
luck that relates to the very reasons for deciding on the appropriate
burden of taxation, luck that goes to command over material
resources, ability to pay, and benefits received. It is not the morally
insignificant luck over the timing of the receipt of material resources;
it is the morally significant luck that goes to the extent of one's total
control over such material resources.
A consistent postpaid consumption tax is source neutral in an
appealing sense; it falls equally on labor market, capital market, and
beneficent transfers, provided that they are used to elevate a
taxpayer's lifestyle. It does not matter what, exactly, supports an
individual's standard of living. All that matters is that something did.
Hence, the animating norm of the tax is solidly a vertical equity one,
looking to a consistent, meaningful, observable, and comparable
measure of interpersonal well being. Among many other practical
virtues, the tax can finesse questions of the precise source of wealth or
income - whether it was derived from labor, capital, or beneficence.
This is a significant improvement on the status quo, in both theory and
practice. Within lifetimes, much effort today goes into dressing up
labor earnings in capital clothing, such as through the use of stock
options. A consistent postpaid consumption tax does not mark the
distinction. Across lifetimes, wealth can be transferred either by
financial and physical capital, or by human capital - the children of
the wealthy tend to get better (more expensive) educations, better

338. I have speculated elsewhere that a society that wished to reduce its citizens'
working hours might indeed welcome such an incentive. See McCaffery, Being the Best,
supra note 15, at 623. But this does not strike me as a compelling reading of contemporary
American norms.
339. As I have put the matter in a different context: "Our current tax system taxes
people when they work, when they save, when they marry, when they give, and when they
die. These are wrong choices, all. We should tax people when and only when they spend."
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Reform to Die For, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at A12.
340. See RAWLS, supra note 52, at 7, 326 ("natural lottery" distributes talents and
abilities, while society's "basic structure" determines income, social standing and the like).
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networks, more job connections, and so forth.341 The current regime,
imposing a porous income-plus-estate tax, scarcely hits at
intergenerational transfers of financial capital, although it does
capture human capital ones, by wage taxation at the child's level. The
postpaid consumption tax once again does not mark the distinctions.
Financially privileged lives are taxed, on account of the privilege,
however financed.342 The practical virtues coincide with a moral,
theoretical appeal.
At the same time, a consistent progressive postpaid consumption
tax implements the other norm of capital, the ordinary-savings one.
Capital transactions that smooth lifestyles, within or between
generations, lower the aggregate burden of taxation.
For the most part, taxpayers do smooth. But a consistent,
progressive postpaid consumption tax as I have described it (that is,
without a mechanism such as Vickrey's cumulative lifetime averaging
to modify or define it)343 determines its level of progressivity on the
basis of taxpayer's actual consumption patterns, whether taxpayers
have smoothed or not. Just as such a tax system allows taxpayers to
lower the burden of taxation by smoothing, it penalizes them, at the
margin, for not smoothing. What is morally compelling about one's
spending level, in general, and, in particular, about average annual
labor market earnings in constant dollar terms? A consistent,
progressive postpaid consumption tax makes its decisions of the
appropriate level of taxation on the basis of the former, and allows
capital transactions that effectuate the smoothing to the latter to lower
the burden of taxes. Why?
First, spending, as already suggested, reflects a fair and objectively
observable measure of a taxpayer's standard of living, command over
material resources, ability to pay, and benefits received. Spending
turns on importantly voluntary, autonomous decisions, as Adam Smith
suggested, rather than the impersonal, external factors that affect the
timing of inflows.344
Second, and related, capital transactions that smooth uneven labor
market earnings do not reflect greater ability to pay, benefits received,
or command over resources. They are simply the means by which one
341. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission , 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988) (explaining that wealth transmission has changed
from land to human capital in the 20th century).
342. In this regard, a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax operates as a
better, more practical "privilege tax" than the specifically designated tax discussed by
ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 103.
343. See Vickrey, supra note 188.
344. SMITH, supra note 54, at 777-78, quoted in note 57, supra. I have discussed the
voluntariness of spending in McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, supra note 43;
McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202; Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play
Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71.
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finances her lifestyle through time, dealing with the particular patterns
of human and financial capital realizations. Using a smoothed
consumption line as an analytic baseline allows us to see two effects of
a consistently progressive postpaid consumption tax in its interaction
with capital market transactions. First, taxpayers who fail to perfectly
smooth consumption can pay a price for their uneven spending profile;
this was the "paternalistic push" of the system, noted above345 (though,
again, it can be eliminated through cumulative averaging within the
postpaid consumption tax system) . But, second, and much more
important, taxpayers who can do better, in material terms, than their
average annual labor market earnings will see the value that enables
them to do so - whether from capital market or beneficent
transactions - taxed at a higher rate. If the combined present value of
one's lifetime annual consumption exceeds that of one's aggregate
lifetime earnings, something has happened to allow the taxpayer to
elevate herself in material consumption terms. The smoothed
consumption line accepts the best lights reading of Mill's argument
against "double" taxation, and Andrews's case for preservation of the
pretax equality of savers and spenders, while at the very same time
conceding the most powerful criticism of these positions made by
Warren and others, namely that those who receive a return to capital
are better off, in terms of their command over material resources, than
those who do not. If capital has made one richer, viewed in a wide lens
of time, the yield-to-capital norm (and vertical equity generally)
demands that we tax the yield; if capital transactions have merely
moved resources around in time, the ordinary-savings norm (and
horizontal equity generally) demands that we not burden its yield. The
smoothed consumption line, as a baseline for choosing the level of
progressivity imposed, is a principle imperfectly reflected in our
present practices, most importantly in regard to retirement savings.
The bottom line, normatively, is what strikes us all as fair.346 A
prepaid consumption tax - like the current "income" tax - makes its
judgments on the appropriate level to tax on the basis of labor
earnings alone. It would ignore all the sources of enhanced lifestyle
from capital markets or beneficent transfers and penalize those with
temporally uneven labor market earnings. A progressive postpaid
consumption tax makes its decisions about the appropriate level of
taxation on the basis of outflows. This means that capital transactions
that smooth out uneven labor market earnings will lower the burden
of taxation; both capital market and beneficent transactions that
finance greater lifestyles than one's own earnings would allow raise
the burden.
345. See supra Part IV.E.
346. See McCaffery, Being the Best, supra note 15; see also Warren, supra note 13, at
946.
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The best, most sophisticated argument for a consumption tax of
the right sort - a progressive postpaid consumption tax - is that this
tax. makes its judgments about the appropriate level of taxation at the
right time, allowing for a fairer, more enduring degree of progression
in tax burdens in both theory and in practice, and differentiating
between savings and investment activities that simply move around
labor earnings in time and those that facilitate greater levels of
consumption, alone among major comprehensive tax options. This is
not as neat and elegant an argument as Andrews's "most
sophisticated" one. It does not pivot on any simple, handy tum of
phrase. But it is a better argument. It connects the fairness of the tax
base question - income versus consumption, of both forms - to the
issue of progressivity by means of the fair timing of tax. It thus not
only reconciles the two appealing norms about the taxation of savings
- the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms - but it also allows
for a better, fairer, more meaningful and enduring progressivity in tax
burdens. This is true both internal to the tax system or base in
question, and external to them. Internally, a consistent, progressive
postpaid consumption tax tethers its decisions on the appropriate level
of taxation to the objective, observable, meaningful variable of
personal spending. Externally - as a matter of tax system design - a
postpaid consumption tax importantly allows for more progressivity in
tax burdens.347

347. I have simply posited this point throughout. It follows from my intuition that
deterring high-end spending is more reasonable than deterring high-wage labor earnings. To
some extent, this is simply a moral argument. See McCaffery, The Right to Waste?, supra
note 24, McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 165. For the empirical consequences, under a
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax, we need to rethink the analysis of optimal
taxation. It is not optimal income tax that we should model, but optimal postpaid
consumption taxes. Of course, for most Americans, Jiving from paycheck to paycheck, the
two converge because income equals consumption for those who do not save. And in all
cases, the social-welfare maximizer will still be concerned with the elasticity of labor, a
productive input. But under a consistent postpaid consumption tax, the nature of this input
ought to change. High marginal tax rates on high-end consumption need not deter labor
efforts, as opposed to spending decisions. Such taxes will deter those who earn only to spend
on themselves - such people will rationally backward induce, and stop working today but they need not deter those building up wealth for other reasons, including
intergenerational altruism (yet another reason not to engraft a wealth transfer tax onto a
consistent postpaid consumption tax model, or to choose Vickrey's cumulative lifetime
income averaging over a cumulative lifetime consumption averaging or the simpler general
tax outlined here). To the extent the behavioral response to progressive spending taxes is to
save, this can be a public good. The questions are technical, empirical ones, beyond the
scope of the present effort. But they hold out an intriguing possibility - the very spirit
behind the project of ascertaining the fair timing of tax. If we get the form of tax right - its
timing and its base - we can, at Jong last, get its redistributive functions down right. The
embarrassments of today point us to hope for a better tomorrow. I thank Kirk Stark for
pressing these thoughts on me.
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B.

Transitions, Implementation, and Objections

This Article has mainly been concerned to advance the new
understanding of tax. I have addressed many of the practical issues of
transitions to and implementation of a progressive postpaid
consumption tax elsewhere, as well as noted the most frequent
objections to the practical proposal.348 This section simply quickly
canvasses some important themes, in the interest of at least noting
them.
1.

Implementation

As Andrews set out perfectly well in his 1974 and subsequent
articles, a postpaid consumption tax is not difficult to implement. In
particular, a consistent postpaid consumption tax does not entail
adding up all the particular items of consumption. Rather it rests on
the simple elegance of the Haig-Simons definition of Income,
Equation [1] above. If Income equals Consumption plus Savings (/ C
+ S), then Consumption equals Income minus Savings ( C
I - S). All
that is needed to implement a consistent progressive postpaid
consumption tax is to systematically subtract savings from "income,''
measured just as we do today. This means, of course, adding in
dissavings - including debt, to which we tum in a moment.
There are hard cases, of course, of defining "consumption,'' but
most of these already exist under the income tax (which after all
includes consumption in its base, as well, as the Haig-Simons
definition shows). The simplest way to get from the current system to
a consistent postpaid consumption tax model is to repeal all limits on
traditional IRA plans, and include debt as taxable "income." Then
one could repeal preferential rates for capital gains and all rules for
the "basis" of investment assets.
=

=

2.

The Role of Other Taxes

One considerable practical advantage of a consistent, progressive
postpaid consumption tax is that it at least lessens the need for both
gift and estate and corporate income taxes. These taxes have been
perhaps best justified as being important "backstops" to the actual
income tax's flawed instantiation of the income ideal. Both taxes
reflect a desire to get at some capital; the gift and estate tax might also
reflect a norm to tax at least extraordinary, large amounts of
beneficence. Under the traditional view of tax, the gift and estate tax
in particular is often thought to be important in any movement
towards a consumption ideal. This is either because a consumption tax
348. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 117-60.

928

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:807

enables second and later generations to live off the fruits of a prior
generation's capital, altogether untaxed, or because a consumption tax
facilitates the building up of large stocks of private capital, as Andrews
maintained.
Under the new understanding of tax, things change. A consistent,
progressive postpaid consumption tax does fall on the yield to capital,
under the right circumstances, and at a compelling time. Such a tax is
also individuated, meeting Vickrey's test. Second and later
generations are taxed at the moment of expenditures, and the tax
burden on the family will have increased if these descendants are in
fact consuming at a higher level than their ancestors. Arguably, this
incentive to redistribute wealth within extended families is a welfare
improving one.349 In any event - and this is important - a consistent
postpaid consumption tax would impose a far greater, far more
systematic and principled burden on inherited wealth than what
obtains today, under the flawed income-plus-estate tax regime. As
things now stand, under the effective prepaid consumption tax model,
both present and future generations living off the yield to capital need
pay no tax. Relatedly, I shall consider below the theoretical issues
involved with large stocks of private capital, which a postpaid
consumption tax might be thought to make more likely and
prevalent.350 But it is again worth pointing out, however, both that
such large stores of capital can and do easily arise today, under the
essentially "voluntary" tax on capital imposed by the income tax, and
that stocks of private capital might well decrease under a conversion
to a consistent postpaid consumption tax, because under it - unlike
the status quo - consumption financed by capital will bear a positive
burden of tax.
A compelling case can be made, then, to replace the current
income, corporate income, and gift and estate taxes with a consistent
postpaid progressive consumption tax - and all to get at the yield to
capital in a better, fairer, more individuated and progressive way. Such
a tax consistently taxes people, including heirs, when they spend, not
when they work or save. Aside from consistency, this principle
comports with ordinary moral intuitions about fairness in tax. Still,
justice might be thought to require some additional tax on inherited
wealth, as a freestanding matter,351 either at the level of the transferor
or in the hands of the transferee. It is worth noting, as a practical
matter, that the latter might be effected by allowing earned-income

349. See Kaplow, supra note 172; see also McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 165, at
319 (citing Joseph E. Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of
Balanced Growth Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. S137, S146-49 (1978)).
350. Andrews thought so. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 1 18-19.
351. Cf RAWLS, supra note 52.
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allowances under the postpaid consumption tax, in effect isolating out
those who live solely off of financial capital for higher tax burdens.352
This adds complexity to the simpler proposal for a consistent,
progressive postpaid consumption tax, and is perhaps inconsistent with
its best spirit, but it can be done. Similarly, untethered from the idea
that an estate tax is somehow needed to "save" the income tax, with
its realization requirement and all, a wealth or wealth transfer tax,
with broader bases and a much reduced rate structure, can isolate out
some of the perceived harms of transferred wealth without the steep
distortions of the status quo.
Still, much of the normative attraction of the new understanding of
tax rests on its more compelling instantiation of a source-neutrality
norm. Persons with high salaries are benefited in many ways, by the
natural lottery of their talents, education, connections, luck, and so on.
A consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax does not
differentiate between and among sources of good fortune - own or
other's labor market earnings, own or other's capital market yields.
All that matters is how one lives in material terms. That is a fairly
simple and compelling norm to implement.
3.

The New Achilles Heel

To Andrews, and within the traditional view of tax, the realization
requirement of Macomber was the Achilles heel of the income tax.
And so it is, from the perspective of an ideal income tax. The
realization requirement is the first and most important step in
converting the so-called income tax into a wage tax. But from the
vantage point of a consistent, postpaid consumption tax, the
realization requirement gets it right: there is no need to tax until and
unless savings or investments are cashed out and consumed on private
preclusive use.
Under the new understanding of tax, however, a new Achilles heel
arises: the tax treatment of debt.353 It is the "borrow" part of Tax
Planning 101 's buy/borrow/die that is problematic. This is the step that
allows consumption to escape tax-free.
The point is especially important because it is so poorly
understood. Thus the USA Tax, the practical variant of a postpaid
consumption tax that received serious legislative consideration in the
mid 1990s, tragically neglected to include debt in its base.354
352. Cf Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra
note 165.
353. Compare Calvin Johnson, What's a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879 (1995)
(arguing that the prevalence of tax shelters arises out of the treatment of debt), with Hime,
supra note 185 (analyzing the problem with current tax law treatment of debt).
354. See SEIDMAN, supra note 88; McCaffery, Tyranny, supra note 192.
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Theoretically, the treatment of debt is essential to the fair timing of
tax and to providing symmetry to the taxation of capital market
transactions by allowing forward as well as backward smoothing, in
the manner of Figure 2. Practically, any postpaid consumption tax that
does not include debt in its base is doomed to failure, on account of
the ease of the arbitrage to avoid it.
Hence it is imperative that any real-world postpaid consumption
tax tackle the issue of debt. This is the single biggest practical
challenge facing the tax. Other perceived obstacles, such as the
problem of "pre-enactment basis," consumer durables, housing, and so
on tend to be overstated.355 The proper treatment of debt is essential
to getting tax right.
4.

Capital as Power

This section picks up an important and long-bracketed issue. The
capital norms central to the new understanding of tax are norms about
cash flow - they are about how to account for and tax the yield to
capital as it comes into and out of a household or a taxpayer's control.
But capital has another dimension as well: its mere presence and the
power and pleasure that this presence brings.356 What should the tax
system do about the stock of wealth? It was this concern that led
Andrews to recommend adding on a gift and estate tax to a consistent
postpaid consumption tax, out of worries that private accumulation
would grow unbearably great under a consistent consumption tax.357
There are compelling reasons, of both a nonideal and an ideal
nature, why this concern against a consistent progressive postpaid
consumption tax is misplaced, and that in fact such a tax can
adequately meet all of society's reasonable concerns over the private
capital stock.358 But it is also important to see that these are, indeed,

355. Preenactment basis is "[t]he basis in an asset held prior to the start of a new tax
system." MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 164. For discussion of the
preenactment basis of assets in the move from the current "income" tax to a consumption
tax. see Louis Kaplow. Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis under a Consumption Tax: The
USA Tax System, 68 TAX NOTES 1 109 (1995).
356. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 1 14 ("It should be obvious that wealth is
an independent source of welfare, quite apart from the fact that some of it may be consumed
later.") I have long argued against the relevance of this fact to tax policy. See McCaffery,
Uneasy Case, supra note 165; McCaffery, Political Liberal Case, supra note 1 97. More
recently, Weisbach & Bankman, supra note 7, have made similar criticisms.
357. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1169-70.
358. I first pressed these arguments in 1994. See McCaffery, Political Liberal Case, supra
note 197; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 165. I attempted to revise them again in 1996.
See McCaffery, Being the Best, supra note 15. I now realize that this argument should not
derail the case against comprehensive tax reform; a separate argument can be had out over
wealth taxes, which can as easily accompany a so-called income as a postpaid (or, for that
matter, prepaid) consumption tax.
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logically distinct arguments. A tax on, or regulation of, private stocks
of capital, at some quanta or in some cases, can accompany any
comprehensive tax plan - income, or prepaid or postpaid
consumption. This is an argument worth having out, but it need not
derail the larger debate over comprehensive tax system design.359
The practical arguments begin with the fact that the present
income tax is not working well, at all, to monitor the situation of
private stocks of wealth. The new understanding of tax gives a precise
reason to understand why this is so: the current system is largely a
prepaid consumption or wage tax that makes little serious attempt to
fall on capital or its yield. It is therefore a mistake to consider that
private stocks of capital will necessarily increase under any conversion
to a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax. Such a tax will
have two large and important base-broadening features. First, there
will no longer be any need for special capital gains rates, or lower rates
on corporate dividends and the like. Wealth that is consumed will all
be taxed under a uniform rate schedule, just as now obtains, for
example, for withdrawals from traditional IRAs and 401(k) plans.
Second, consumption that is financed by debt backed by capital will
now bear a tax. I have no ready way of quantifying the magnitude of
this effect, but I suspect it to be large.360 Finally, the rate structure can
also increase in its slope under a consistent postpaid consumption tax.
One of the animating goals of getting the fair timing of tax down right
is to increase the level of progressivity in the tax system, reversing a
seemingly irreversible trend under the status quo, witnessed over a
half century of tax policy changes. Spending can be taxed in a more
steeply sloped fashion than can wages.
These practical advantages of a postpaid consumption tax over the
status quo add to the practical difficulties with any separate wealth
tax, one that would apply to stocks of capital alone. Such taxes
encourage consumption, of course, which seems inconsistent with the
spirit of a consumption tax, but the new understanding of tax helps to
show that things are not so simple. A consistent, progressive postpaid
consumption tax is a tax on capital in important cases, after all. But
taxes on static sources of wealth are problematic, difficult, and costly.
Postpaid taxes on cash flows are far simpler to implement.
None of these practical, nonideal concerns would carry much
weight, however, if theory suggested a large and persistent problem
with private stocks of capital. As I have suggested, this is not a concern
that ought either to favor the status quo, or to prevent a conversion to
a more principled and progressive postpaid consumption tax. Further,

103.

359. Rakowski, supra note 15; Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 77; Shaviro, supra note
360. I thank Bill Gale for related discussions.
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even in the domain of theory, there are reasons to believe that the
concern over capital as power is mistaken. A consistent, postpaid
consumption tax already chills the use of "private" capital to fund
private preclusive use at any point in the future, through its tax rate
mechanism: the future tax operates as a present lien against potential
consumption. Tax rates can - and I believe should - increase under
the more principled tax system design. The further use of private
capital to achieve private benefit can be affected far more by the
regulation of private capital than by its taxation. A consistent postpaid
consumption tax provides a mechanism to regulate wealth. As I have
written elsewhere, a postpaid consumption tax importantly redefines
property rights: it changes what it means for wealth to be one's own.361
Society has a stake in the private savings accounts, and is justified in
regulating them, just as it does now with IRAs and pension plans.
Simply forbidding monies in tax-favored accounts from being used to
finance personal political pursuits, for example, would go a long way
- farther than the current tax system and farther than the current
regulation of campaign financing - toward curtailing the power of
private capital to influence politics.
In short, the problems of private capital as private power, far from
posing objections to a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption
tax, seem to offer a powerful set of reasons for such a tax.
5.

Transitions

Finally, it is often thought or written that transition concerns loom
large in adopting any form of a consistent consumption tax. While any
large-scale tax reform does indeed pose difficult problems of
implementation and transition, the new understanding of tax helps to
show that there are ways in which this usual and customary objection
is overstated, or at least misstated. Practically, all that need be done is
to repeal the limits on traditional IRAs and include debt as income.
Taxing debt poses challenges, to be sure, but the rest does not; the
move to a consistent postpaid consumption tax is mainly a simplifying
one. Still, scholars fret that moving from a system that directly taxes
capital - in theory - to one that does not will create problems. The
concern is usually put in the terms of the traditional view of tax, that
is, as if we were moving from an income ideal to a consumption one.
In such a case, it appears as if "old" capital would suffer a fatal blow,
whereas "new" capital would be blessed.362

361. See McCaffery, The Right to Waste?, supra note 24.
362. This leads to the problem of preenactment basis, a concern which I feel is
overstated. See Kaplow, supra note 355.
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But in fact, as the new understanding of tax shows, we do not have
an income ideal. A good deal of capital has not yet been taxed under
the existing hybrid. Further, as noted above and below, it is wrong to
simply assume that any conversion to a consistent consumption tax
would mean an increase in rates. A move to a consistent postpaid
consumption tax would entail two major base-broadening features: the
elimination of preferential rates for capital gains and other sources of
capital income, such as dividends, and the inclusion of debt-financed
consumption. These would be balanced against the more systematic
deduction for savings, bearing in mind that much savings already
escape tax.
On another hand, the new understanding of tax points to a new set
of transition issues. Whereas moving from an income tax ideal to a
prepaid consumption model is simple enough - one gets there by
repealing all second taxes on capital, as current policy seems bent on
doing - and the transition from an income ideal to a postpaid
consumption one has at least been well-studied, the new
understanding argues for the replacement of a prepaid with a postpaid
consumption tax model. While actual law has allowed conversions of
IRAs in the other direction - from traditional to "Roth" style363 the converse can be tricky. The attendant problems warrant study.
C.

Common Errors About Income and Consumption Taxes

We have come a long way, using many words, covering the
intellectual history of tax, the status quo, tax theory and practice in the
income and other taxes, and more. Now it is time to be brief, to list
some lessons and final thoughts. Before concluding, this section simply
lists and comments on some common mistakes in the popular
understanding of tax systems based on the traditional understanding
of tax that have been impeding better, more fruitful discussion about
tax reform. The new understanding of tax helps to set things straight.
1.

We Have a n Income Tax

As the growing cognitive psychological literature shows us
abundantly well, labels matter.364 The major comprehensive tax system
in America is officially termed the "income" tax, and virtually all
political discourse about it takes it as such. Yet the tax system we have
is far closer to a consumption tax because of its many omissions of
taxing capital and its yield. More specifically, under the new

363. I.RC. § 408A(d)(3)(C) (2004).
364. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Thinking
about Tax, in Proceedings of the 96th Annual Conference on Taxation, 2002, 443 (2003).
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understanding of tax, we are moving ever closer to a prepaid
consumption or wage tax. Second taxes have become voluntary.
2.

The Principal Choice in Comprehensive Tax Policy Is Between an
Income and a Consumption Tax

A central goal of the new understanding of tax has been to show
that the classic income-versus-consumption debate is moot. We do not
have, have never had, and will never have an income tax. The real
choice is and ought to be over what form of consumption tax to have.
Here the stakes are large and dramatic.
3.

Consumption Taxes A re Flat Taxes

This is a confusion present in certain popular political discourses,
one that conservative politicians have used to their advantage.
Further, it relates back to Mill and an important theme in the tax
policy literature. If the reason for supporting a consumption tax is to
preserve the pretax equality between savers and spenders - to effect
yield exemption - then there is indeed something compelling about a
flat-rate structure. That is why a large element of the new
understanding of tax lies in establishing the idea that this horizontal
equity argument is not the right reason for a consumption tax.
4.

A ll Consumption Taxes A re Created Equal

All flat consumption taxes are indeed largely equal, except for the
important points about infra-marginal returns to capital. But
progressive consumption taxes vary greatly. A prepaid consumption or
wage tax, even at progressive rates, features yield-exemption, by
design; a postpaid consumption tax most decisively does not.
5.

Consumption Taxes Do Not Reach the Yield to Capital

The dominant analytic point of the new understanding of tax is
that, under progressive rates, a postpaid consumption tax reaches the
yield to capital when such yield is the source of enhanced lifestyles,
but not otherwise.
6.

The Best A rgument for a Consumption Tax Is One of Horizontal
Equity

Here is where we can blame Mill, again, and take objection to
Andrews's "most sophisticated" argument. Indeed and ironically, a
very good reason for consumption taxes, of the right sort, is that they
fall on the yield to capital under just the circumstances in which

March 2005)

A New Understanding of Tax

935

ordinary moral intuitions suggest that this is the right thing to do. But
there are other good reasons for a consumption tax, of the right sort,
most importantly including that a consistent postpaid consumption tax
opens the door to deeper, more-lasting progressivity in the allocation
of tax burdens.
7.

The Case for Consumption Taxation Is One About the Importance
of Capital, on the Individual or Aggregate Level

Here is where we perhaps can blame Hobbes, and his
"foundational" argument for consumption taxation based on the
common pool of capital.365 Depending on the rate structure, there can
be more, less, or the same amount of capital under a consumption as
under an income tax. Indeed, in part because a consistent postpaid
consumption tax facilitates more progressivity - a steeper slope in the
rate structure - than we now have, it is possible that tax rates could
decrease on the lower income classes while increasing on the upper
ones. In such a case we might get less savings among the poor and
more savings among the rich, which can be a compelling normative
endpoint, especially given a basically just society that provides basic
needs and goods to all its citizens.366
8.

Rates Would Have to Increase Under a Transition to a
Consumption Tax

The standard income-versus-consumption debate assumes that
rates would have to increase under any conversion to a consumption
tax, at constant revenue needs, because the consumption tax fails to
reach an element of the income tax's base, namely savings. In fact, we
do not have an income tax. In moving from the status quo - the
flawed income-with-realization tax - to a consistent, postpaid
consumption tax, there would be two large base broadening features.
First, we could repeal the special rate preferences for capital gains and
corporate dividends.367 Second, we would have a mechanism for
picking up debt, and thus would add debt-financed consumption to the
base. These two provisions could well offset the greater allowance of
deductions for savings, especially as so little savings is taxed today.

365. Hobbes, supra note 57; Fried, supra note 7, at 962 (calling Hobbes's argument
foundational}.
366. See RAWLS, supra note 52, at 90-95, 277.

367. Because a consistent postpaid consumption tax eliminates the need for the concept
of "basis," the base would also broaden by including gain now lost to the over-stated basis
problem. See Dodge & Soled, supra note 220.
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The Gift and Estate and Corporate Income Taxes Are Important
Backstops to the Individual Income Tax

The traditional view of tax sets an income tax against all forms of
consumption taxes. Most tax policy scholars and makers through the
years have favored the former, for they ascribe to the yield-to-capital
norm. But the status quo individual income tax disappoints, for it fails
to get at the yield to capital in many, and many of the most important,
cases. Thus, the gift and estate and corporate income taxes are desired
as "backstops" to the income tax, as some way of getting at the yield
to capital. But in practice these taxes are porous in their application,
and unfair in their incidence. Under the new understanding of tax, we
can see that a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax does
get at the yield to capital, in the right cases, in a principled and
individuated manner. Thus, under it, and putting aside the analytically
separable question of the problems of capital-as-power, these two
additional taxes are not needed.
10. Adopting a Consumption Tax Would Be a Radical Change

If one believes that the great fault line in tax policy is between an
income and a consumption tax, and that we have the former, then a
change to a consumption tax seems radical. But it is not. We do not
have an income tax, and the only real question is what kind of
consumption tax to have. Adopting a consistent, postpaid
consumption tax would entail only two major steps: (1) institute an
unlimited deduction for savings, along the lines of traditional IRA
plans; and (2) include debt as a taxable input. At the same time, we
could repeal: (1) all preferences for capital gains, corporate dividends,
and the like; (2) all rules relating to "basis" (as assets would have no
basis, not having been taxed); (3) the corporate income tax; and (4)
the gift and estate tax. While there are important transitional
concerns, such as those over "pre-enactment basis," these tend to be
overstated.
D.

Tax Matters

Why does the new understanding of tax matter? Because tax
matters. Tax represents the last battle line for any meaningful
redistribution of material resources from the better able to the least
well off.368 The traditional view of tax gives us an impoverished choice
368. Or perhaps it does. There is also some hope for effecting redistribution through
expenditure programs. See Bird & Zolt, supra 5 1 ; see also Baron & McCaffery, Masking
Redistribution, supra note 21 (experimental results showing that ordinary subjects fail to
compensate in tax system for decline in redistribution attendant on "privatization" of
formerly publicly provided goods and sources).
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set, between a wildly unpopular income-plus-estate-plus-corporate
income tax regime that is scarcely doing any real work in the cause of
liberal egalitarian justice, and a flat consumption tax of some sort or
another that cannot possibly do any such work. The new
understanding of tax is essential to getting us out of this morass.
The traditional view of tax pits income against consumption taxes,
with income taxes, alone, on the side of liberal egalitarian justice and
fairness in tax. Under its dim lights, liberals continue to cling to and
argue for a porous income plus corporate income plus gift and estate
tax regime, all unpopular and ineffective choices. Meanwhile,
conservative forces opposed to redistribution have begun to see the
light of the new understanding. They are arguing, not just for a
consumption tax, but for a particular form of consumption tax: a
prepaid one. To them, victory seems close at hand. With President
Bush's reelection, prepaid consumption proponents have been
speaking openly of their mounting piecemeal victories and the ever
closer horizon of their promised land. The highly influential Grover
Norquist, for example, notes of the four tax cuts in Bush's first term
that "[p]eople looked at those and thought they were just catch as
catch can. But every one of those tax cuts moved us toward a single
rate tax system that taxes income just one time."369 Stephen Moore,
president of the powerful Club for Growth, foresees not "a big
grandiose plan, but rather incremental steps." Moore regards the flat
tax as the "Garden of Eden . . . [that requires] that every change we
make with tax policy is moving us in that direction."370 The new
understanding of tax would have helped to predict the ultimate effects
of this gradual shift.371 Now that we stand on the brink of getting a flat
wage tax, ordinary people are beginning to size up, comprehensively,
where we are.372
What they see is not bright. These are dark times for the great
progressive spirit in America. We have, perhaps wisely, rooted out
many vestiges of inefficient and haphazard redistribution from our
general socio-economic laws and regulations, persuaded in part by a
welfarist economic argument that. such redistribution is best left to the

369. Warren Vieth, U.S. Tax Code May Be Facing a Full Rewrite, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2004, at A27. I have been making this point for a while.
370. Id.
371. See Edward J. McCaffery, Ten Facts About Fundamental Tax Reform, 101 TAX
NOTES 1463 (2003).
372. See, e.g., Primer: Consumption Tax, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at F3 (the
Washington Post's basic explanation of the consumption tax). Tax scholars too are
concerned. See, e.g. , Martin M. McMahon, Jr., The M�tthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45
B.C. L. REV. 993, 998-1012 (2004) (presenting data showing that the extremely rich are
getting richer); William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy
in the Bush Administration, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 157, 1-220 -31 (2004).
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tax system.373 But when we look at that tax system, whose very design
once served as a shining light of progressive liberalism, we see a steady
retreat towards something very different from where we started. More
darkly still, we seem ill-served by our intellectual armament to halt the
retreat. Most people pay little or no attention to the frightening details
of tax, deterred and dismayed by its dizzying complexity. Those who
do know, and care, are trapped in the traditional income-versus
consumption debate. Progressives fight to maintain whatever vestiges
of an income tax we have, and defend its adjutants, the corporate and
gift and estate taxes, as the last best hope for justice in tax and, by
extension, in society at large. Yet these very choices are giving comfort
to the enemies of redistribution, for the income, corporate, and gift
and estate taxes are wildly unpopular - and, ironically, wildly
ineffective to boot. The tax system is drifting, seemingly inexorably,
towards a flat wage tax. All hope for effecting redistribution from rich
to poor may soon be lost. Amidst the darkness, dramatic change seems
beyond the pale; the very tinkering that has gotten us into the state of
tax we are in seems to be the only procedure for going forward.
"People treat a plan as realistic when it approximates what already
exists and as utopian when it departs from current arrangements. Only
proposals that are hardly worth fighting for - reformist tinkering seem practicable."374
But perhaps it is darkest before the dawn. By rethinking first
principles in the analytics of tax, we can come to a new understanding.
An income tax is not needed to advance the progressive cause, and in
fact its very structure impedes it. Yet all consumption taxes are not
created equal. While a prepaid consumption or wage tax does indeed
let capital off the sodal hook altogether, a consistently progressive,
postpaid consumption tax gets matters just right, by design. It
comports with compelling ordinary moral intuitions about the taxation
of capital and its yield, allowing people to lower the burden of taxation
by ordinary-savings, but falling on the yield to capital when it
facilitates a better, richer lifestyle. Such a tax, alone among feasible
alternatives, allows for a structure in which a deep and meaningful
progressivity in the allocation of tax burdens can flourish. It is not
where we are headed now, but it could yet be where we end up - if
we get our understanding of tax down right.

373. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 21.
374. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 12 (1987).

